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Abstract 
 
THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF WILLIAM WOLLASTON 
 
by 
 
Yael Sofaer 
 
 
 
 
Adviser: Professor Stefan Bernard Baumrin 
 
This dissertation provides the first thorough exposition of the moral theory proposed by William 
Wollaston in his treatise The Religion of Nature Delineated (1724), and demonstrates it to be an 
innovative contribution to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries  project of developing a moral 
theory by reason alone (in which lie the origins of contemporary moral realism); with the 
foundational principle of acting in accordance with nature as the standard of morality.  
Wollaston s treatise contains an unrecognized innovation: the principle that rational agents express 
propositions by their actions that, as propositions, have truth values which makes it possible to 
determine the moral status of such actions by evaluating these truth values.  The principle that 
actions express propositions to the same extent that verbal statements express propositions bridges 
the gap between ideas in the mind and the facts of the world (i.e., nature).  It defines the deliberate 
actions of moral agents as natural events which can thus be evaluated in the same way that all 
natural objects and events are evaluated.  Actions of moral agents can then be evaluated as to 
whether they are consistent or inconsistent with all other parts of nature.  The correspondence 
between the truthfulness or falsehood of the propositions that moral agents express by their 
v 
 
deliberate actions, and the empirical facts of the world, provides a focused method of evaluating 
the moral status of such actions in accordance with the empirical standard of moral realism.  Also, 
in Wollaston s system, as it is the nature of human beings to seek happiness, and as acting in 
accordance with nature is the means of attaining happiness, the production or destruction of 
happiness determines the degree of the moral rightness or wrongness of actions.  The dissertation 
also demonstrates that the prevalent criticisms of The Religion of Nature Delineated which have 
caused it to be largely disregarded do not engage the theory and are often directed at straw men.  
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CHAPTER I.  INTRODUCTION   
The Rev. William Wollaston (1659-1724) was one of the most famous and highly 
esteemed writers of his time, and yet in the century following his death, his 
reputation fell into sharp decline until he became an object of disrespect in the 
writings of Hume, Price, Bentham, and others.  A fair-minded contemporary 
reader, I think, will find that Wollaston did have something important and original 
to say, however confused his manner of saying it, so that is one reason for 
reexamining his major work, The Religion of Nature Delineated (1722)—Joel 
Feinberg.
1
    
 
William Wollaston, author of The Religion of Nature Delineated (1724) (hereinafter 
referred to as RND), was a popular and highly regarded moral philosopher in the eighteenth 
century, yet in the nineteenth century he fell into disrepute.  He was no longer read and his moral 
theory was ridiculed and dismissed.  This view has persisted to the present.   
In this dissertation I will provide the first thorough exposition of Wollaston’s moral theory 
and demonstrate it to be an innovative contribution to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries’ 
project of developing a moral theory by reason alone (in which lie the origins of contemporary 
moral realism); with the foundational principle of acting in accordance with nature as the standard 
of morality.  Also, that it contains a largely unrecognized innovation: the principle that rational 
agents express propositions by their actions—that, as propositions, have truth values—which 
makes it possible to determine the moral status of such actions by evaluating these truth values.  I 
will also demonstrate that the prevailing dismissal of this theory is based on arguments which fail 
to engage it and instead attack straw men.   
Wollaston’s moral theory is usually classified as rationalist, but not clearly described.  It is 
                                            
1 Joel Feinberg, “Wollaston and His Critics,” The Journal of the History of Ideas 38, no. 2 (1977): 
345.   
 
 2 
most commonly, and incorrectly, described as being somehow similar to Samuel Clarke’s theory 
of fitness,
2
 with Wollaston sometimes labeled a disciple of Clarke and subject to descriptions such 
as this:   
The moral rationalists claimed, for example, that moral distinctions are based on 
transcendental principles and immutable relations that oblige all rational creatures 
and that can only be discerned by the use of reason.... An exaggerated view of the 
power of reason leads the rationalist to suppose that reason can pierce its way into 
the realm of transcendental values.
3
 
 
However, Wollaston had no such visions of transcendental normative realms nor does his theory 
resemble Clarke’s doctrine of intuitively observable fitnesses; rather, he devised a rule for deriving 
moral judgments from propositions concerning empirical experience. 
Wollaston fits into the category Stephen L. Darwall defines as Empirical naturalist 
internalism:  
An empirical naturalist tradition, comprising Hobbes, Cumberland, Hutcheson, 
Hume, and, in most moods, Locke, was driven primarily by the desire to account 
for normativity in a way consistent with an empiricist epistemology and naturalist 
metaphysics.
4
   
 
Central to Wollaston’s theory is his innovative idea that agents express propositions by 
their actions as well as their words.  This provides a means of assigning truth values to actions.  
Doing so enables judging actions morally on the basis of the foundational principle that the 
                                            
2 Hume’s description of rationalism as “affirm[ing] that virtue is nothing but a conformity to 
reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses of things, which are the same to every 
rational being that considers them,” best describes Clarke’s thesis.  David Hume, A Treatise of 
Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton, Introduction by David Fate Norton 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000): 294 (3.1.1.4).    
3 David Fate Norton, “Hume, human nature, and the foundations of morality” in The Cambridge 
Companion to Hume, edited by David Fate Norton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1993): 156.   
4 Stephen L. Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal ‘Ought’: 1640-1740 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 14.   
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standard of morality is accordance with nature; this is joined with the epistemic principle that the 
definition of truth is accordance with nature.  This foundational principle of acting in accordance 
with nature originated in Stoicism and was the prevailing standard of moral theory.
5
  The idea that 
actions express propositions provides a systematic method of evaluating whether actions are in 
accordance with nature. 
In addition, Wollaston offers a secondary justification for why acting in accordance with 
nature is right—because it is the method of attaining happiness.  As happiness is the criterion of 
Epicureanism this makes Wollaston’s theory a fusion of Stoic and Epicurean elements, which adds 
to its interest.  This fusion is accomplished in two steps.  In the first, a rule for practicing the 
Stoic principle of acting according to nature is promulgated (RND Section I).  In the second, it is 
established that seeking happiness is in accordance with human nature (RND Section II).  As 
human nature is part of nature, this is encompassed within the Stoic principle of acting in 
accordance with nature.  The Epicurean principle is made subordinate to the Stoic principle as 
Wollaston warns that acting in accordance with nature does not mean acting in accordance with the 
brutish part of human nature. 
In the rationalist project, the Stoic principle of following nature was joined with the project 
of science, leading to the attempt to derive universal moral laws from nature in the same manner 
that scientists, especially Newton, derived universal physical laws from nature.  The rationalist 
project was proposed by John Locke, who believed morality could be scientifically demonstrated.   
I am bold to think, that morality is capable of demonstration, as well as 
                                            
5 “[Wollaston’s] theory is...the prevailing deist-stoic theory of ‘living according to nature,’ and is 
in fact what Wollaston intended it to be, an interpretation and partial clarification of that ancient 
theory.  Wollaston holds with the Stoics that actions are wrong because they are ‘contrary to 
nature.’”  Feinberg, 347.   
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mathematics; since the precise real essence of the things moral words stand for may 
be perfectly known; and so the congruity or incongruity of the things themselves, 
be certainly discovered, in which consists perfect knowledge.
6
   
 
A founding participant in this project was Richard Cumberland.   
Cumberland was the first man to produce a full-fledged doctrine of natural law in 
which both the general methods and the specific findings of modern natural 
science, or natural science as it developed after Galileo, were used to define man's 
moral duties.
7
 
 
Thus, Cumberland defines morality as being a subset of the laws of nature:  
The laws of nature are the only solid foundations of all morality and civil polity.
8
   
Cumberland’s innovation was to bring logic to bear on moral issues.  The principle he 
developed is that an immoral action expresses a logical contradiction because it expresses two 
opposing propositions concerning the same category of being, namely human.   
For, that rational agent most certainly contradicts himself, who prescribes one rule 
for his own private conduct, and a quite different rule for the conduct of other 
rational beings, who partake of the very same nature with himself (I.I.vi, p.17).   
 
This differs from advocating the golden rule, or the general, widespread idea of fairness.  
A person who affirms a proposition concerning conduct for himself, but denies the same 
proposition concerning someone else (or vice versa), while both are the same category of 
                                            
6 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), ed. Peter H. Nidditch 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), III.11.16.  Spelling, italics, capitalization, and punctuation have 
been modernized.  All subsequent Locke quotes in this chapter are from the Essay.   
7 Murray Forsyth, “The Place of Richard Cumberland in the History of Natural Law Doctrine,” 
Journal of the History of Philosophy 20, no. 1 (January 1982), doi: 10.1353/hph.1982.0007, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v020/20.1forsyth.html: 26.   
8 Richard Cumberland, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Laws of Nature, translated, notes, and 
appendix by John Towers (Dublin: Samuel Powell, 1750), http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ 
ECCO, document no. CW3322449132, Prolegomena, section 1:ix.  Subsequent references to this 
work are by part number, chapter number, section number, and page number.  Spelling, italics, 
capitalization, and punctuation have been modernized.  This is a translation of De Legibus 
Naturae, originally published 1672.   
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being—human, is thereby expressing a contradiction.9   
For example:  
P(1): It is wrong for a person to hit another person. 
If when A is hit by B he says: “It is wrong of you to hit me,” he is thereby affirming P(1).  If A 
then hits C and says: “It is right for me to hit you,” he is thereby denying P(1).  He both affirms 
and denies P(1) and that is a logical contradiction.   
If he claims that B and C are different, the answer is that they all belong to the same 
category, that of human being.  That is, A = H, B = H, C = H, and therefore by commutation A = 
B = C.   
Hence Cumberland’s principle of right conduct:  
 
[I]t is essentially included in the notion of a person who judges right, to determine 
that the same things in a like case may lawfully be done by others, which such a 
person truly thinks either were or may be lawfully done by himself (I.II.vii, p.149).   
 
His principle is summarized by Henry Sidgwick: 
[W]hatever action any of us judges to be right for himself, he implicitly judges to be 
right for all similar persons in similar circumstances.  Or, as we may otherwise put 
it, “if a kind of conduct that is right (or wrong) for me is not right or (wrong) for 
some one else, it must be on the ground of some difference between the two cases, 
                                            
9 This also differs from Hobbes’s definition of injustice as an absurdity, in which a person denies 
a previous agreement. “[W]hen a man has in either manner abandoned or granted away his right; 
then is he said to be obliged or bound not to hinder those to whom such right is granted or 
abandoned, from the benefit of it; and that he ought, and it is his duty, not to make void that 
voluntary act of his own; and that such hindrance is injustice and injury, as being Sine Jure; the 
right being before renounced or transferred.  So that injury or injustice in the controversies of the 
world is somewhat like to that which in the disputations of scholars is called absurdity.  For as it is 
there called an absurdity to contradict what one maintained in the beginning; so in the world, it is 
called injustice and injury voluntarily to undo that which from the beginning he had voluntarily 
done.”  Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), edited with an introduction by C.B. Macpherson 
(Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1968), Part I, Chapter 14, p. 191.  Spelling, italics, 
capitalization, and punctuation have been modernized.   
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other than the fact that I and he are different persons.”10   
 
There is a similarity between this principle and Kant’s categorical imperative.   
There is therefore only a single categorical imperative and it is this: “Act only on 
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law.”11   
 
This principle was also reasserted in the twentieth century by R. M. Hare. 
Universalizability can be explained in various equivalent ways; it comes to this, 
that if we make different moral judgments about situations which we admit to be 
identical in their universal descriptive properties, we contradict ourselves.  By 
'different', I mean 'such that, if they were made about the same situation, they would 
be inconsistent with one another'.
12
   
 
In addition to his principle of moral non-contradiction, Cumberland originated this 
definition of the standard of right action: 
All these [universal natural] laws may be comprehended under one single universal 
law...That the fullest, most vigorous endeavour of each and all rational agents, in 
promoting the common good of the whole rational system, contributes effectually 
to the good of each single part in such a system; under which whole, or system, the 
single, individual happiness of each, and all of us, is essentially contained (P.IX, 
p.xxv-xxvi).   
 
                                            
10 Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1907; 
reprint ed., introduction by John Rawls, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981): 379.   
11 Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, translated by H. J. Paton (London: 
Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 3rd ed., 1956; reprint ed., New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Incorporated, 1964): 421.  The similarity between this view and Kant’s was noted by John Rawls, 
who, however, attributed it to Samuel Clarke (who was influenced by Cumberland) and did not 
mention Cumberland.  John Rawls, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, ed. Barbara 
Herman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000): 76.  Christine M. Korsgaard does the 
same.  Christine M. Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996): 76n63.  For Kant’s familiarity with Cumberland, see Allen W. Wood, 
“Kant's History of Ethics,” Studies in the History of Ethics (June 2005), 
http://www.historyofethics.org/062005/KantsHistoryofEthics.pdf: 4-7.   
12 R. M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981): 
21.   
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Wollaston should be understood as a participant in the rationalist project of attempting to 
derive universal moral laws from nature, who continued the project of developing a system of 
ethics by demonstration, by building on Cumberland’s principle of moral non-contradiction.   
While Wollaston accepted and used Cumberland’s principle that an immoral action 
constitutes a logical contradiction, he was dissatisfied with existing moral theories because he 
regarded them all as failing to provide definite means of determining what is the right action in a 
particular situation.   
Wollaston states:   
Others acknowledge, that there is indeed moral good and evil; but they want some 
criterion, or mark, by the help of which they might know them asunder.  And 
others there are, who pretend to have found that rule, by which our actions ought to 
be squared, and may be discriminated; or that ultimate end, to which all ought to be 
referred; but what they have advanced is either false, or not sufficiently guarded, or 
not comprehensive enough, or not clear and firm, or (so far as it is just) reducible to 
my rule (I.ix).
13
   
 
Wollaston’s objections to other moral theories are either:  
1) They do not have a means of determining what is good or evil, or,  
2) They do have such means but these means are either:  
A) False  
B) Too broad  
C) Too narrow  
D) Not clear  
                                            
13 William Wollaston, The Religion of Nature Delineated, 8th ed. (London: 1759).  All quotes 
from RND will be referenced by upper case Roman numeral for section number and lower case 
Roman numeral for proposition number.  Spelling, italics, capitalization, and punctuation have 
been modernized.  All square-bracketed items within quotes are my additions unless otherwise 
stated.   
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E) Amount to RND’s rule. 
He considers the following moral theories: 
1. Honestum (I.ix). 
Criterion: The good is honestum, either as the cause or the end of actions. 
Objections: This does not provide a means of determining what is honestum and what is inhonesta 
(Objection 1). 
2. Following nature (I.ix). 
Criterion: Treating things as they are (according to their nature).  
Objection: If they mean this, it is right (and the same as RND) but that is not what they mean; if 
they mean for human beings to follow only their nature, that is, their inclinations (unlike RND 
which requires following all of nature) that is wrong because human nature includes a brutish part 
which will mislead them.  Because their definition of following nature is unclear, this standard is 
unclear (objection 2D). 
3. Right reason (I.ix). 
Criterion: Actions are to be judged according to their conformity to right reason; those which 
conform to right reason are lawful and good; those which do not are unlawful and bad. 
Objection: It is true that what is according to right reason is right and what is against right reason is 
wrong.  However, if by right reason is meant what is discovered by the correct use of reason then 
that is the same as truth and therefore covered by RND’s rule (objection 2E); however, this rule is 
not clear enough as everyone claims his reason is right (objection 2D).  In addition, it does not 
account for obtaining truth by sense information and therefore does not constitute the rule of 
treating everything as what it is, regardless of the means by which one has obtained knowledge of 
what it is (either reason or sense) (objection2C).  As Wollaston states in RND Section III “Of 
 
 9 
Reason”: 
Reason without observation wants matter to work upon: and observations 
are...no[t] to be aptly applied without the assistance of reason (III.xvi).    
 
(For the exposition of RND Section III see Chapter III.B below.)   
4. Common Sense (I.ix).   
Criterion: The “common sense of mankind” and innate principles.   
Objection: There are no innate moral beliefs; they are the result of education.  Also,  
the beliefs of human beings are not “uniform and constant” hence they are not common (objection 
2A). 
5. Pleasure (I.ix).   
Criterion: The only good is pleasure, the only evil is pain.   
Objection: Those who advocate this cannot agree on what specifics constitute pleasure nor what 
brings it about.  Also, people differ and therefore the same things cannot be pleasures to all, 
therefore it is not possible to judge particular actions by this standard.  In addition, without 
restraints this view leads to “gross voluptuousness.”  This standard is not unclear, it is false; only 
true pleasure, that is, happiness, is the ultimate good (objection 2A).  (For RND’s happiness 
standard see Chapter III.C below.)   
6. Aristotle (I.ix). 
Criterion: Virtue is the mean between two wrong extremes. 
Objection: While often a useful standard of behavior this only applies to those virtues that lie 
between extremes; it does not cover several obligations (objection 2C); also, it does not offer much 
more than the idea of moderation in general; and it is difficult to discern the mean (as Aristotle was 
aware) (objection 2D).   
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7. Plato (I.ix). 
Criterion: Virtue as likeness to God. 
Objection: Does not say how to accomplish this (objection 2D); unless it means practicing truth 
and not acting contrary to it (which is the principle expressed in RND) (objection 2E).   
Wollaston sought to develop a moral rule which would not have such faults.  Although he 
did not explicitly criticize Cumberland’s principle that the standard of right action is the promotion 
of the common good, it would presumably also be subject to the criticism that it is too general a 
principle.   
Wollaston went beyond Cumberland's principle that an immoral act is a self-contradictory 
act by the moral agent, and broadened it to the principle that an immoral act is one which 
contradicts nature itself and thus violates the foundational principle of acting in accordance with 
nature.  He did so by originating the principle that the actions of rational agents express 
propositions (See Chapter III.D below).     
A true proposition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by 
deeds, as well as by express words or another proposition (I.iii).   
 
The propositions expressed by actions have truth values, just as the propositions expressed 
by words do.  Thus the principle of contradiction can be applied to the actions of rational agents, 
not only to their statements. 
In addition, actions have more moral import than words because actions create states of 
affairs, whereas words are merely symbolic expressions of mental states. 
I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim, That whoever acts as if things were 
so, or not so, doth by his acts declare, that they are so, or not so; as plainly as he 
could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwise, his acts 
contradict those propositions, which assert them to be as they are (I.iii).   
 
 
 11 
Thus, in Wollaston’s system words and acts are not two separate categories; rather, words 
are a subcategory of acts.  Moral agents perform acts, some of which constitute the expression of 
words, and some of which are deeds.  Both the word acts and the deed acts express propositions.  
The propositions expressed by the deed acts have greater moral import because they create states 
of affairs, whereas the word acts are symbols of mental states.  (For the complete explanation see 
Chapter III.D below.)  Thus the claim that Wollaston’s system consists of defining all immoral 
acts as lying is false.  E.g., Jeremy Bentham: 
We have one philosopher, who says, there is no harm in any thing in the world but 
in telling a lie.
14
 
Rather,  
The force of this doctrine is not that acting is a special case of speaking (as his 
traducers have alleged), but that speaking is a special case of acting.
15
   
 
Cumberland’s definition of an immoral act as a logical contradiction does not state how the 
moral agent “prescribes” the rules he does.  In most cases, people do not state in words, “I hereby 
declare that one rule applies to me and the opposite rule applies to others.”  It may be argued that 
it is implicit in Cumberland that these “rules” are being “prescribed” by actions.       
Thus, in Wollaston’s system, the standard of contradiction is broadened from 
Cumberland’s standard of the contradictory prescriptions of a rational agent, to the contradiction 
being a contradiction of nature itself.  A false proposition denies nature to be what it is, and thus is 
                                            
14 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, chapter 2, 
section 14, note 8, in D. D. Raphael, ed., British Moralists 1650-1800 (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Co., 1991), volume 2, section 959.   
15 Ralph Stedman, “The Ethics of William Wollaston,” The Nineteenth Century and After 118, 
no. 702 (August 1935): 219.   
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contrary to nature.  If a rational agent’s action expresses a proposition which is false, then it is 
denying nature to be what it is.  Hence, a rational agent who deliberately performs an action 
which expresses a false proposition denies whatever part of nature is under consideration to be 
what it is and thus acts contrary to nature.  As the foundational principle of this moral theory is 
acting in accordance with nature, such an action is immoral.   
Contrary to the prevalent misrepresentation of Wollaston’s theory, this principle has 
nothing whatever to do with what opinion an observer might form of an action.  It concerns the 
action’s relation to nature (see Chapter III below for the full account of Wollaston’s theory and 
Chapter V below for the discussion of his critics).       
Wollaston defines the status of an immoral act as a logical contradiction and of a moral act 
as a logical non-contradiction as follows: 
[T]he formal ratio of moral good and evil be made to consist in a conformity of 
men’s acts to the truth of the case or the contrary (I.ix).16   
 
He gives the following example, in which A promises B not to do X, then A does X.   
If A should enter into a compact with B, by which he promises and engages never 
to do some certain thing, and after this he does that thing; in this case it must be 
granted, that his act interferes with his promise, and is contrary to it.  Now it 
cannot interfere with his promise, but it must also interfere with the truth of that 
proposition, which says there was such a promise made, or that there is such a 
compact subsisting.  If this proposition be true, A made such a certain agreement 
with B, it would be denied by this, A never made any agreement with B.  Why? 
Because the truth of this latter is inconsistent with the agreement asserted in the 
former.  The formality of the denial, or that, which makes it to be a denial, is this 
inconsistence.  If then the behaviour of A be inconsistent with the agreement 
mentioned in the former proposition, that proposition is as much denied by A’s 
behaviour, as it can be by the latter, or any other proposition.  Or thus, if one 
                                            
16 This argument is based on a correspondence theory of truth (RND I.ii) which is based on 
Locke’s definition of truth as “ideas agreeing to things” (IV.5.8) and “real knowledge” as “ideas 
agree[ing] with the reality of things” (IV.4.18).  See the exposition of RND Section III “Of 
Reason” in Chapter III.B below.   
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proposition imports or contains that which is contrary to what is contained in 
another, it is said to contradict this other, and denies the existence of what is 
contained in it.  Just so if one act imports what is contrary to the import of another, 
it contradicts this other, and denies its existence (I.iii).   
 
A promises not to do something, then he does it.  That A made that promise can be 
expressed by a proposition.  That proposition is true.  If A were to say that he did not make that 
promise, he would be contradicting the true proposition that states that he made that promise.  
When A does the thing he promised not to do, his action can also be described by a proposition.  
That proposition also contradicts the proposition that describes his promise.  This constitutes the 
formal contradiction his action expresses.   
As follows: 
A performs the act of promising not to do X: 
Pr~X. 
This action can be described by a true proposition: 
P(1) Pr~X.  
If A then expressed a proposition denying that he made the promise, it would be this: 
P(2) ~(Pr~X).  
Proposition P(2) contradicts proposition P(1).  In this case A has denied the true proposition P(1) 
by expressing in words the contrary proposition P(2).   
If A performs act X, the action of performing X contradicts the action of promising not to 
do X: 
X = ~(Pr~X).  
This action can be described by a proposition: 
P(3) ~(Pr~X). 
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This proposition also denies that the promise was made.  Proposition P(3) is identical to 
proposition P(2).  Hence, both the proposition expressed by words and the proposition expressed 
by the act (of doing X) deny the true proposition that the promise was made (proposition P(1)).   
It is this denial that constitutes the formal contradiction, as both propositions P(2) and P(3) 
contradict true proposition P(1).   
 Nature, reason, truth, non-contradiction, the principle that actions express propositions, 
and happiness combine to form Wollaston’s moral theory.   
The foundational premise of Wollaston’s moral theory is the principle, ultimately derived 
from Stoicism, that morality consists of acting in accordance with nature.  Truth is coextensive 
with nature, as a true proposition is one which accurately describes nature (Section I of RND “Of 
Moral Good and Evil”; see Chapter III.D below).  Human reason is a valid means of knowing 
nature; reason is also coextensive with truth, as it is the means of determining what is true, that is, 
deriving true propositions about nature by a combination of sense data and inferential deductions 
(Section III of RND “Of Reason”; see Chapter III.B below).   
Rational observation of human nature leads to the conclusion that happiness, defined as an 
excess of pleasure over pain, is the goal of human life.  It also leads to the conclusion that in order 
to attain happiness, it is necessary to act in accordance with truth, that is, nature and reason; 
therefore, happiness is coextensive with nature, truth, and reason (Section II of RND “Of 
Happiness”; see Chapter III.C below).   
 Human beings express propositions by their actions, as well as their words.  The 
propositions expressed by actions are true or false, just as propositions expressed by words are true 
or false.  To perform an action which expresses a false proposition is to deny truth and therefore to 
act contrary to nature (which is coextensive with truth), and is therefore immoral, in accordance 
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with the foundational premise (Section I); it also reduces happiness (which is coextensive with 
nature and truth) (Section II).  The degree of immorality is determined by the quantity by which 
happiness is reduced.  Therefore, in Wollaston’s moral theory, happiness is the aim and standard, 
and truth is the means of attaining happiness.  (For the explanation of Wollaston’s moral theory, 
see Chapter III below.)   
Wollaston defines his moral theory as natural religion, and natural religion as the union of 
truth, happiness, and reason.   
[N]atural religion is grounded upon this triple and strict alliance or union of truth, 
happiness, and reason; all in the same interest, and conspiring by the same 
methods, to advance and perfect human nature: and its truest definition is, The 
pursuit of happiness by the practice of reason and truth (III.xii).    
 
In Section I of RND natural religion is first defined as act obligations: 
If there be moral good and evil, distinguished as before, there is religion; and such 
as may most properly be styled natural. By religion I mean nothing else but an 
obligation to do (under which word I comprehend acts both of body and mind...) 
what ought not to be omitted, and to forbear what ought not to be done (I.x).  
 
And truth is defined as what is in accordance with nature:   
Those propositions are true, which express things as they are: or, truth is the 
conformity of those words or signs, by which things are expressed, to the things 
themselves.  Defin. (I.ii).  
 
In section II of RND, happiness is demonstrated to be the aim of human nature; and acting in 
accordance with truth, that is, in accordance with nature, is demonstrated to be the means of 
attaining it.  Which leads to the conclusion that: 
[T]he way to happiness and the practice of truth incur the one into the other (II.xiv).  
 
And that because they are coincident, they both constitute natural religion:  
And since both these [the way to happiness, the practice of truth] unite so amicably, 
and are at last the same, here is one religion which may be called natural upon two 
accounts (II.xiv).  
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In Section III of RND, it is demonstrated that reason is the means of discovering truth: 
There is such a thing as right reason: or, truth may be discovered by reasoning 
(III.ix).  
 
And therefore,  
To act according to right reason, and to act according to truth are in effect the same 
thing (III.x).  
 
Which leads to the above conclusion of the union of truth, happiness, and reason as constituting 
natural religion.   
Wollaston summarizes his argument as follows:  
Whether any of those other foundations, upon which morality has been built, will 
hold better than these mentioned, I much question. But if the formal ratio of moral 
good and evil be made to consist in a conformity of mens acts to the truth of the 
case or the contrary, as I have here explained it, [in Section I of RND; see 
exposition of it in Chapter III.D below] the distinction seems to be settled in a 
manner undeniable, intelligible, practicable. For as what is meant by a true 
proposition and matter of fact is perfectly understood by every body; so will it be 
easy for any one, so far as he knows any such propositions and facts, to compare not 
only words, but also actions with them.
17
  A very little skill and attention will serve 
to interpret even these, and discover whether they speak truth, or not (I.ix).   
 
Wollaston’s moral rule can be summarized as follows: 
It is wrong for a human being (a moral agent), knowingly ("designedly") to perform an 
action which asserts a proposition which is false and affects the happiness of himself or (an)other 
human being(s).  It is right to refrain from doing so.  It is right, and an obligation, to pursue 
happiness, defined as an excess of pleasure over pain (in the long run and according to reason, not 
mere sense), for both oneself and others, via actions which are in accordance with the above rule. 
                                            
17 “Actions...can enter into logical relations with each other and with other bearers of meaning 
and implication: thoughts, words, beliefs, hopes and expectations.”  Renford Bambrough, 
“Thought, Word and Deed, Part I,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. LIV (July 
1980): 107.   
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Wollaston’s statement of his moral rule is:  
That every intelligent, active, and free being should so behave himself, as by no act 
to contradict truth; or, that he should treat every thing as being what it is (I.xi).   
 
Writing of this period Stephen L. Darwall says:  
[T]he works of Cudworth, Cumberland, and Shaftesbury continue to be largely 
unread by all but the most dedicated specialists.  It is my hope to make evident, 
however, both how central these texts are to one of the most exciting periods in the 
history of ethical thought and how enduring their intrinsic philosophical interest 
continues to be.
18
   
 
This thought applies to RND as well.  The roots of moral realism lie in eighteenth-century 
rationalism.
19
  However, moral realism is often defined as referring to external moral entities as in 
the Norton quote above, and this statement by Korsgaard:     
Moral realism, then, is the view that propositions employing moral concepts may 
have truth values because moral concepts describe or refer to normative entities or 
facts that exist independently of those concepts themselves.
20
 
 
Contrary to this claim, Wollaston’s theory does not consist of claims of knowledge of external 
normative entities, but rather of normative principles derived from rational analysis of empirical 
knowledge.  There is a family resemblance between his theory and that of one of the most 
frequently cited contemporary works on moral realism, that of Peter Railton.
21
  (For a comparison 
of Wollaston’s views with Railton’s see Chapter VI below.)  Wollaston’s role in the history of 
                                            
18 Darwall, 22.   
19 E.g., “[Samuel Clarke’s] work contains the first clear statement of the position we have come 
to know as moral realism.”  Christine M. Korsgaard, “Realism and Constructivism in 
Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy,” The Journal of Philosophical Research, Philosophy in 
America at the Turn of the Century, The Philosophy Documentation Center (2003): 99.  As 
mentioned in note 12 above, Clarke’s theory is influenced by Richard Cumberland’s.   
20 Ibid., 100.   
21 Peter Railton, “Moral Realism,” The Philosophical Review 95, no. 2 (April 1986): 163-207.   
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rationalism/moral realism has long been neglected, as he has been dismissed with vague 
statements that he is a follower of Samuel Clarke, and his theory frequently replaced by straw men.  
An accurate exposition of his moral theory will add to knowledge of the development of 
rationalism and of the precursors of contemporary moral realism.   
The dissertation consists of the following chapters.   
Chapter II is a survey of the response to RND over three centuries, tracing its decline from 
initial enthusiasm and praise to dismissal and neglect.  The section concerning the twentieth 
century also constitutes the literature review.   
 Chapter III is an exposition of Wollaston’s innovative moral theory which is set forth in 
Sections I-IV of RND.  I have reorganized the argument to make it clearer and more detailed and 
also spelled out connections which Wollaston did not.  I have also responded to some of the 
criticisms raised against the theory at the relevant points.   
Chapter IV is an exposition of the moral instruction portion of RND, Sections V-IX.  I 
have focused on those parts which expand upon the argument in the first part, such as Section IX’s 
more detailed account of moral obligation.  In addition, I have provided an  exposition of 
Wollaston’s political theory, which is of interest for its possible influence on eighteenth-century 
American thought, and considered some issues it raises. 
Chapter V examines the arguments offered by Wollaston’s most prominent and/or 
influential critics.  For the most part, they turn out to be attacks on straw men. 
In Chapter VI I consider possible reasons why RND declined into such (undeserved) 
neglect and disrepute, and argue that it is of interest not only for its place in the history of 
rationalism, and as a precursor of contemporary moral realism, but also because Wollaston’s 
overlooked innovation could serve as a method of carrying out moral realism’s project of deriving 
 
 19 
moral truths by empirical observation.   
 
 20 
CHAPTER II.  THE RESPONSE TO WOLLASTON’S THEORY 
A.  THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: POPULARITY AND INFLUENCE
Wollaston was popular and highly regarded as a moral philosopher in the eighteenth 
century.  Ten thousand copies of RND were sold within a few years of its publication in 1724.
22
  
It provoked immediate debate; several pamphlets attacking and defending it were published within 
a year of its publication.
23
  An abridged version of RND was published in 1726 (at the request of 
Sir Richard Steele).
24
  In the same year an edition was published in Ireland with a specially 
commissioned translation of the Hebrew footnotes
25
 and also a French translation.
26
  It went 
                                            
22 [John Clarke], Preface to The Religion of Nature Delineated by William Wollaston, 8th ed. 
(London: 1759): xxiv; John Nichols, The History and Antiquities of the County of Leicester...vol. 4 
(London, 1795-1815): 528, http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO, document no. 
CW103199282.   
23 John Clarke, An Examination Of the Notion of Moral Good and Evil, Advanced in a late Book, 
entitled, The Religion of Nature Delineated (London, 1725), http://galenet.galegroup.com/ 
servlet/ECCO, document no. CW119839350; [Thomas Bott], The Principal and Peculiar Notion 
Advanc'd in a Late Book, Intitled, The Religion of Nature Delineated; Consider'd and Refuted. In a 
Letter to a Gentleman (London, 1725), http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ ECCO, document no. 
CW123174468; [Joseph Spence], A Defence of Mr. Wollaston's Notion of Moral Good and Evil; 
In Answer to a Letter, In Which It is said to be Considered and Refuted (London, 1725), 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ ECCO, document no. CW123094054; Anonymous, A Brief 
Profession of Religion, as founded on Reason, Consistent with, and confirm’d by Revelation.  
Collected and drawn up in the present Form, by a Gentleman. To which are added, Some 
Thoughts, occasion'd by a late Remarker on the principal and peculiar Notions advanced in The 
Religion of Nature Delineated. And on A Letter to the Reverend Dr. C_____ Added to a late Essay 
towards a Demontration of the Scripture-Trinity (London, 1725), 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO, document no. CW123274196.   
24 Anonymous, A Compendious View of the Religion of Nature Delineated. With an Appendix 
Concerning the Christian Religion (London: R. Williamson, 1726), http://galenet.galegroup.com/ 
servlet/ECCO, document no. CW118784073.   
25 [William Wollaston], The Religion of Nature Delineated (Dublin: George Grierson and George 
Ewing, 1726): iv-v, http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO, document no. CW119696965.   
26 [William] Wollaston, Ebauche de la religion naturelle (La Haye: Jean Swart, 1726), 
http://www. books.google.com.   
 
 21 
through eight editions by 1759.   
The regard in which Wollaston was held in the decades following the publication of RND 
is expressed by John Conybeare.   
I believe it will be allowed by every one, that this is the most complete system of 
moral principles and precepts, which hath been yet given us on the mere foot of 
natural reason....Surely those persons who have set so great a value on Mr. 
Woollaston's [sic] performance, have not mistaken matters so much, as to bestow 
the highest praise on him....Thus much I am sure may be concluded from the 
general applause with which this gentleman's book hath been received, that it was 
thought to contain something extraordinary.
27
  
 
Wollaston was thought to have made progress towards the goal of deriving moral 
principles by demonstration, a goal proposed by Locke, among others,    
Though by the view I had of moral ideas whilst I was considering that subject, I 
thought I saw that morality might be demonstratively made out [Locke's Familiar 
Letters, p. 10.] [Brackets in original.]
28
   
 
Leslie Stephen states that RND “[was] quoted with profound respect by contemporary 
writers.”29  
Admiration of Wollaston reached the top of society.  Among Wollaston’s admirers was 
Queen Caroline (consort of George II), who commissioned a translation of RND’s footnotes by 
John Clarke,
30
 and who placed a bust of Wollaston alongside those of Robert Boyle, Isaac 
                                            
27 John Conybeare, A Defence of Revealed Religion, Against the Exceptions of a Late Writer, in 
His Book, Intituled, Christianity as old as the Creation [1732], 4th ed. (Dublin: Grierson, 
McKenzie, and Moore, 1788): 169-179, http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/ECCO, document 
no. CW121916856.   
28 Ibid., 169.   
29 Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, 3rd ed. [1902] (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962), vol. 1, ch. 3, sec. 38:109.   
30 [Clarke], Preface, xxx.   
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Newton, John Locke, and Samuel Clarke in her Hermitage
31— whose purpose was to “make an 
artistic statement of her belief that natural religion and the new science could be reconciled.”32  
The arrangement of the busts, Newton and Locke on one side, Samuel Clarke and Wollaston on the 
other, and Robert Boyle in the center, expressed the relation between natural philosophy and 
science—“Robert Boyle, an adept both of natural philosophy and Newtonian science, provided a 
link between the two pendant pairs of worthies and presided over the pantheon as a whole.”33   
Later in the Eighteenth Century RND was still sufficiently well-regarded to serve as a 
major influence on the decision rendered in a landmark intellectual property case in Britain 
(Donaldson vs. Becket, decided in 1774).
34
  One of the judges in the case, Richard Aston, quoted 
RND's section on property extensively in his decision.
35
  Wollaston's property rights theory went 
further than Locke's in its emphasis on property rights as emanating from the individual's 
ownership of himself.
36
  (See Chapter IV.B below.)  (This theory of self-ownership plays a major 
role in modern libertarian thinking.)
37
  Aston's use of it emphasized the status of a literary work as 
                                            
31 Judith Colton, “Merlin's Cave and Queen Caroline: Garden Art as Political Propaganda,” 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 10, no. 1 (Autumn 1976): 1-20, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2737814.   
32 Ibid., 1.   
33 Ibid., 2.   
34 Gregory Hahn, “Anti-Copyright: 18th- and 20th-Century Arguments Against Copyright” 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1993): 138-143; Martin A. Kayman, “Lawful Writing: 
Common Law, Statute and the Properties of Literature,” New Literary History 27, no. 4, 
Literature, Media, and the Law (Autumn, 1996): 761-783, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20057390.   
35 Hahn, 138-143.   
36 George H. Smith, “William Wollaston on Property Rights,” Journal of Libertarian Studies 2, 
no. 3 (Fall 1978): 217-224, http://mises.org.ezproxy.gc.cuny.edu/journals/jls/2_3/2_3_2.pdf.   
37 Ibid.   
 
 23 
an expression of its creator.
38
   
RND was sufficiently familiar for one of its central premises to be cited in a moral manual 
for tradesmen: “persons may act as well as speak a lie: for, words are but the mode of expressing 
our apprehensions, which may as strongly be signified by actions.”39 
RND was on a list of 156 books on moral philosophy and metaphysics which were 
“recommended or in use” at Cambridge in 1730.40    
 RND was also popular and influential in America.  “[T]he two moralists whose writings 
were probably more widely approved of in Britain and America in the second quarter of the 
century than those of any other philosophers: William Wollaston and Francis Hutcheson.”41 
 RND was part of the curriculum at Harvard and was in the Harvard library by 1725.  As 
conflict with Britain increased, it was one of the texts used to support arguments in favor of the 
contractual basis of the state.
42
  Myers states: “Hooker, Selden, Taylor, and Wollaston are not 
titles that have been seen as basic to the formation of the American political mind, yet their 
presence in Johnson's syllabi of readings should alert modern scholars to their possible subtle 
                                            
38 Kayman, Lawful Writing, 774.   
39 Isaac Watts, The Religious Tradesman: or, Plain and Serious Hints of Advice for the 
Tradesman's Prudent and pious Conduct; from his Entrance into Business, to his leaving it off.  
(London: T. Field, 1792): 96, http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/MOME, document no. 
U102370463.  This is an adaptation of a 1684 work by Richard Steele.   
40 A. Rupert Hall, “Cambridge: Newton's Legacy,” Notes and Records of the Royal Society of 
London 55, no. 2 (May 2001): 218, http://www.jstor.org/stable/532096.   
41 Norman S. Fiering, “Irresistible Compassion: An Aspect of Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and 
Humanitarianism,” Journal of the History of Ideas 37, no. 2 (April-June 1976): 205, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2708821.   
42 Minor Myers, Jr., “A Source of Eighteenth-Century Harvard Master's Questions,” The William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series 38, no. 2 (April 1981): 261-267, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1918778.   
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influence.”43   
 At Yale, RND was a central ethics text during Thomas Clap's presidency (1740-1766).
44
  
Clap regarded RND as “the best of the ‘many Treatises which contain good Rules of external 
Conduct’” and Yale students were “thoroughly drilled in Wollaston.”45  RND continued to be 
used as a text under the presidency (1777-1795) of Ezra Stiles, who had studied it while an 
undergraduate at Yale.  Styles taught the senior year moral philosophy course.
46
  
 Some American intellectuals wrote ethics treatises which were based on RND.  James 
Logan “one of the three or four most considerable men in colonial America,”47 (and a mentor of 
Benjamin Franklin), first read RND “with great excitement in the autumn of 1726.”48  A decade 
later, Logan began writing a treatise on ethics, “[t]aking Wollaston's Religion of Nature Delineated 
as his model.”49  (He did not complete it.)  Wollaston’s views on biology also led Logan to 
conduct notable experiments in botany.
50
  Samuel Johnson, the first president of King’s College 
(later Columbia University) from 1754-1763, wrote a treatise on ethics that was influenced by 
                                            
43 Ibid., 266.   
44 Fiering, “Irresistible Compassion,” 206n31.   
45 Leon Howard, The Connecticut Wits (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1943): 10, 
26.   
46 Gladys Bryson, “The Emergence of the Social Sciences from Moral Philosophy,” International 
Journal of Ethics 42, no. 3 (April 1932): 304-323, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2989580.   
47 Frederick B. Tolles, James Logan and the Culture of Provincial America, The Library of 
American Biography, ed. Oscar Handlin (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1957): 6.   
48 Frederick B. Tolles, “Philadelphia's First Scientist: James Logan,” Isis 47, no. 1 (March 1956): 
20-30.   
49 Tolles, James Logan, 208-9.   
50 Tolles, “Philadelphia’s First Scientist,” 28; Tolles, James Logan, 200-202.   
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RND and explicitly referenced it.
51
  Jonathan Edwards may also have been somewhat influenced 
by RND.  He mentioned Wollaston briefly in his treatise The Nature of True Virtue (not published 
in his lifetime).
52
  A commentator states: “Here Edwards is subconsciously verging on the 
doctrine of William Wollaston that vice consists in acting contrary to truth and not treating things 
as they are.” 53     
 RND’s political theory (see Chapter IV.B-C below for the similarity between Wollaston’s 
political theory and revolutionary ideas), among others, influenced the American Revolution.
54
  
Richard Bland, a prominent member of the government of Virginia, cited RND in his 1766 
pamphlet Inquiry Into the Rights of the British Colonies.
55
  Thomas Jefferson owned a copy of 
RND
56
 (Wollaston defines natural religion as “The pursuit of happiness by the practice of reason 
and truth” (III.xii.3)).  John Witherspoon, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, and an 
early and influential president of Princeton (1768-1794) listed RND in the bibliography of his 
                                            
51 James W. Woelfel, “William Wollaston’s Religion of Nature and Samuel Johnson’s System of 
Morality,” Historical Magazine of the Protestant Episcopal Church 34 (1965): 239-264.   
52 Jonathan Edwards, The Nature of True Virtue [1755], ch. 3, sec. 4, 
http://depts.washington.edu/lsearlec/texts/edwards/virtue.htm.   
53 A. Owen Aldridge, “Edwards and Hutcheson,” The Harvard Theological Review 44, no. 1 
(January 1951): 43n14, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1508416.   
54 Herbert Lawrence Ganter, “Jefferson's ‘Pursuit of Happiness’ and Some Forgotten Men,”  
William and Mary College Quarterly Historical Magazine 2nd ser. 16, no. 4 (October 1936): 
558-585, 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0043-5597%28193610%292%3A16%3A4%3C558%3AJ%22OH
AS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E; also Myers, “Harvard Master’s Questions.”   
55 Richard Bland, An Inquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies, ed. Earl Gregg Swem  
(Richmond [VA]: Appeals Press, Inc. for the William Parks Club, 1922): 9, 10, 
http://www.books.google.com.   
56 Ganter, “Jefferson’s ‘Pursuit of Happiness.’”   
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published lectures.
57
  RND was present in a significant portion of American libraries.
58
 
                                            
57 Francis Broderick, “Pulpit, Physics, and Politics: The Curriculum of the College of New 
Jersey, 1746-1794,” The William and Mary Quarterly 3rd ser. 6, no. 1 (January 1949): 42-68, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1921859.   
58 David Lundberg, Henry F. May, “The Enlightened Reader in America,” American Quarterly 
28, no. 2, Special Issue: An American Enlightenment (Summer 1976): 262-293, 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0678%28197622%2928%3A2%3C262%3ATERIA%3E2.0.
CO%3B2-G.   
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B.  THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: DECLINE AND DISMISSAL 
 In the nineteenth century, RND gradually fell into disrepute.  By 1807, Timothy Dwight, 
president of Yale from 1795-1817, who had been one of the undergraduates “drilled in 
Wollaston,” was (according to a student’s notes) dismissing RND in his ethics lectures as “Mr. 
Wollaston asserts that all sin is telling a lie, and all virtue is truth.  A very absurd assertion."
59
   
 Although RND had been out of print since the eighteenth century, there is evidence it was 
still read and met with mixed reactions.  An 1849 book on crime and punishment begins the 
chapter on punishment by quoting extensively Wollaston’s views on how people should be treated 
(Section II, proposition i, observations 5, 6, and 7 in their entirety).
60
   
 On the other hand, it was also subject to contemptuous dismissals such as this:  
It will suffice on these subjects if I remark, that we are told by a much venerated 
authority, that it is not what enters into a man—not what he eats and what he 
drinks—but the words which come out of him that defile him; and that such was the 
well-weighed conviction of a philosopher of some celebrity of the last century, that 
he represented, and with great though not perfect truth, all immorality and all 
crimes to be nothing more than telling lies or giving a false representation of 
things.
61
   
 
 More serious historians of ethics or philosophy dealt with RND briefly in entries ranging 
from a sentence to a page or two, of varying accuracy.  They sometimes listed him as a follower of 
                                            
59 Vincent Freimarck, “Rhetoric at Yale in 1807," Proceedings of the American Philosophical 
Society 110, no. 4 (August 23, 1966): 241, http://www.jstor.org/stable/985686.   
60 R[obert] Hovenden, Crime & Punishment; Or the Question, How should we Treat our 
Criminals? Practically Considered (London: Charles Gilpin, 1849): 58, 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/MOME, document no. U106870508.   
61 Thomas Hodgskin, “‘Peace, law, and order,’: a lecture delivered in the hall of the National 
Association on September 29, 1842,” Hume Tracts (1842): 3-4, http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 
60207083.   
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Samuel Clarke and categorized his theory as a variation of Clarke’s theory of fitness.62   
 Late in the century Leslie Stephen’s influential history of eighteenth-century thought63  
propagated Bentham’s straw man.  That, and Hume’s straw man, became the prevailing view of 
RND which by that time had been out of print for over a century.   
 L. A. Selby-Bigge’s collection of texts by British moralists was, by then, the most readily 
available version of RND, but as it contained only portions of the first two chapters, it presented 
readers with only the theoretical portion of the book, and only a part of that.
64
 
                                            
62 F. C. Schlosser, History of the Eighteenth Century and of the Nineteenth Till the Overthrow of 
the French Empire; With Particular Reference to Mental Cultivation and Progress, Volume I, 
trans. D. Davison (London: Chapman and Hall, 1843): 46, 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/MOME, document no. U106293628; Friedrich Ueberweg, 
History of Philosophy: From Thales to the Present Time, Vol. II: History of Modern Philosophy, 
4th ed., trans. Geo. S. Morris with additions by the translator. An appendix on English and 
American Philosophy by Noah Porter (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1873; 1909 reprint 
edition): 91, 382-3, https://archive.org/details/historyofphiloso02uebeuoft; Johann Eduard 
Erdmann, A History of Philosophy, Volume II: Modern Philosophy, translation edited by Williston 
S. Hough (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1890): 119-121, http://www.books.google.com; 
Wilhelm Windelband, History of Philosophy, Volume II: Renaissance, Enlightenment, and 
Modern, trans. James H. Tufts (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1901; reprint edition, New 
York: Harper & Brothers, 1958): 504; Noah Porter, The Elements of Moral Science: Theoretical 
and Practical (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1885): 422, http://books.google.com.   
63 Stephen, History of English Thought, 109-12.  Most of Stephen’s comments on RND consist 
of an attack on Wollaston’s argument for an afterlife.   
64 L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., British Moralists, Being Selections from Writers principally of the 
Eighteenth Century (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1897; reprint ed., intro. Bernard H. Baumrin, 
Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1964).  Another anthology containing excerpts 
from RND was published early in the twentieth century: Benjamin Rand, The Classical Moralists: 
Selections Illustrating Ethics from Socrates to Martineau (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 
1909), http://books.google.com.   
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C.  THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: SPORADIC INTEREST 
 This section also constitutes the literature review. 
 In the Twentieth Century, occasionally a philosopher would encounter RND, conclude that 
Wollaston’s theory was interesting and worth consideration, and write a paper recommending 
discussion of it.  This was done by Ralph Stedman in the 1930s, Stanley Tweyman, and Joel 
Feinberg in the 1970s, and Olin Joynton in the 1980s.  However, these attempts did not succeeded 
in generating more widespread consideration of Wollaston’s moral theory.     
RND...in its ethical portions is one of the subtlest treatises on morals in the 
language.
65
    
 
[A] thinker who could...so acutely analyse the ethical situation that on several of 
the crucial points he anticipates, in so far as he does not actually influence, the two 
greatest moralists of the eighteenth century [Butler and Kant], deserves a better fate 
than his countrymen have accorded him.
66
  
 
Wollaston will be found to be a moral philosopher with important things to say, and 
therefore to be a moral philosopher with a theory worth taking seriously.
67
 
 
A fair-minded contemporary reader, I think, will find that Wollaston did have 
something important and original to say, however confused his manner of saying it, 
so that is one reason for reexamining his major work, The Religion of Nature 
Delineated.
68
   
 
                                            
65 Ralph Stedman, “The Ethics of William Wollaston,” The Nineteenth Century and After 118, 
no. 702 (August 1935): 217.   
66 Ibid., 225.   
67 Stanley Tweyman, “Truth, Happiness and Obligation: The Moral Philosophy of William 
Wollaston,” Philosophy 51 (1976): 35.   
68 Feinberg, “Wollaston and His Critics,” 345.   
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 Ralph Stedman's paper “The Ethics of William Wollaston”69 is primarily a corrective to 
the straw-man attacks on Wollaston from Hume to Leslie Stephen.  In the limited space of a 
paper, he discusses briefly many important points of Wollaston's theory.  Aside from correcting 
specific misrepresentations of Wollaston's theory, he notes a distinction between the form of the 
theory, which is rationalistic, and its content, which he likens to Aristotelian phronesis; and the 
distinction between the dominance of reason, which is absolute, and its scope, which is more 
modest.  The result is to make probability the primary guide of life.  He argues that Wollaston's 
theory does not depend on theism, but only some of his specific positions do.  He also notes that 
Wollaston was so widely read in the Eighteenth Century that his ideas were “public property” and 
may have influenced Kant.  (Kant’s contemporary Garve said that “the Kantian principle, if 
strictly and consistently applied, was bound to lead to the doctrine of Wollaston.”70  Clifford 
Griffeth Thompson
71
 says that German historians of philosophy regarded Wollaston as a 
precursor of Kant but his references for this are unreliable.  Arthur N. Prior says, “[M]any 
subsequent ethical theories have been adumbrations of [Wollaston’s] central idea.  It is present, 
for example, in Kant's well-known view that a right action must be one which we can ‘without 
self-contradiction’ imagine as performed by every rational being.”72) 
 Stanley Tweyman, who edited a facsimile edition of RND, discusses the question of why 
                                            
69 Ibid.   
70 This quote is a summary of Garve’s position from Alexander Altmann, “William Wollaston: 
English Deist and Rabbinic Scholar” [1948] in Studies in Religious Philosophy and Mysticism 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969): 212n5.   
71 Clifford Griffeth Thompson, The Ethics of William Wollaston (Boston: Richard G. Badger, 
The Gorham Press, 1922).   
72 Arthur N. Prior, Logic and the Basis of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949): 56.   
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RND eventually faded from consideration in his Introduction.
73
  He suggests that Wollaston's 
death soon after its publication meant he could not defend it, nor could he elaborate what he 
regarded as only a rough draft (delineation means rough draft).   
 In his paper Tweyman
74
 summarizes the relationships of truth, happiness, and obligation 
in Wollaston’s theory.  Both truth and happiness are criteria of right action.  The harmony 
between them is guaranteed by God.  Both self and others are beings that naturally seek 
happiness.  Inasmuch as that is human nature, there is a duty to make oneself happy, which is thus 
an obligation.  The obligations which follow from happiness are the same as the obligations 
which follow from reason.   
 Joel Feinberg's paper “Wollaston and His Critics”75 is based on his interpretation of 
Wollaston's theory as focusing on the expressive function of actions, an interest that Feinberg 
shares.  His interpretation of RND follows Hume's claim that Wollaston's theory concerned an 
action's effect on the perception of onlookers;
76
 it thus omits consideration of Wollaston's 
happiness criterion and therefore leads him to claim that Wollaston's theory cannot explain why 
some acts are worse than others and that it assumes moral principles that are distinct from it.  It 
also leads him to discuss the difficulties of determining the characteristics of an act merely from 
observing it.   
 Feinberg refutes Hume's claim (based on his straw man) that if a natural event or a mistake 
                                            
73 Stanley Tweyman, Introduction to The Religion of Nature Delineated, by William Wollaston  
(Delmar, NY: Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, 1974).   
74 Tweyman, “Truth, Happiness and Obligation.”   
75 Feinberg, “Wollaston and His Critics.”   
76 That this claim constitutes a straw man is discussed in Chapter V.A below.   
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causes a false perception then that event or mistake would be immoral, and responds to Hume's 
criticism of Wollaston's theory as circular.  
 Feinberg regards Wollaston as reworking the Stoic ideas of following nature.  He is 
interested in Wollaston's position that some actions can express propositions because it supports 
Feinberg’s position that there are cases in which people experience a feeling of violated truth that 
is distinct from feeling sympathy for the victim of an injury.  (For a discussion of Feinberg’s 
paper see Chapter V.D below.)     
 Olin Joynton
77
 responds to Feinberg’s paper, arguing that Feinberg misinterpreted 
Wollaston as making the deontological claim that making false assertions is wrong in and of itself.  
In order to do so, Feinberg regards Wollaston as claiming that all actions are declarative.  Joynton 
claims this is a misinterpretation and argues that Wollaston regarded only those actions which 
would be understood by an observer to be declarative and that this means he cannot account for 
actions which are nondeclarative. 
 In his second paper,
78
 Joynton addresses the criticism of circularity that has been directed 
at RND, namely, that the totality of truths includes moral truths, hence they are being assumed.  
Joynton argues that happiness and truth have different roles in Wollaston's system.  Happiness is 
the aim of morality and acting according to truth is the rule for obtaining happiness.  Wrong 
actions are wrong because they threaten happiness, not because they interfere with truth.  Thus, 
while all truth-violations are wrong, the degree of wrongness is determined by the amount of harm 
                                            
77 Olin Joynton, “Wollaston's Theory of Declarative Actions,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 
19 (Winter 1981): 439-449.   
78 Olin Joynton, “The Problem of Circularity in Wollaston's Moral Philosophy,” Journal of the 
History of Philosophy 22 (October, 1984): 435-43.   
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to human happiness.   
 The reason truth rather than happiness-diminishment is the criterion, is that knowledge is 
clearer than hedonistic judgment, individuals vary, and pain and pleasure are conscious states 
knowable only to the subject.  The hedonic calculus is not useful because of its subjectivity.  
Finding the propositions in actions and testing their truth is a better procedure for identifying the 
moral qualities of actions than predicting their effect on happiness (which can only be subjectively 
known).  
 In a recent paper
79
 John J. Tilley argues that Tweyman's and Feinberg's criticisms of 
Hume's criticism of RND overlook and thus do not refute an error by Hume, which is his failure to 
recognize that “[t]he fact that two properties, W and S, are necessarily coextensive in a certain 
domain does not imply that in every domain in which S occurs, it shares its extension (in whole or 
in part) with W” (93).  Hume's argument depends on assuming that in RND falsehood is identical 
to moral wrongness and that this extends to all domains, including inanimate objects.   
 In another paper
80
 he argues that Bott’s, Hutcheson’s, and John Clarke of Hull's criticisms 
of RND are successful, unlike better-known ones by Hume, Bentham, etc., and are the reason 
interest in RND faded.  (See Chapter V.A below for more on this.)  On the other hand, in another 
paper,
81
 he argues that Hutcheson's and Clarke's claims that RND is inconsistent are not successful 
but Thomas Bott's claim is successful.  (See Chapter V.B below for more on this.)   
                                            
79 John J. Tilley, “Physical Objects and Moral Wrongness: Hume on the ‘Fallacy’ in Wollaston's 
Moral Theory,” Hume Studies 35, nos. 1-2 (2009): 87-101, doi: 10.1353/hms.2009.0006.   
80 John J. Tilley, “Wollaston's Early Critics,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20, 
no. 6 (2012): 1097-1116, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2012.731239.   
81 John J. Tilley, “The Problem of Inconsistency in Wollaston’s Moral Theory,” History of 
Philosophy Quarterly 29, no. 3 (July 2012): 265-280.   
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 Other twentieth-century sources are discussed below.   
 A Ph.D. dissertation on Wollaston was written by Clifford Thompson in 1922 (at Yale).
82
  
He discusses the views of many nineteenth-century historians of philosophy and various issues 
raised by Wollaston's theory.   
 Alexander Altmann's monograph William Wollaston: English Deist and Rabbinic Scholar, 
traces the influence of Jewish philosophers on Wollaston's thought using the Hebrew footnotes in 
RND.  Wollaston's Hebrew references are from an extraordinarily wide range of sources and 
show great biblical and rabbinic scholarship.  Altmann concludes, “There is hardly any important 
topic in Wollaston's exposition of Natural Religion in which the influence of medieval Jewish 
philosophy does not make itself felt in some degree.”83  He also notes that Wollaston is 
expressing the humanist idea of the unity of knowledge by quoting from many different sources in 
Hebrew, Greek, and Latin.   
 The nature of Wollaston’s religious views is discussed by James Woelfel and Chester 
Chapin.  In “William Wollaston’s Religion of Nature and Samuel Johnson’s System of Morality,” 
Woelfel argues that Wollaston’s views were in accord with Anglican belief.  He classifies 
Wollaston as “orthodox, albeit very latitudinarian” and characterizes his “understanding of prayer 
and worship“ as “idiosyncratically Anglican.”84  Chapin, in “Was William Wollaston 
(1660-1724) a Deist?”85 argues against the view espoused by Leslie Stephen that Wollaston 
should be classified as a deist.  Chapin argues that Wollaston was “orthodox in a distinctively 
                                            
82 Thompson, The Ethics of William Wollaston.   
83 Altmann, “William Wollaston: English Deist,” 228.   
84 Woelfel, “William Wollaston’s Religion of Nature,” 249.   
85 Chester Chapin, "Was William Wollaston (1660-1724) a Deist?" ANQ (April 1994): 72-76.   
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Anglican manner”86 because he was not regarded as a deist by his contemporaries and he affirmed 
several Anglican doctrines.   
 RND’s political theory appears in discussions of property rights.  George H. Smith’s 
paper
87
 (see Section A above) summarizes Wollaston's theory of property rights and argues that it 
anticipates twentieth-century libertarian theories of property rights.  The influence of Wollaston’s 
property rights theory in the eighteenth century is also discussed by Hahn and Kayman (see section 
A above).   
 Some books and papers mention Wollaston briefly.     
 In his book Logic and the Basis of Ethics, Arthur Prior Compares Wollaston with Kant: a 
right action must be one that we can imagine “without self-contradiction” as performed by every 
rational being.
88
  Prior discusses Wollaston primarily as a transitional figure between Samuel 
Clarke and later moral philosophers.   
 In his book The Logic of Saint Anselm,
89
 Desmond Henry briefly compares Anselm and 
Wollaston and speculates whether Wollaston read Anselm. 
 Renford Bambrough
90
 discusses Wollaston as part of his paper on the relationships of 
thoughts, words, and actions.  He argues that because actions express propositions they can have 
the logical relations of propositions.  Thus, thoughts, words, and deeds may all agree or conflict 
with each other.  He also argues that logical and moral thought are closely related although this is 
                                            
86 Ibid., 73.   
87 Smith, “William Wollaston on Property Rights.”   
88 Prior, Logic and the Basis of Ethics, 56.   
89 Desmond Paul Henry, The Logic of Saint Anselm (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967): 230-240.   
90 Bambrough, “Thought, Word and Deed, Part I.”   
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not commonly recognized.  R. F. Holland’s paired paper91 discusses a straw man, not RND. 
 An exchange by Alan Brinton
92
 and Alan Millar
93
 concerning Butler briefly mentions 
Wollaston.  Brinton makes a passing reference to Wollaston as proponent of the idea that, “moral 
good and evil (and virtue) are a function of the nature of things in a larger sense, which goes 
beyond human nature,”94 and Millar notes that Butler was concerned by a criticism by Wollaston 
of the idea of following nature as encompassing all parts of human nature including the brutish 
ones (rather than limiting it to reason). 
 Lastly, Oliver Johnson’s paper, “Hume’s Refutation of—Wollaston?”95 makes an 
interesting argument concerning the criticism Hume directed at Wollaston.  Johnson argues that 
Hume claims that Wollaston argued that immorality consists of creating false judgments in an 
observer.  Hume's argument against this position is that it takes the issue of morality or 
immorality away from the action, leaving it entirely in the (rational) reactions of the observer.  
But Hume's theory of ethics is that judgments of morality and immorality are solely (emotional) 
reactions in an observer.  Therefore, Hume's argument against Wollaston refutes his own moral 
theory.   
 
                                            
91 R. F. Holland, “Thought, Word and Deed, Part II,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 
Suppl. LIV (July 1980): 119-132.   
92 Alan Brinton, “‘Following Nature’ in Butler's Sermons,” The Philosophical Quarterly 31, no. 
164 (1991): 325-332.   
93 Alan Millar, “Reply to Brinton,” The Philosophical Quarterly 42, no. 169 (October 1992): 
486-491.   
94 Ibid., 331-2.   
95 Oliver Johnson, “Hume's Refutation of—Wollaston?” Hume Studies 12 (November 1986): 
192-200.   
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CHAPTER III.  WOLLASTON’S MORAL THEORY 
A.  THE STRUCTURE OF THE RELIGION OF NATURE DELINEATED 
The moral rule is stated in the first section, “Of Moral Good and Evil.”  Section II, “Of 
Happiness,” sets forth happiness as the standard for the moral rule.  Section III, “Of Reason, and 
the Ways of Discovering Truth,” is an argument for the validity of reason.  Section IV, “Of the 
Obligations of Imperfect Beings with Respect to Their Power of Acting,” defines the extent of 
moral obligation.   
 The rest of the book consists of application, that is, of establishing true statements about 
certain issues.  Section V, “Truths Relating to the Deity. Of His Existence, Perfection, 
Providence, etc.” consists of arguments for the existence of God and discussion of some related 
issues.  This is the longest chapter in the book.  Section VI, “Truths Respecting Mankind in 
General, Antecedent to All Human Laws,” begins with what Wollaston terms a “principle of 
individuation” which leads to equality of rights.  In modern terms, it's a theory of individual 
rights.  As the title indicates, these rights are inherent in human beings and precede all 
government.  Section VII, “Truths Respecting Particular Societies of Men, or Governments” is a 
theory of legitimate government.  Human beings are social.  Government is created by mutual 
consent, its purpose is the common welfare, and its laws must be in accordance with natural 
justice.  Section VIII, “Truths Concerning Families and Relations.”  Views concerning marriage, 
children, and other relations.  Section IX, “Truths Belonging to a Private Man, and Respecting 
(Directly) Only Himself.”  Views on the proper way to lead one's life (rational and virtuous), the 
nature and immortality of the soul, etc.  This is the second longest section in the book  
 This chapter of the dissertation constitutes an explication of Wollaston’s moral theory 
which is presented in the first four chapters of RND.  In the next chapter I will discuss the 
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remaining application sections of RND.   
 The complexity of the argument in RND makes it difficult to follow.  The order in which 
the argument is presented is the reverse of the structure of the argument.  The moral rule which is 
the conclusion of the argument is presented first, in section I.  The premises on which the moral 
rule depends come after it.  When the premises are presented, the moral rule is not repeated, and 
the connection between the moral rule and its premises is not clearly stated.  The standard of the 
moral rule, i.e., happiness, is presented in Section II, after the rule itself.  The argument for the 
validity of reason is presented in Section III, following the argument for the moral rule in Section I, 
and the standard for the rule in Section II.  Yet it underlies the entire argument, which is that this 
moral rule can be derived by reason alone.   
 Thus, the conclusion which is presented in the first section depends on principles 
established in both the second and third sections, and the principle established in the second 
section depends on the principle established in the third section.  Because the premises follow the 
conclusion it is easy for readers to overlook them and miss the structure of the argument.  It can 
also be difficult to keep track of the intricate connections among truth, reason, happiness, and 
nature. 
 In addition, Wollaston regards nature, truth, reason, and happiness as coextensive, which 
also obscures the order of the argument.  In some propositions Wollaston states that any and all 
denial of truth is wrong.  This obscures the argument that it is only denial of truths concerning the 
happiness of human beings that is the subject of the moral rule.  
 The first premise of the theory is the validity of reason, which is presented in Section III.  
Reason is also demonstrated to be coextensive with truth (that truth is coextensive with nature is 
stated in Section I).  In Section II, rational observation is used to evaluate human nature and reach 
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the conclusion that happiness, defined as an excess of pleasure over pain, is the goal of human life.  
Furthermore, truth is demonstrated to be the means of attaining happiness and thus coextensive 
with happiness.  In Section I, reason and happiness (both coextensive with truth) are used as the 
standards to devise the moral rule.  Section I also contains the definition of nature, of truth, and of 
human actions as expressions of propositions.   
 In order to make the argument easier to follow I will present it in this reverse order, 
proceeding from Section III to Section I.  (Section IV remains last.)     
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A note on terminology  
 Wollaston considers truth, reason, and happiness to coincide.  He uses many terms to 
describe their relationship.   
 Happiness “abet[s] the cause of truth,” “[i]s...allied to it,” “they cannot...be parted” (II).    
 Happiness and truth “incur the one into the other,” are “consistent and coincident,” are 
“met together, and embrace each other,” “unite...amicably,” “are...the same” (II.xiv).    
 Happiness and reason “fall in each with [the] other” (III.xii).     
 Reason, truth, and happiness are “the same thing,” a “triple and strict alliance or union,” are 
“in the same interest,” “conspir[e] by the same methods” (III.xii), “always keep close together” 
(IX.iii.7).       
 I will use the term “coextensive” to refer to this relationship.   
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B.  THE RELIABILITY OF REASON: SECTION III, “OF REASON, AND THE WAYS OF 
DISCOVERING TRUTH” 
 The question Wollaston addresses in Section III is the validity of human cognition— 
whether reliable knowledge is possible.  The answer he offers is that reason is indeed a means of 
obtaining reliable knowledge.  However, by reason he means all deliberation, not only logical 
deductions.  He defines reason not only as a system of logical deductions from given premises but 
as a faculty of deducing reasonably reliable, good-enough-for-living, probable conclusions from a 
combination of sense information and axioms.  His epistemological view is influenced by John 
Locke and Richard Cumberland.   
 Although he uses reason to deduce the moral rule, even that deduction is based on 
empirical observation of nature in general and human nature in particular.  The definition of 
nature as a system of identities in relations (see discussion of RND Section I in section III.D 
below) is deduced from observation, as is the happiness standard of the moral rule (see discussion 
of RND Section II in III.C below), which is deduced from observation of human experience. 
 The role of truth within this theory is as the standard of knowledge.  A true proposition is 
one which accurately describes the world, that is, gives an accurate account of nature.  (For the 
definition of nature see section III.D below.)  Therefore, truth is coextensive with nature.    
Those propositions are true, which express things as they are: or, truth is the 
conformity of those words or signs, by which things are expressed, to the things 
themselves. Defin. (I.ii).   
 
This view is similar to Locke.  
 
Real truth is about ideas agreeing to things....But then it is they contain real truth, 
when these signs are joined, as our ideas agree; and when our ideas are such, as we 
know are capable of having an existence in nature: which in substances we cannot 
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know, but by knowing that such have existed.
96
   
 
Wherever we perceive the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, there is 
certain knowledge: and wherever we are sure those ideas agree with the reality of 
things, there is certain real knowledge.
97
  
 
And Cumberland:  
[T]he truth, the rectitude, the reality of propositions, entirely depends upon their 
conformity, their agreement with things themselves.
98
 
 
Wollaston’s view is that while some human knowledge consists of intuitively known axioms 
which cannot be doubted and therefore constitute certainly true propositions, in most cases the 
contents of a true proposition are obtained by empirical examination of the world.  Truth is a 
standard, not an end in itself, nor the abstract source of intuited moral principles.     
 Wollaston is usually classified as a rationalist and subject to criticisms such as this:   
It seems that they had created unnecessary problems for themselves by blinding 
[sic] adhering to one very arbitrary assumption: that reason is a strictly theoretical 
or speculative faculty, whose essential business is to determine the truth or falsity 
of propositions.  None of the rationalists conceived of reason as a practical faculty 
whose main task is to direct action, or to determine the ends of conduct, through 
imperatives rather than propositions.  This stubborn insistence upon seeing reason 
in a theoretical rather than a practical role made them formulate their criterion of 
morality in terms of truth and falsehood rather than universalizability.
99
 
 
This is ascribed to a “deeply conservative political ideology” in which “‘truth’ was the fact of 
late-seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century British society.”100  Thus Wollaston is depicted as 
                                            
96 Locke, Essay, IV.5.8.   
97 Ibid., IV.4.18.   
98 Cumberland, Laws of Nature, part 1, chapter 2, section 5:146.   
99 Frederick C. Beiser, The Sovereignty of Reason: The Defense of Rationality in the Early 
English Enlightenment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996):321.  For Wollaston’s 
position on universalizability see Chapter IV.B, proposition iii below.   
100 Ibid., 319.   
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“an extreme rationalist in ethics, desiring to give to contemporary moral judgments the force of a 
priori ethical intuitions.”101 
 However, Wollaston’s definition of reason is instrumental and in his moral theory its use is 
primarily empirical.  Furthermore, he regards most knowledge as being merely probable (in 
various degrees) and is thus very far from an idealized rationalistic certainty.  (As to political 
ideology, see Wollaston’s radically libertarian political philosophy in RND Sections VI and VII, 
chapter IV.B-C below.)   
 This is Wollaston’s definition of reason:  
That power, which any intelligent being has of surveying his own ideas, and 
comparing them; of forming to himself out of those, that are immediate and 
abstract, such general and fundamental truths, as he can be sure of; and of making 
such inferences and conclusions as are agreeable to them, or to any other truth, after 
it comes to be known; in order to find out more truth, prove or disprove some 
assertion, resolve some question, determine what is fit to be done upon occasion, 
etc. the case or thing under consideration being first fairly stated and prepared, is 
what I mean by the faculty of reason, or what entitles him to the epithet rational.  
Or in short, reason is a faculty of making such inferences and conclusions, as are 
mentioned under the preceding proposition, from any thing known, or given 
(III.viii).  
 
Furthermore, Wollaston regards reason and sense experience as equally valid sources of 
knowledge.   
[W]e are not only to respect those truths, which we discover by reasoning, but even 
such matters of fact, as are fairly discovered to us by our senses.  We ought to 
regard things as being what they are, which way soever we come to the knowledge 
of them (I.ix).    
 
In fact, he regards them as inseparable. 
Reason without observation wants matter to work upon: and observations 
                                            
101 Ralph E. Stedman, “Review of ‘Bishop Butler and the Age of Reason: A Study in the History 
of Thought’ by Ernest Campbell Mossner,” Mind NS 46, no. 184 (October 1937): 518.  Stedman 
argues against this view.   
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are...no[t] to be aptly applied without the assistance of reason (III.xvi).
102
     
 
With the caveat that this knowledge is mostly probable, not certain.   
Upon this account it is, that I add the word given at the end of my description of 
reason (III.viii.nl).    
 
Because this information is “given,” that is, sense information, as stated in the definition of reason 
above, most of it is only probable.  However, good reasoning produces knowledge that is good 
enough for human purposes.  It is also the only knowledge that is available to human beings, 
unlike God’s divine knowledge.   
The Supreme being has no doubt a direct and perfect intuition of things, with their 
natures and relations, lying as it were all before Him, and pervious to His eye: or at 
least we may safely say, that He is not obliged to make use of our operose methods 
by ideas and inferences; but knows things in a manner infinitely above all our 
conceptions (III.viii).  
 
 Thus, human knowledge is not intuitive, nor certain, but laboriously obtained by sense data 
(“ideas”) and reasoning (“inferences”).103  However, some of it does have a very high degree of 
probability.   
 Wollaston’s moral theory depends on the reliability of reason.   
It is necessary to consider whether there is a means of true and certain knowledge.  
If not [Section I, “Of Moral Good and Evil” and Section II, “Of Happiness” are] 
useless (III). 
 
That means is reason and thus he presents an argument for the validity of reason and a response to 
the denial of the validity of reason (III.ix).    
                                            
102 Compare with “Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind....The understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing. Only through their 
unison can knowledge arise.”  Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman 
Kemp Smith (New York: St Martin's Press, 1965): A51:B75.   
103 Whether revelation is a source of knowledge is not addressed in RND.  Presumably, it would 
have been addressed by a treatise Wollaston was composing at the time of his death.   
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 The argument may be summarized as follows: an intelligent being is defined as one who 
“[has] some immediate objects of his understanding; or at least a capacity of having such” (III.i).  
We have certain knowledge of the contents of our minds, that is, our immediate (unmediated) 
ideas.  (Wollaston’s immediate ideas are equivalent to Locke’s sensations.)  Because they are 
immediate they must be perceived truly (III.iii).  There are also relations of immediate ideas 
which are themselves immediate and thus also known immediately, e.g., the relation of whole and 
part.  Such relations are intuitively known axioms and cannot be doubted (III.iv).  From these 
immediate ideas and relations, non-immediate relations may be discovered by a chain of reasoning 
(III.vii).  As long as each step in such a series is true, the knowledge thus discovered is reliable, 
e.g., theorems (III.v).  The mind also contains immediate abstract and general ideas (III.ii).  
(Wollaston’s abstract ideas are equivalent to Locke’s reflections.104)  We have ideas that are not 
about any particular, such as logical and mathematical ideas with which we reason and 
demonstrate (III.ii).  The abstract ideas and the capacity for abstract thinking are innate.  They 
are not sense information, although sense information triggers their use (III.xiii).  Reasoning is 
done with these abstract ideas and with species (specific and abstract ideas), not with particulars.  
Reason is a general, universal instrument which is applied to particular cases (III.ii).   
 The ideas are different from “things in themselves” (III.iii).  While the perception of 
immediate ideas is always correct there can be mistaken perception of things which are not 
immediate but are represented by some media, e.g., the senses.  The mediate ideas provided by 
the senses can generally be relied upon, but are subject to correction by reason (III.xiii).  If there is 
                                            
104 “This is called abstraction, whereby ideas taken from particular beings, become general 
representatives of all of the same kind; and their names general names, applicable to whatever 
exists conformable to such abstract ideas....and thus universals, whether ideas or terms, are made.”  
Locke, Essay, II.XI.9.   
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no reason to doubt sense information that is reason enough to believe it
105
 (III.xiv).     
 Reason is the means of obtaining true information.  An objection to the reliability of 
reason is the considerable quantity of false reasoning that can be observed.  This false reasoning is 
due to various errors.
106
  Therefore, the term “right reason” is used to distinguish true from false 
reasoning.  Reason cannot discover truth in all cases but human knowledge may be greatly 
increased by it (III.ix).  By definition, a conclusion reached by right reason is true.  If it is not true 
then it is not right reason. 
That reason, which is right (by the meaning of the words) must conclude rightly: 
but this it cannot do, if the conclusion is not true, or truth (III.x).  
 
His view is similar to Cumberland’s.  
[W]hosoever determines things different from what they really are, does not 
determine according to right reason, neither does he employ his judgment right. 
[W]hosoever...either affirms or denies, just as the nature of the thing is, pronounces 
his judgment according to right reason.
107
 
 
Because reason is the faculty which discovers truth, acting according to reason is coextensive with 
acting according to truth.  
                                            
105 Compare with Locke: “And thus our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer 
and agree to those powers of things, which produce them in our minds, that being all that is 
requisite to make them real, and not fictions at pleasure. For in simple ideas (as has been shown) 
the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it; and can make to itself no simple 
idea, more than what it has received.”  Locke, Essay, II.30.2.   
106 The principal causes of the errors people make in their reasoning are: lack of faculties (having 
opinions about what they don't know or denying truths because they can't understand them); lack 
of reflection (not thinking about their ideas, using words without meaning, or words which do not 
correspond to any internal idea); lack of proper qualifications (ignorance or speculating outside 
one's area of expertise); lack of knowledge of how to determine a consequence; false memories 
(memory should not be absolutely relied upon); excessive reliance on sense; lack of retirement 
(not spending time alone thinking and considering one's ideas); emotions and prejudices; and 
stating the question badly or not defining the terms clearly (III.xvi).   
107 Cumberland, Laws of Nature, part 1, chapter 2, section 5:146.   
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To act according to right reason, and to act according to truth are in effect the same 
thing.  For in which sense soever the word reason is taken, it will stand either for 
truth itself, or for that, which is instrumental in discovering and proving it to be 
such (III.x).  
 
 Reason is part of human nature and thus it is part of nature.  It is also the nature of human 
beings to be governed by reason—it is not possible for human beings to decide not to act according 
to reason
108
 (III.xi).   
 The phenomenon of rationalization demonstrates that reason commands.  People may act 
in ways that are contrary to reason, but that they find it necessary to provide a supposed reason, 
however specious, for such actions, shows that they acknowledge the requirement to act according 
to reason.  As reason is part of human nature, and thus of nature, and as it is the nature of reason to 
command, therefore, acting according to right reason is acting in accordance with nature.  
 The same holds for sense information.  As it is reasonable to believe sense information 
when there is no reason to disbelieve it, then to act in accordance with reasonable sense 
information is to act according to reason and therefore according to nature .  
In this case to act according to them (i.e. as taking the informations of sense to be 
true) is to act according to reason (III.xv).  
 
 There are thus two ways of being assured of truth, or sufficient certainty to choose one's 
actions.  Reason, and sense subject to reason—supported, or at least unopposed, by reason.  By 
reason we discover speculative truths; by sense, or by sense and reason together we discover 
matters of fact (III.xv).    
 However, most reasoning is only probable.  It is possible to reason from premises which 
                                            
108 Either one has a reason for deciding this, or not.  If one has no reason then there is no basis 
for the decision and it fails.  If one does have a reason then one is acting according to reason.  
Therefore, reason must govern (III.xi).  Also, an argument against right reason is either without 
reason and meaningless, or uses reason and thus disproves itself (III.ix).   
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are only probable (or from those which are false).  In that case the results are only probable (or 
false).  
[O]ne may reason truly from that, which is only probable, or even false....But then 
what follows, or is concluded from thence, will be only probable, or false, 
according to the quality of that proposition, or those propositions, from which the 
inference is made (III.viii).  
 
To “reason truly” means the procedure followed is a true deduction from premises.  However, 
except for axioms, the premises may be only probable or false, although some of the products of 
reasoning may be very highly probable.   
 If the premises are true then the conclusion is true.  If the premises are hypothetical then 
the conclusion is hypothetical or conditional. 
That is...if the principles and premises from whence it results are true, and certainly 
known to be so, the conclusion may be taken as certain and absolute truth: but 
otherwise the truth obtained at the end of the argument is but hypothetical (III.x).     
 
It is reasonable to act according to probability when certainty is not available—which is the case 
most of the time.     
To conclude, that we ought to follow probability, when certainty leaves us, is plain; 
because then it becomes the only light and guide we have.  For unless it is better to 
wander and fluctuate in absolute uncertainty than to follow such a guide; unless it 
be reasonable to put out our candle, because we have not the light of the sun, it must 
be reasonable to direct our steps by probability, when we have nothing clearer to 
walk by (III.xvi).  
 
In reasoning concerning probable things, the following three rules should be used.   
Rule 1: What is in accordance with nature is probable.  
Rule 2. What has been constantly true may be assumed to be true unless there is definite evidence 
to the contrary, e.g., mortality.  
Rule 3. If the above are not available, then one should use the most knowledgeable and reliable 
reports.  
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 Rule 1 is the most important.  The application of all three rules together produces the 
highest probability (III.xvi).  
 What reasoning based on probability provides is something that approximates to truth, and 
for practical purposes serves as truth.   
Here then is another way of discovering, if not truth, yet what in practice may be 
supposed to be truth.  That is, we may by this way discover, whether such 
propositions as these be true, I ought to do this, rather than that; or, to think so, 
rather than the contrary (III.xvi).   
 
 Human beings have an obligation to act according to reason.  Because (right) reason is 
coextensive with truth, and truth is an accurate description of nature and thus coextensive with 
nature, then acting according to reason is coextensive with acting in accordance with nature.  
From this it follows that  
the dictates of it [reason] in particular cases are the particular laws, to which they 
[human beings] are subject (III.xi).  
   
That is, acting according to nature means acting according to whatever reason (rightly) concludes 
in every case.  Also, as it is reasonable to act according to the merely probable knowledge which 
is what we have most of the time “we are obliged to do it” (III.xvi).    
 To summarize, Wollaston’s view of reason is primarily empirical, not rationalistic.  Far 
from believing that one can obtain certain knowledge by finding some certain premises and 
making rational deductions from them, he regards nearly all knowledge as merely probable, 
though some of it is very highly probable.  He believes that for the purpose of existence as a 
human being, relying on this probable knowledge is reasonable and feasible, and that no matter 
how much one may yearn for God-like certainty, it just isn’t to be had.  Human beings should act 
according to such knowledge as they can acquire and not give that up because it is not perfect.  
Unfortunately, most of them have little knowledge and poor reasoning ability, due to lack of 
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education and other obstacles.  As the validity of reason (and sense data subject to evaluation by 
reason) is the foundational premise of his moral theory, his definition of reason as the means of 
obtaining empirical and probable knowledge means that his moral theory is based on empirical 
observation of nature in general and human nature in particular and does not constitute a series of 
rational deductions from given premises.  Nor does it contain claims about “a priori ethical 
intuitions.”        
 In this section (III), Wollaston argues that reason is coextensive with truth.  In Section I, 
he argues that truth is coextensive with nature.  Hence, reason is coextensive with nature and 
truth.  Therefore, acting in accordance with reason constitutes acting in accordance with truth and 
in accordance with nature.   
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C.  THE STANDARD OF MORALITY: SECTION II, “OF HAPPINESS” 
 In section II Wollaston argues that happiness, which is good, is also coextensive with truth.   
That, which demands next to be considered, is happiness; as being in itself most 
considerable; as abetting the cause of truth; and as being indeed so nearly allied to 
it, that they cannot well be parted.  We cannot pay the respects due to one, unless 
we regard the other.  Happiness must not be denied to be what it is: and it is by the 
practice of truth that we aim at that happiness, which is true (II). 
 
 His argument can be summarized as follows.   It is a self-evident fact of human nature that 
pleasure is good and pain is evil, and that happiness consists of an excess of pleasure over pain.  In 
order to attain happiness, it is necessary to perform the mathematical calculation of pleasures and 
pains.  However, one can attain happiness only if one performs the calculation correctly.  
Otherwise, one may do things which one may regard as leading to happiness but which do not lead 
to happiness because the calculation was incorrect.  Furthermore, this calculation must be done 
prospectively, that is, one must be able to calculate correctly the means of causing pleasure and 
avoiding pain.   
 Thus, in order to obtain happiness, one must accurately calculate what will produce 
pleasure and what will produce pain, how much pleasure and/or pain it will produce, and the 
means by which to obtain whatever produces pleasure and avoid whatever produces pain.    
 Only if one calculates accurately will the result be more pleasure than pain—which 
constitutes happiness.  That is, all the propositions that constitute the calculation must be true 
propositions.  One’s propositions concerning what causes pleasure must be true; one’s 
propositions concerning what causes pain must be true; one’s propositions concerning how much 
pleasure or pain the items under consideration cause must be true; one’s propositions concerning 
how to get whatever causes pleasure and avoid whatever causes pain must be true.  Only then will 
one succeed in producing more pleasure than pain, that is, happiness.  That is why happiness and 
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truth are coextensive.  Only when all one’s propositions (including those propositions expressed 
by actions) are true will one attain “true” happiness, that is, more pleasure than pain.  
Alternatively, if one’s propositions are false, one will not succeed in producing an excess of 
pleasure over pain, and thus produce unhappiness.   
 The argument has five steps.  1. He defines pleasure and pain (propositions i, ii, iii) and 
notes that perceptions of pleasure and pain are subjective.  2. The quantity of pleasure and pain is 
calculable (propositions iv, v, vi).  The net result of this calculation is true pleasure or pain.  3. 
Happiness is defined as the true excess of pleasure over pain (propositions vii, viii).  4. There 
follows a demonstration that seeking happiness is acting in accordance with nature (propositions 
ix, x).  5. Attaining happiness by acting in accordance with nature requires taking actions which 
express true propositions concerning the natures of things (this draws on propositions from Section 
I), which leads to the conclusion that truth and happiness are coextensive (propositions xi, xiv).    
 
1. Definition of Pleasure and Pain  
Pleasure is a consciousness of something agreeable, pain of the contrary: & v.v. the 
consciousness of any thing agreeable is pleasure, of the contrary pain (II.i).   
 
Pain considered in itself is a real evil, pleasure a real good (II.ii).   
 
By the general idea of good and evil the one [pleasure] is in itself desirable, the 
other [pain] to be avoided [Brackets in original] (II.iii). 
 
1A. Pleasures and pains are relative to the sensitivity of the subject 
Pleasures and pains are proportionable to the perceptions and sense of their 
subjects, or the persons affected with them.  For their consciousness and 
perception cannot be separated (II.i.obs.1).   
 
Whatever increases the power of perceiving, renders the percipient more susceptive 
of pleasure or pain (II.i.obs.2).   
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The causes of pleasure and pain are relative things: and in order to estimate truly 
their effect upon any particular subject they ought to be drawn into the degrees of 
perception in that subject (II.i.obs.3). 
 
2. Pleasure and Pain are calculable 
 The quantity of pleasure and pain can be calculated, therefore there is “moral arithmetic” 
(II.i.obs.3). 
 The calculation consists of three parts.  Calculating the perceptivity of the subject, the 
quantity of the experienced pleasures and pains, and the total result of the combination of pleasures 
and pains produced by an experience (and finally, by an entire life).   
Calculation 1: perceptivity. 
 The experience of pleasure and pain is subjective.  How much pleasure and pain is 
experienced by an individual varies depending on the perceptivity of the individual.  Therefore, 
the same experience does not produce the same quantity of pleasure and pain in different 
individuals.  Hence, pain and pleasure are relative.   
The causes of pleasure and pain are relative things: and in order to estimate truly 
their effect upon any particular subject they ought to be drawn into the degrees of 
perception in that subject (I.i.obs.3). 
   
The effects of pleasure and pain on an individual are calculated by multiplying the quantity of 
pleasure and pain by the degree of perceptivity.  Wollaston gives these examples: 
P = external stimuli; R = receptivity of individual. 
Case of A & B:  
A: P x R = 1.   
B has double the receptivity of A, and experiences half the stimulus: 
B = ½P x 2R = 1.   
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B received half the stimulus of A, but because his receptivity is double, his subjective  experience 
is of the same quantity. 
Case of C & D: 
C has 2 degrees of perceptivity and D has 3 degrees of perceptivity. 
C: P x 2R = 2,  D: P X 3R = 3. 
Therefore the perceptivity of D is 50% greater than perceptivity of C, and if the quantity of 
stimulus on D is doubled then,  
C: P x 2R = 2; D: 2P x 3R = 6. 
The experience of D is tripled (compared to C) because D is 50% more sensitive than C. 
 He gives the following as a practical example: if a rich man steals a sheep from a poor man 
the measure of the loss is not what such a loss would be to the rich man— insignificant, but what it 
is to the poor man, devastating; and adds that if the rich man regarded the severity of his action by 
his own perceptivity, then “[he] must be very defective in moral arithmetic, and little understood 
the doctrine of proportion” (II.i.obs.4). 
 From this it follows that there is no universally applicable formula for judging happiness,  
because the calculation for each individual depends on his subjective experience: 
Every man's happiness is his happiness, what it is to him; and the loss of it is 
answerable to the degrees of his perception, to his manner of taking things, to his 
wants and circumstances (II.i.obs.4). 
 
Calculation 2: quantity. 
 The quantity of pleasure or pain consists of the intensity multiplied by the duration.   
P = I x D.   
 The products of the calculations of pleasures and pains are in a ratio to each other. 
Pleasures can be compared with pains, pleasures with pleasures, pains with pains, 
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all may be equal, more, or less.  Because all the moments of the pleasure must bear 
some respect or be in some ratio to all the moments of pain: as also all the degrees 
of one to all the degrees of the other: and so must those of one pleasure, or one pain, 
be to those of another.  And if the degrees of intenseness be multiplied by the 
moments of duration, there must still be some ratio of the one product to the other 
(II.iv). 
 
Ratio = (Pl = I x D) : (Pn = I x D).  Or, R = Pl : Pn.   
Calculation 3: total of pleasure and pain. 
 To get the total, pleasures and pains are compared.  Equal pleasures and pains cancel each 
other, giving a total of zero.  When one of them exceeds the other, the calculation gives the “true 
quantity” of either pleasure or pain resulting from the matter under consideration.   
 Wollaston provides some sample calculations. 
Nine units of pleasure and nine units of pain cancel out.  9Pl - 9Pn = 0.   
Nine units of pleasure minus three units of pain produces a total of six units of pleasure.  9Pl - 3Pn 
= 6Pl “net and true.”   
Nine units of pain plus three units of pleasure produces a total of six units of pain. 
9Pn - 3Pl = 6Pn “net & true” (II.v).   
Thus the entire calculation is: 
Net = R x ((Pl = I x D) - (Pn = I x D)). 
Alternatively, if the intensity is determined by the receptivity then: 
Net = ((Pl = (I x R) x D) - (Pn = (I x R) x D)). 
 And this constitutes true pleasure or pain.  It is “true” because only when the correct total 
has been arrived at does one have an accurate view of the result of an action.   
 However, the calculations are complicated.  
As therefore there may be true pleasure and pain: so there may be some pleasures, 
which compared with what attends or follows them, not only may vanish into 
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nothing, but may even degenerate into pain, and ought to be reckoned as pains; and 
v.v. some pains, that may be annumerated to pleasures (I.vi).   
 
Pleasures may lead to pains, pains may prevent greater pains, and so forth.  Also, for most people, 
a little pain outweighs much pleasure.  It may follow that there can be pains so great that no 
pleasure outweighs them as the pain is so great that it reduces the pleasure to practically nothing 
(i.vi).
109110
   
 That the above is true is demonstrated by human behavior.  People constantly make these 
pleasure/pain calculations and seek to get a positive ratio of pleasure over pain.  That they make 
mistakes in their calculations does not refute that they are making these calculations.  They accept 
pains for the sake of greater pleasures; they prefer some pleasures (and pains) to others.  
Introspection also shows that we are indifferent to many pleasure/pain combinations which 
indicates that in such cases the pleasure and pain are equal, (a zero ratio) (I.iv). 
 
3. Definition of Happiness (as the result of the Pleasure/Pain calculation) 
Happiness differs not from the true quantity of pleasure, unhappiness of pain.  Or, 
any being may be said to be so far happy, as his pleasures are true, etc.  
 
That cannot be the happiness of any being, which is bad for him: nor can happiness 
be disagreeable.  It must be something therefore, that is both agreeable and good 
for the possessor.  Now present pleasure is for the present indeed agreeable; but if 
it be not true, and he who enjoys it must pay more for it than it is worth, it cannot be 
                                            
109 Some version of this argument goes as far back as Plato’s Protagoras (351b-358d). 
110 Also compare this with Locke: “[W]hat is apt to produce any degree of pleasure, be in it self 
good; and what is apt to produce any degree of pain, be evil; yet it often happens, that we do not 
call it so, when it comes in competition with a greater of its sort; because when they come in 
competition the degrees also of pleasure and pain have justly a preference.  So that if we will 
rightly estimate what we call good and evil, we shall find it lies much in comparison: For the cause 
of every less degree of pain, as well as every greater degree of pleasure, has the nature of good, and 
vice versa.”  Essay, II.21.42.   
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for his good, or good for him.  This therefore cannot be his happiness.  Nor, again, 
can that pleasure be reckoned happiness, for which one pays the full price in pain: 
because these are quantities which mutually destroy each other.  But yet since 
happiness is something, which, by the general idea of it, must be desirable, and 
therefore agreeable, it must be some kind of pleasure: and this, from what has been 
said, can only be such pleasure as is true.  That only can be both agreeable and 
good for him.  And thus every one’s happiness will be as his true quantity of 
pleasure (II.vii).   
 
The result of the calculation above was: Net = R x ((Pl = I x D) - (Pn = I x D)) or  
Net = ((Pl = (I x R) x D) - (Pn = (I x R) x D)).  Happiness is defined as the Net Amount of the 
calculation if the Net Amount is positive.  A negative Net Amount is defined as unhappiness.    
 Happiness by definition is good, agreeable, and “some kind of pleasure” (II.vii).  A 
present pleasure is agreeable, so does it constitute happiness?  Not necessarily.  A particular 
pleasure may lead to a pain that is greater than the pleasure and therefore the net total of that 
experience is pain, which is bad.  Also, a particular pleasure may lead to an equal pain and the net 
total of that experience is zero, which is not happiness.    
 In order for an experience to produce happiness, it must be a pleasure.  But because a 
pleasure which leads to an equal or greater amount of pain is not a pleasure it must be a pleasure 
which is still a pleasure after all the associated pain has been subtracted.  Only then would it fulfill 
the criteria of being desirable, agreeable, and good.  That is, the net amount of the pleasure/pain 
calculation must be positive.   
 For an entire life, whether a person is happy or unhappy is determined by the grand total of 
all the pleasure/pain calculations.    
That being may be said to be ultimately happy, in some degree or other, the sum 
total of whose pleasures exceeds the sum of all his pains: or, ultimate happiness is 
the sum of happiness, or true pleasure, at the foot of the account.  And so on the 
other side, that being may be said to be ultimately unhappy, the sum of all whose 
pains exceeds that of all his pleasures (II.viii). 
 
 
 58 
 
4. Happiness is coextensive with Nature 
 From self-evident propositions II.ii, that pleasure is agreeable and a real good, and pain is 
disagreeable and a real evil, and II.iii that pleasure is desirable (because good) and pain 
undesirable (because bad), and II.vii that happiness equals the quantity of true pleasure and 
unhappiness equals the quantity of true pain he deduces, as also self-evident, that making oneself 
happy is a duty.   
To make itself happy is a duty, which every being, in proportion to its capacity, 
owes to itself; and that, which every intelligent being may be supposed to aim at, in 
general (II.ix). 
 
As pleasure is naturally good and pain naturally evil, in seeking the excess of pleasure over pain 
that is happiness (and avoiding unhappiness, which is an excess of pain), an intelligent being is 
acting in accordance with its nature.  As it is one’s duty to act according to nature, it is one’s duty 
to seek happiness.   
 The same principle applies to others.  They are intelligent beings who by nature seek 
happiness and avoid unhappiness.  Therefore, treating human beings as beings who experience 
happiness and unhappiness and who desire happiness and are averse to unhappiness constitutes 
treating them as they are, that is, in accordance with their nature.  
We cannot act with respect to either ourselves, or other men, as being what we and 
they are, unless both are considered as beings susceptive of happiness and 
unhappiness, and naturally desirous of the one and averse to the other (II.x).   
 
 To summarize the argument to this point, why is happiness coextensive with nature?  
 It is natural, that is, a characteristic of human nature, to experience pleasure as good; it is 
natural to experience pain as evil; it is natural to seek pleasure; it is natural to avoid pain; the 
naturally sought-after condition of more pleasure than pain is defined as happiness; therefore, by 
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definition, it is natural to seek happiness, and it is natural to avoid its contrary, unhappiness.  The 
seeking of happiness is coextensive with nature because it is the nature of intelligent beings to seek 
happiness.   
 If the seeking of pleasure is natural, then why is not pleasure, rather than happiness,  
coextensive with nature?  That pleasure is good and pain bad is clear only when they are 
considered as abstract terms,  
What is here said, respects mere pleasure and pain, abstracted from all 
circumstances, consequences, etc. (I.iii).   
 
The complexity of experience means that the pleasures and pains produced by actions are mixed; 
because a pleasure can lead to a pain, a pain can lead to a pleasure, a pain can prevent a greater 
pain, and so forth.  This necessitates calculating the total result of this mix of pleasures and pains 
so as to produce more pleasure than pain.  Thus, only successful pleasure-seeking is the natural 
(though not necessarily successful) goal of human behavior, and this successful pleasure-seeking 
is not the same as a discrete, momentary pleasure which may turn out to be part of an ultimately 
painful experience, and thus successful pleasure-seeking requires a definition distinct from 
discrete pleasures, that definition being happiness. 
 
5. Happiness is coextensive with Truth 
 Thus far, it has been established that it is the nature and therefore the duty (4 above) of 
human beings to seek happiness.  How is that to be done successfully?  It can be accomplished 
only by acting in accordance with the nature of things (the nature of all things in addition to human 
nature.)  What constitutes acting in accordance with the natures of things?  Taking those actions 
which express true propositions concerning the nature of things.   
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As the true and ultimate happiness of no being can be produced by any thing, that 
interferes with truth, and denies the natures of things: so neither can the practice of 
truth make any being ultimately unhappy (II.xi). 
 
 In Section I, a true proposition was defined as one which accurately describes the nature of 
things.   
Those propositions are true, which express things as they are: or, truth is the 
conformity of those words or signs, by which things are expressed, to the things 
themselves.  Defin. (I.ii).   
 
Also, a central premise of this theory was stated, that propositions are expressed by actions, as well 
as words.   
A true proposition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by 
deeds, as well as by express words or another proposition (I.iii). 
 
(For the full discussion of this, see section III.D below.)  Hence, the deliberate actions one takes 
constitute expressions of propositions.  Only if the propositions expressed by one’s actions are 
true, that is, constitute an accurate description of the natures of things, can one obtain happiness.  
This is “the practice of truth,” which consists of “conforming [one]self to truth, and owning things 
and the relations lying between them to be what they are,” and “act[ing] according to nature and 
reality” (II.xi). 
 Happiness can be produced only by actions that produce a net positive amount in the 
pleasure/pain calculation.  Actions can produce a net positive amount only if they are in 
conformity with the natures of things.  Actions are in conformity with the natures of things if they 
express propositions that are true.  A true proposition is one that describes the natures of things 
accurately.  Hence, the conclusion that happiness is coextensive with truth.       
To conclude this section, the way to happiness and the practice of truth incur the 
one into the other (II.xiv). 
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 Wollaston addresses the problem of the suffering of good people and the well-being of evil 
people within his arguments concerning God (RND Section V) and the immortality of the soul 
(RND Section IX).  He offers several solutions to this problem—see Chapter IV.A, page 100-1 
below on Section V, and Chapter IV.E, pages 163 below on Section IX.  However, his principle 
argument is that this problem serves as proof of the existence of an afterlife, because as it cannot be 
that God is unreasonable, and as there are clearly cases of “oppressed innocence and flourishing 
wickedness” (IX.viii.4) it follows that there must be an afterlife in which this is corrected.  
Furthermore, it is likely that God has arranged matters in this way in order to provide proof of an 
afterlife (IX.viii.4).   
 In this section (II) Wollaston argues that seeking happiness constitutes acting in 
accordance with (human) nature.  In Section III (discussed above) he argued that reason is 
coextensive with truth.  In Section I (discussed below), he argues truth is coextensive with nature.  
Hence, the conclusion of Section III was that acting in accordance with reason, acting in 
accordance with truth, and acting in accordance with nature are coextensive.  In this section he 
argues not only that seeking happiness is in accordance with nature but that in order to seek 
happiness successfully it is necessary to act in accordance with nature, which means acting in 
accordance with reason and truth (which are coextensive with nature).  Which leads to the 
conclusion that happiness (and happiness-seeking) is coextensive with nature, reason, and truth.   
 
 
  
 
 62 
D.  THE MORAL THEORY OF RND: SECTION I, “OF MORAL GOOD AND EVIL” 
 In Section I Wollaston develops the moral rule. 
The foundation of religion lies in that difference between the acts of men, which 
distinguishes them into good, evil, indifferent. For if there is such a difference, 
there must be religion; & contra. Upon this account it is that such a long and 
laborious inquiry hath been made after some general idea, or some rule, by 
comparing the foresaid acts with which it might appear, to which kind they 
respectively belong. And tho men have not yet agreed upon any one, yet one 
certainly there must be. That, which I am going to propose, has always seemed to 
me not only evidently true, but withal so obvious and plain, that perhaps for this 
very reason it hath not merited the notice of authors: and the use and application of 
it is so easy, that if things are but fairly permitted to speak for themselves their own 
natural language, they will, with a moderate attention, be found themselves to 
proclaim their own rectitude or obliquity; that is, whether they are disagreeable to 
it, or not. I shall endeavour by degrees to explain my meaning (I).    
 
What does it mean that “if things are but fairly permitted to speak for themselves their own natural 
language”?  This refers to Wollaston’s definition of nature as a system of identities in relations. 
 “Nature” is constituted of everything that exists.  Whatever exists has identity—to exist is 
to have identity—not having an identity constitutes non-existence.   
Designedly to treat things as being what they are not is....flatly to deny the 
existence of any thing. For nothing can be true, no thing does exist, if things are not 
what they are (I.iv).
111
    
 
Because nature and existence are coextensive, and existence and identity are coextensive, nature 
and identity are coextensive, and thus the identity of anything constitutes its nature.   
 Identities stand in relations to each other which are determined by their natures.   
[T]his relation (or, if you will, the nature of this relation) is determined and fixed by 
the natures [identities] of the things themselves (I.iv).   
 
 The natures of identities and their relations are as fixed and certain as mathematical 
                                            
111 Compare with Locke: “[W]hatever exists any where at any time, excludes all of the same 
kind, and is there it self alone.”  Essay, II.27.1.   
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propositions, (though not as knowable as mathematics).  
And, beside this, they bear certain respects to things, which are not arbitrary, but as 
determinate and immutable as any ratio’s are in mathematics. For the facts 
[identities] and the things they respect [relations] are just what they are, as much as 
any two given quantities are; and therefore the respects [relations] interceding 
between those must be as fixed, as the ratio is which one of these bears to the other: 
that is, they must remain the same, and always speak the same language, till things 
cease to be what they are (I.iii).   
 
The relations among identities are fixed and certain, not a priori but a posteriori.  At any time T, 
there exists a state of affairs which consists of all identities and the relations in which they stand to 
each other.  For any moment of existence that has occurred, once it has occurred, the nature of the 
identities that existed at that moment and their relations are fixed permanently.  This does not 
mean that this arrangement of identities and relationships is permanent, it is not, as nature is a flux.  
The relation’s existence is not permanent, but the relation having existed is permanent.   
 What would constitute a description of this state of affairs, of all the identities and their 
relations, is also fixed permanently.  It is in this sense that things “speak.”  At time T and at all 
subsequent times, it is possible to describe the identities and their relations by propositions.       
 How does a proposition describing relationships of identities compare with a proposition 
describing a mathematical statement?  An example of a proposition describing a mathematical 
statement is: 
P(1) 1 + 1 = 2.   
This “ratio” is fixed and immutable.  It is always true.   
 An example of a proposition describing relations of identities is: 
P(2) At time T, X put a pen on a table.   
The “ratio” of X, the pen, the table, and the action at time T are as fixed and immutable as the 
mathematical statement.  This does not mean that the relation of X, pen, and table is permanent, it 
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can change a moment later, if X picks up the pen and moves it again.  However, once the 
existence of this relation—that at time T, X placed this pen on this table—has been established, its 
having existed is fixed and immutable and that P(2)  constitutes a description of this relation is 
fixed and immutable.  Hence, P(2) is always true, at and subsequent to time T.       
 The certainty of a possible description that could be made of identities and their relations is 
distinct from the possibility of identities and relations being knowable certainly by human beings.  
Although every and all identities and their relations which exist at every and all moments are fixed 
and certain, they are not knowable certainly by human beings.  Human knowledge is probable, 
not certain (III.xvi).   
 The gulf between the certainty of a description of a state of affairs and the limits of human 
knowledge may be illustrated by the following example.  Consider the relations among the leaves 
of a tree being blown by a breeze.  There is an almost infinite set of propositions that would 
describe the relation of every leaf to every other leaf at every moment.  The descriptions of the 
ever-changing positions of the leaves and their relations are definite even though they are nearly 
infinite.  Knowing them, however, is beyond human capacity.   
 That the nature of identities and their relations are as fixed and certain as those of 
mathematics (though not known to human beings as certainly as mathematics) leads to 
Wollaston’s argument that a moral rule that is derived rationally from nature is possible.   
 His argument can be summarized as follows.  Actions express propositions and do so with 
“more reality” than words, because actions create states of affairs, whereas words are merely 
symbolic expressions of mental states.  The propositions expressed by actions are true or false just 
as the propositions expressed by words are true or false.  Actions which express propositions 
which are false deny the identities and relations which constitute nature to be what they are, and 
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therefore are contrary to nature, and therefore wrong.  As it is the nature of human beings to be 
happiness-seekers, an act which expresses a false proposition and affects human happiness denies 
human nature and is immoral.  (It was established in Section II that “The way to happiness and the 
practice of truth” (II.xiv) are coextensive; therefore, such an act will diminish human happiness.)  
The rule is negative: it is wrong to perform any action which denies things to be what they are 
when such an action affects human happiness.  However, there is also a moral duty to act in 
accordance with human nature by seeking happiness.      
 The argument consists of the following steps.  1. Define what is a moral being 
(proposition i).  2. Define truth (correspondence definition of truth) (proposition ii).  3. 
Deliberate actions express propositions (proposition iii).  4. The propositions expressed by 
actions have “more reality” than those expressed by words because they create states of affairs 
(proposition iii).  5. The moral rule is stated in its first form: an act which deliberately denies the 
nature of anything, that is, denies “what is,” is wrong (proposition iv).  6. Omissions may also 
constitute denials of “what is” (proposition v).112  7. Moral good and evil are equivalent to right 
and wrong (propositions vii, viii).  8. Happiness is the standard by which the moral status of 
actions is calculated; the degree of wrongness or rightness is determined by the degree of 
unhappiness or happiness they bring about (proposition ix).  9. The definition of natural religion 
as moral obligation is stated (proposition x).  10. The moral rule is stated in its final form: a moral 
being should not act so as to contradict truth nor deny the nature of anything (proposition xi).   
  
                                            
112 Proposition vi is discussed in subsections 10.1 and 10.2, below.   
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1. Define what is a moral being 
 A moral being is one that is possessed of reason and free will.   
That act, which may be denominated morally good or evil, must be the act of a 
being capable of distinguishing, choosing, and acting for himself: or more briefly, 
of an intelligent and free agent (I.i).    
 
 Actions can be judged to be good or evil only if they are truly acts.  There is a distinction 
between what can act and what cannot act.  In order to act a being must be able to distinguish, 
choose, and act for itself from an internal principle.  Whatever does not possess these capacities 
cannot be said to act—it is only acted upon.  What is only acted upon is the same as inert matter 
and therefore is not subject to moral appraisal.  Only the actions of intelligent and free agents are 
truly acts and thus can be judged to be morally good or evil (I.i).   
 
2. Define truth 
 A correspondence definition of truth:  
Those propositions are true, which express things as they are: or, truth is the 
conformity of those words or signs, by which things are expressed, to the things 
themselves. Defin. (I.ii).
113
   
 
A true proposition is one that accurately describes nature.  Truth is an accurate description of the 
identities and their relationships, and hence of nature.   
 (For the exposition of this see Section B, above.)   
 
 
                                            
113 Compare with Cumberland: “From hence necessarily it follows, that the truth, the rectitude, 
the reality of propositions, entirely depends upon their conformity, their agreement with things 
themselves.  And it is as confessedly acknowledged also, that the truth of our apprehensions must 
be taken from the same correspondence.”  Laws of Nature, part 1, chapter 2, section v:146.   
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3. Actions express propositions 
 A central premise of this theory is that deliberate actions express propositions. 
A true proposition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by 
deeds, as well as by express words or another proposition (I.iii).   
 
 The argument may be broken down into these steps. 
 1. Actions, like everything that exists, have a nature consisting of identities in relations.  
(See beginning of this section above.)     
 2. The deliberate actions taken by rational agents express propositions, just as the words 
spoken by rational agents express propositions.  
There are many acts of other kinds [not gestures], such as constitute the character of 
a man's conduct in life, which have in nature, and would be taken by any indifferent 
judge to have a signification, and to imply some proposition, as plainly to be 
understood as if it was declared in words (I.iii).   
 
Natural language acknowledges that deliberate actions express propositions, that is, signify, by 
classifying some actions as “insignificant.”    
In common speech we say some actions are insignificant, which would not be 
sense, if there were not some that are significant, that have a tendency and meaning 
(I.iii).   
 
 3. The content of the propositions that deliberate actions express is determined by the 
nature/identity/relations of the actions, not by the knowledge (or intentions) of the agent.  The 
content of the proposition is determined by the state of affairs the actions have created.   
The truth or falsehood of this affirmation doth not depend upon the affirmer’s 
knowledge or ignorance (I.iii).   
 
 4. The propositions expressed by actions have a truth value, just as the propositions 
expressed by words have a truth value.   
Now what is to be understood, has a meaning: and what has a meaning, may be 
either true or false: which is as much as can be said of any verbal sentence (I.iii). 
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 5. The truth value of the propositions expressed by actions is determined by their 
nature/identity/relations, not by the mental state of the agent. 
 An example he gives is of friendly fire.  
If a body of soldiers, seeing another body approach, should fire upon them, would 
not this action declare that they were enemies; and if they were not enemies, would 
not this military language declare what was false? (I.iii).   
 
An objection offered to this is that soldiers are supposed to fight and therefore it is natural to 
suppose that the soldiers are firing on enemies; that is common sense.   
A pertinacious objector may perhaps still say...it is natural to conclude, that they are 
enemies against whom we see soldiers defending themselves....Ans. If it be natural 
to conclude any thing from them, do they not naturally convey the notice of 
something to be concluded?....[I]f this signification is natural and founded in the 
common principles and sense of mankind, is not this more than to have a meaning 
which results only from the use of some particular place or country, as that of 
language doth?  (I.iii).  
 
Wollaston responds that if it is natural to conclude thus, then the actions are naturally conveying 
the information leading to those conclusions.  Furthermore, if it is natural to draw conclusions 
from actions, then it follows that actions naturally convey the information from which the 
conclusions are drawn; which means the actions are signifying the information (just as words 
signify information); if this signifying of information is universal (which is implied by claiming 
that it is natural to draw those conclusions from those actions) then it is a conveyance of 
information which is universal, unlike culturally determined communications, such as language, 
symbols, and gestures.   
 To expand upon Wollaston’s statement, saying something in a language conveys a 
meaning that is only meaningful to a speaker of that language.  But an action conveys a meaning 
that is meaningful to everyone.  Hence the propositions expressed by actions are universally 
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understandable, unlike the propositions expressed by language.  This does not imply that 
everyone necessarily has the knowledge to interpret the propositions expressed by an action—it 
means actions are understandable, not that everyone is in a position to understand every action.  
Nor does it constitute a claim that actions can be understood simply by viewing them.    
 The identities and relations of acts are part of nature.  They are not arbitrarily determined 
by the agent.  Whereas language and customs are arbitrary social constructs, the identities and 
relations of actions, and the propositions expressed by them, are determined by their nature and are 
therefore unchangeable, and are not subject to social custom.  Therefore, the content of the 
propositions which actions express is determined by the nature/identity/relations of the actions, not 
by the knowledge (or intentions) of the agent.   
 The truth or falsity of the proposition is determined by the nature of things, not by the 
knowledge of the person performing the act.  In the friendly fire example, the soldiers who fire on 
a “body of troops” are asserting by that action the proposition that the soldiers they fire upon are 
enemies.  If those soldiers are not enemies, then the proposition expressed by the action is false.  
Its falsehood is determined by the nature of things, in this case, by the identity of the soldiers.  The 
belief of the soldiers who fire does not determine the truth or falsehood of the proposition that 
“those are enemy soldiers.”  What if it is a mistake?  It is still a false proposition regardless of the 
belief of the agent or speaker.  A person may express a false proposition while sincerely believing 
it to be true.   
 If an agent expresses the same proposition in words as he expresses in action then the truth 
value of both propositions is the same.  If he says, “Those are enemy soldiers,” he is expressing 
the proposition,  
(1)P(Words) Those are enemy soldiers.   
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If he fires at those soldiers, he is expressing the proposition,  
(2)P(Action) Those are enemy soldiers.   
Both propositions, the one expressed by words, and the one expressed by action, are the same.  
Therefore, their truth value is the same.  In this case, both are false. 
 To summarize the argument to this point, actions have a nature—like everything that exists 
they are identities in relations.  Actions also express propositions.  Propositions have truth 
values.  The truth value of propositions is determined by nature (identities in relations).  A true 
proposition is one which constitutes an accurate description of nature.  Therefore, true 
propositions are in accord with nature; actions which express true propositions are in accord with 
nature; truth is coextensive with nature.  From this it follows that actions which express false 
propositions are denying nature; they are denying the identities and relations which constitute 
nature to be what they are. 
 It is by this means that the connection between nature, truth, and the actions of rational 
beings is established.  Rational beings and the actions of rational beings are part of nature and thus 
have the character of all things which exist in nature, that is, they have an identity and they stand in 
relation to other identities.  The identities of actions are determined by their nature, not by the 
mental states of the agents performing them.  The actions express propositions.  The propositions 
expressed by the actions of rational beings have a truth value.  The truth value of the propositions 
expressed by the actions of rational beings is determined by whether they constitute an accurate 
description of nature, that is, of the relevant identities and relations.  An action that expresses a 
proposition which is false is therefore denying identities and relations to be what they are and is 
contrary to nature.   
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4. Propositions expressed by actions have “more reality” than propositions expressed by words 
 Actions have more reality than words because they create states of affairs, whereas words 
are merely symbolic expressions of mental states.  Also, words are social constructs, as are 
customs.  Both words and actions express propositions about nature, but the actions create new 
states of affairs (although words may create a new mental state in a person; and performatives may 
constitute an action).  
 All actions are part of nature and thus constitute identities in relations.  The propositions 
they express are determined by the identities and relations, not by the mental state of the agent.            
Words are but arbitrary signs of our ideas, or indications of our thoughts... but facts 
may be taken as the effects of them, or rather as the thoughts themselves produced 
into act; as the very conceptions of mind brought forth, and grown to maturity; and 
therefore as the most natural and express representations of them (I.iii).  
 
I lay this down then as a fundamental maxim, That whoever acts as if things were 
so, or not so, doth by his acts declare, that they are so, or not so; as plainly as he 
could by words, and with more reality. And if the things are otherwise, his acts 
contradict those propositions, which assert them to be as they are (I.iii).   
 
Actions express propositions concerning identities and relations with more reality than verbal 
propositions.  If the actions express propositions which are false, then they contradict the true 
propositions which describe the identities and relations as they are.  Actions which express false 
propositions about identities and relations, and thus about nature, are therefore denying identities 
and relations, and therefore nature, to be what they are.   
 
5. First statement of the moral rule: an act which “interferes” with a true proposition or denies what 
is, is wrong 
 An act which expresses a false proposition “interferes” with the relationships in nature and 
therefore it is unnatural.  Because: 
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1. Nature consists of identities in relations.       
2. A true proposition is one which constitutes an accurate description of nature (I.ii). 
3. An act expresses a proposition (I.iii). 
4. If the act expresses a false proposition then it, 
a. denies identities and relations to be what they are, 
b. and therefore denies nature,  
c. and therefore is unnatural, contrary to nature,  
d. and therefore is wrong in nature. 
 This is Wollaston’s definition of acting according to nature: refraining from taking any 
action which expresses a proposition that denies the identities and relations which constitute nature 
to be what they are.  
No act (whether word or deed) of any being, to whom moral good and evil are 
imputable, that interferes with any true proposition, or denies any thing to be as it 
is, can be right (I.iv). 
 
It should be noted here that the qualification “a being, to whom moral good and evil are 
imputable,” applies not only to whom the rule applies as actor, but also to whom the rule applies as 
subject.  That is, it only applies to actions which affect human beings.  (Although he discusses 
how animals should be treated in view of their being sensitive beings.) 
   Those propositions, which are true, and express things as they are, express the 
relation between the subject and the attribute as it is; that is, this is either affirmed 
or denied of that according to the nature of that relation.  And further, this relation 
(or, if you will, the nature of this relation) is determined and fixed by the natures of 
the things themselves.  Therefore nothing can interfere with any proposition that is 
true, but it must likewise interfere with nature (the nature of the relation, and the 
nature of the things themselves too [their identities]), and consequently be 
unnatural, or wrong in nature (I.iv).  
 
To deny identity is to deny existence and therefore to deny nature. 
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Designedly to treat things as being what they are not is the greatest possible 
absurdity....It is to subvert all science, to renounce all sense of truth, and flatly to 
deny the existence of any thing.  For nothing can be true, nothing does exist, if 
things are not what they are.    
 
To talk to a post, or otherwise treat it as if it was a man, would surely be reckoned 
an absurdity, if not distraction [confusion].  Why? because this is to treat it as 
being what it is not.  And why should not the converse be reckoned as bad; that is, 
to treat a man as a post; as if he had no sense, and felt not injuries, which he doth 
feel; as if to him pain and sorrow were not pain; happiness not happiness.  This is 
what the cruel and unjust often do (I.iv).   
 
 Why is it the case that to act so as to deny what things are, that is, to perform an act which 
expresses a proposition which is false constitutes a denial of existence?   
 To deny an entity’s identity is to deny its existence, because identity and existence are 
inseparable.  To exist means to have an identity.  To have an identity it is necessary to exist.  
Hence, to deny the identity of an existent thing is to deny its existence.  The example given is one 
in which the identity of an object is denied by claiming, via the propositions asserted by the agent’s 
behavior, that it is a different object whose identity is exclusive of the object denied.   
 There are two objects, X(person) and Y(post), whose identities are exclusive, X  Y.  
 The existence of object X may be denied  by a proposition that asserts that there is no 
object without specifying X:  
(P1) There is nothing here.   
Its existence may be denied by a proposition that asserts a specific denial that X exists: 
(P2) There is no X here.   
Its existence may be denied by a proposition that asserts that the object has an identity other than 
X, where that identity excludes X:  
(P3) There is object Y here.     
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It is the third case which is given as the example.   
 Asserting an identity excludes, and therefore denies, all other contradictory identities.  (It 
does not mean that an object cannot have more than one description, nor that its identity cannot be 
complex (see 10.1 below.)  Thus, the proposition:  
(P4) X is a rational being 
does not deny that X also has the identity of a happiness-seeking being, but proposition (P3) does 
deny the identity of X, the rational, happiness-seeking being, because the identity of being a post 
excludes the identity of being a rational, happiness-seeking being.   
 As previously defined (proposition ii), true propositions are those that accurately describe 
the identities of existing things.  Hence, to express false propositions about existing things 
(whether by words, or as here, by actions) is to deny their identities and therefore to deny their 
existence.   
 To deny an essential characteristic or part of an entity’s identity has the effect of denying 
its identity altogether and hence is a denial of its existence.  To treat a post as a man means to deny 
the existence of the post.  Conversely, to treat a man as a post denies the existence of the man.  
Such an action expresses proposition (P3).     
 To deny identity is also to deny nature, because the identity of an existing thing constitutes 
its nature.  (See beginning of this section above.)
114
   
 In the case of human beings, to deny human identity is to deny human nature (which is part 
of nature) and therefore to deny nature.  In Section III of RND “Of Reason,” it was established 
                                            
114 To put this in Kantian terms, to treat a person as an means and not an end is to treat him as an 
object (post) and not as a happiness-seeker (an end).  Objects, such as posts, are used, they are 
merely means, to the end, which is human happiness.   
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that human beings are rational beings, and in Section II of RND “Of Happiness,” that human 
beings are happiness-seekers.  Therefore, in the case of persons, to deny either that they are 
rational, or that they are happiness-seekers is to deny their identity, and therefore to deny their 
nature, and therefore is to act contrary to nature.     
 An objection that has been made to this theory is that if one expresses with words a 
proposition that constitutes a true description of the action of treating a person as what he is not, 
then one has met the requirement of not acting in such a way as to express a proposition that denies 
the nature of things.
115
   
 The objector may claim that he acknowledges that a human being is a human being while 
treating him as a post.  That is, he says, “I hereby acknowledge that you are a human being but I 
am going to treat you as though you are a post.”     
 If the objector claims a post can talk he is asserting what is false.  If he claims a man is a 
piece of wood, e.g., does not feel pain, he is asserting what is false.  If he claims that a man does 
feel pain but it is of no consequence, he is denying the nature of the man— that he desires to avoid 
pain—and thus is asserting what is false.  
 If the objector claims that there is no reason he should care that a man feels pain and desires 
not to, then he is appealing to reason.  It was established in Section III of RND, “Of Reason,” that 
reason is coextensive with acknowledging truth.  The objector then does have a reason for caring 
                                            
115 Feinberg states this objection using Hume’s straw-man example.  “Suppose Hume, to make 
things perfectly clear to his neighbor's wife, shuts the windows, pulls the blinds, and then 
announces: ‘I hereby declare that I am not your husband and you are not my wife, and that I am not 
about to treat you as if you were my wife, but rather I am going to act as if you are what you are in 
fact, namely, my mistress,’ and then proceeds to ‘take his liberties.’  It would be difficult to see in 
what way, then, Hume could be accused of acting ‘contrary to truth.’”  Feinberg, “Wollaston and 
His Critics,” 349.  For more on this see Section V.E below.   
 
 76 
that the man feels pain which he desires to avoid—that is the accurate description of the situation 
and therefore constitutes the rational view of it.   
 If the objector then claims that he does not intend to act according to reason but only in 
accordance with his wishes, and therefore reason is not an argument against his actions, then he is 
asserting that he is irrational.  But acting contrary to reason is acting against nature, because it is 
the nature of human beings to act according to reason and because reason consists of 
acknowledging nature.  (See section III.B above  for the argument as to why reason governs.)  
Because his actions deny nature, specifically, the rational nature of human beings (in his case), and 
the happiness-seeking nature of human beings (in the case of the other person), he is acting 
contrary to nature.   
 Such an action denies both the rational nature of human beings, because it rejects reason, 
and the happiness-seeking nature of human beings.  
 
6. Omissions may also constitute denials of “what is” 
 In addition, sometimes omissions, that is, deliberate choices not to act, may constitute a 
denial of true propositions. 
What has been said of acts inconsistent with truth, may also be said of many 
omissions, or neglects to act: that is, by these also true propositions may be denied 
to be true; and then those omissions, by which this is done, must be wrong for the 
same reasons with those assigned under the former proposition (I.v).  
 
 Actions express propositions only concerning those things to which they have a relation.  
It is therefore much more difficult to judge omissions.  Whether not performing an action 
expresses a proposition that is false is far more difficult to determine than the truth or falsity of a 
proposition expressed by an action.  But in some cases, not performing an action expresses a 
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proposition that is false.   
But yet there are some neglects or refusals to act, which are manifestly inconsistent 
with it [truth] (or, with some true propositions) (I.v).   
 
For example, if a person promises to do something but deliberately does not do it, he is expressing 
the false proposition that he did not make the promise.  (But see section 10.2 below on conflicting 
obligations.)       
 Refraining from avoiding unhappiness and seeking happiness, and from taking those 
actions which would bring this about, constitutes denial of human nature and the nature of 
happiness, and thus constitutes the expression of false propositions concerning them.   
  Again, there are some ends, which the nature of things and truth require us to aim 
at, and at which therefore if we do not aim, nature and truth are denied. If a man 
does not desire to prevent evils, and to be happy, he denies both his own nature and 
the nature and definition of happiness to be what they are. And then further, 
willingly to neglect the means, leading to any such end, is the same as not to 
propose that end, and must fall under the same censure (I.v).     
 
 It is difficult to know how to seek happiness and avoid unhappiness.  The ability and 
opportunity to seek happiness vary considerably and some people have no chance of doing so.  
Lack of knowledge of how the world works, and luck, make it difficult.  However, not doing what 
one is able to do constitutes an omission.   
 In the case of some types of actions, not performing a particular instance of such an action 
does not constitute the expression of a false proposition but never performing that particular type 
of action does constitute the expression of a false proposition. 
There are omissions of other kinds, which will deserve to be enumerated to these by 
being either total, or notorious, or upon the score of some other circumstance (I.v).   
 
The examples he gives are, for a person of means not to give charity to a particular poor person 
does not express a false proposition, but for him never to give charity expresses false propositions 
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concerning the condition of the poor and of himself.  Not to pray at a particular time or in a 
particular manner does not express a false proposition, but never praying does express a false 
proposition (that God does not exist).  Not helping someone in an emergency when one is able, 
denies human nature (as a happiness-seeker and a social being) and also denies what one would 
want if the situation were reversed.   
 
7. Moral good and evil are equivalent to right and wrong 
When any act would be wrong, the forbearing that act must be right: likewise when 
the omission of any thing would be wrong, the doing of it (i.e. not omitting it) must 
be right.  Because contrariorum contraria est ratio (I.vii).   
   
Moral good and evil are coincident with right and wrong (I.viii).   
 
 The standard of morality is conformity to nature.  In preceding propositions it was 
established that nature consists of identities in relations, that a true proposition is one which 
constitutes an accurate description of nature, and that actions express propositions.  From this it 
followed that if an action expresses a false proposition then it denies identities and relations to be 
what they are; as nature consists of identities in relations, denying identities and relations to be 
what they are constitutes denying nature; what denies nature is, by definition, unnatural or contrary 
to nature; what is contrary to nature is wrong in nature; what is in accordance with nature is right in 
nature.  The actions of intelligent and free agents are subject to classification as good or evil 
(proposition i).  Therefore, if an intelligent and free agent’s actions are in accordance with nature 
(express true propositions), that is, are right in nature, then they are morally good.  If an intelligent 
and free agent’s actions are contrary to nature (express false propositions), that is, are wrong in 
nature, then they are morally evil.    
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8. Happiness is the standard by which the moral status of actions is calculated 
 Because the nature of human beings is that of happiness-seekers, the degree of wrongness 
of an action which expresses a proposition which is false, i.e., denies nature, is determined by the 
quantity of happiness it reduces. 
Every act therefore of such a being, as is before described, and all those omissions 
which interfere with truth...are morally evil, in some degree or other (I.ix).   
 
While all truths are equally true, they vary in importance, that is, in the degree of unhappiness their 
denial produces.  Thus while all denials of truth are equally false, they are not all morally equal, 
because their moral importance is judged by the amount of unhappiness they cause.   
 An example Wollaston offers is a comparison of the amount of happiness affected by the 
theft of a book with that affected by the theft of an entire estate.  The book provided some 
pleasure and the owner was deprived of that.  The loss of the estate deprives him of all his 
pleasures, and also deprives his family and his heirs.  It is therefore a much greater loss of 
happiness to the owner (and his heirs).   
 This answers an objection that has been made to this theory, that, under it, all denials of 
truth are morally equal because all truths are equally true.  
I think his notion of moral good and evil makes all truths not only moral, but 
equally so; or, in other words, all truths are in themselves of equal importance, 
according to his definition; and the agreement or disagreement of our actions with 
them, equally moral or immoral.
116
    
 
If then significancy of falsehood be the very same with moral evil, all crimes must 
be equal.
117
 
                                            
116 [Bott], Principal and Peculiar, 9.   
117 [Francis Hutcheson], An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections with 
Illustrations on the Moral Sense, 4th ed. (London: W. Innys, etc., 1756): 274, 
http://www.books.google.com.  Spelling, capitalization, and italicization have been modernized.   
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The true defects in Wollaston’s theory of violated truth as the essence of all 
immorality are the same as those of the ancient Stoic systems of which it is an 
explication.  The theory cannot explain why some immoral acts are worse than 
others, and presupposes in still other ways antecedent moral principles that are 
irreducibly distinct from it.
118
   
   
Wollaston explicitly rejects this part of the Stoic view:  
This may serve for an answer to Chrysippus, and them who say ‘That if no one truth 
be greater than another truth, nor no one falsehood greater than another falsehood; 
then neither is one fraud nor one sin greater than another’ (I.xi.nn).   
 
The degree of wrongness is determined by the quantity of harm to human happiness done by the 
action.    
 The rule is negative.  It says what not to do—deny truth, by taking as action which 
expresses a proposition which is false and which affects human happiness and thus denies the 
happiness-seeking nature of human beings.
119
   
 The rule does not call for “acting according to truth.”    
Acting according to truth, as that phrase is used in the objection,
120
 is not the thing required 
by my rule; but, so to act that no truth may be denied by any act (I.xi). 
 
9. The definition of natural religion as act obligation is stated 
If there be moral good and evil, distinguished as before, there is religion; and such 
as may most properly be styled natural. By religion I mean nothing else but an 
obligation to do (under which word I comprehend acts both of body and mind...) 
                                            
118 Feinberg, 351.   
119 This negative approach is somewhat prefigured by a statement by Francis Bacon “And in this 
latter sense chiefly does the soul partake of some light to behold and discern the perfection of the 
moral law, a light however not altogether clear, but such as suffices rather to reprove the vice in 
some measure, than to give full information of the duty.”  Quoted in Forsyth, “Place of 
Cumberland,” 35.   
120 “If I want money, don't I act according to truth, if I take it from some body else to supply my 
own wants? And more, do not I act contrary to truth, if I do not?” (I.xi.obj.3).   
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what ought not to be omitted, and to forbear what ought not to be done (I.x).   
 
10. Final statement of the moral rule 
That every intelligent, active, and free being should so behave himself, as by no act 
to contradict truth; or, that he should treat every thing as being what it is (I.xi).   
 
 Treating things as being what they are means treating them in accordance with their nature.  
Inasmuch as truth, that is, true propositions, constitutes an accurate description of nature, not 
contradicting truth means not contradicting nature.  The rule then, is to act in accordance with 
nature by treating everything as it is, that is, in accordance with its nature, which is done by not 
performing acts that express false propositions and thereby contradict truth and nature.  
 Acting in accordance with nature (treating things as what they are) requires: 
1. Considering all the relevant attributes of the identities and relations in question (i.e., their 
nature). 
2. Dealing with cases of conflicting moral obligations. 
3. Recognizing the limited nature of one’s reason and knowledge. 
4. Acting in accordance with the happiness-seeking nature of human beings. 
 
1.  Considering all the relevant attributes of the situation.     
 Treating things as what they are, that is, acting in accordance with their identities and 
relations that constitute their nature, requires taking into consideration all the attributes of the 
situation that are relevant to the action being considered, and only those that are relevant.   
In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it must be considered not only what it is 
in itself or in one respect, but also what it may be in any other respect, which is 
capable of being denied by facts or practice: and the whole description of the thing 
ought to be taken in (I.vi). 
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 The responses to two objections demonstrate how relevance and irrelevance are to be 
considered.   
Objection 1: 
If every thing must be treated as being what it is, what rare work will follow? 
For...to treat my enemy as such is to kill him, or revenge myself soundly upon him 
(I.xi.obj1). 
 
Objection 2:  
To use a creditor, who is a spend-thrift, or one that knows not the use of money, or 
has no occasion for it, as such, is not to pay him (I.xi.obj2).  
 
 The answer to Objection 1 is, inasmuch as all the relevant identities and relations 
concerning a situation must be considered, that E is an enemy is not the only relevant fact 
concerning him.  Other relevant facts are that he is a human being, and therefore to be treated 
according to common humanity.  He is also a fellow-citizen, and so to be treated according to the 
laws which include the social contract not to engage in private vengeance.  Objector is also a 
member of the society, and hence of the social contract and is subject to these laws.  If Objector 
treats E contrary to these laws, he denies their existence.  Therefore, Objector should treat E as a 
complex being who is “a man, a fellow-citizen, and an enemy” (I.xi).   
 The answer to Objection 2 is that Objector is claiming to be a judge over the creditor (i.e., 
entitled to deprive him of property), which is a false assertion.  Objector is also claiming what 
cannot be true, that he knows certainly the creditor’s future as well as present circumstances.  He 
denies the creditor’s money to be his, which is a false proposition.  If he is a creditor then the 
money is owed to him; if it is owed to him, then he has a right to it; if he has a right to it, it is his.  
If Objector (the debtor) keeps the money, he treats it as if it were his own, which asserts a false 
proposition.  To pay the creditor asserts only the proposition that the money is due to him—it is 
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not expressing a proposition about anything else (such as his lifestyle) (I.xi). 
 It may appear that the responses to Objections 1 and 2 contradict.  Should one consider all 
true propositions concerning identities and relationships, or not?  The answer is that one must 
consider all the relevant true propositions.  All the true propositions that are relevant to the issue 
under consideration, not all true propositions under the sun.  To disregard relevant true 
propositions produces a wrong result.  But to consider irrelevant true propositions also produces a 
wrong result.   
 In the case of the first objection, that the enemy is a human being, and that there is a social 
contract, are relevant true propositions that must be considered in order to arrive at a correct 
evaluation of the situation.   
 In the case of the second objection, as the issue is whether to pay money owed, the relevant 
question is whether it is a true proposition that the money is owed.  The action of paying the 
creditor asserts only the proposition that he is owed the money (the money is his) and that 
proposition is true.  As paying him the money does not assert propositions about any other 
identity or relation, propositions about other identities (e.g., he is a spendthrift) or relations (how 
he relates to money) are not relevant.   
 An objection that may be raised is that the rule does not answer the question of how the 
relevant facts are to be determined.  But that question is not particular to this moral theory—it 
applies to all moral theories and to human cognition in general.  Every moral theory requires 
selecting the relevant facts in order to make a judgment.  In the case of Kantian ethics, how does 
one determine which element of the situation is to be universalized?
121
  In the case of Aristotelian 
                                            
121 “[Kant’s] rule about universalizable maxims is useless without stipulations as to what shall 
count as a relevant description of an action with a view to constructing a maxim about it.”  G. E. 
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ethics, how does one decide which virtue applies?  In the case of utilitarianism, how does one 
calculate the greatest happiness for the greatest number in the face of the practically infinite 
variables involved?   
 The problem of relevance applies to all human cognition.  The world is indeed a 
blooming, buzzing confusion, and in order to reason about any topic it is necessary to determine 
what are the relevant elements of the subject under consideration.  At this point it becomes a 
question of epistemology.     
 Acting in accordance with nature means taking into account the relevant identities and 
relations in all their complexity and excluding those that are irrelevant.  There is no question that 
this can be very difficult.  Wollaston acknowledges this in the last objection:  
Lastly, how shall a man know what is true: and if he can find out truth, may he not 
want the power of acting agreeably to it? (I.xi). 
 
He addresses the first part of the question in Section III of RND "Of Reason, and the Ways of 
Discovering Truth" (see section III.B above) and the second part in Section IV “Of the Obligations 
of Imperfect Beings with Respect to Their Power of Acting” (see section III.E below).  
    
2.  Conflicting moral obligations. 
 All truths are true, therefore they cannot contradict each other.  However, there can be 
truths which support conflicting positions.   
[T]here are not indeed opposite truths, but there are truths on opposite sides (I.vi).   
 
                                                                                                                                            
M. Ancombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy 33 no. 124 (January 1958): 2, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3749051.   
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Moral obligations may be, indeed, often are, conflicting.  In the case of conflicting obligations the 
principle stated above applies.  All the relevant truths concerning the identities and relations have 
to be considered for a correct moral decision to be reached.    
Here the importance of the truths on the one and the other side should be diligently 
compared (I.vi).     
 
The importance of the truths is evaluated by their effect on the happiness of the persons involved.     
 Wollaston’s position is summarized by Ralph Stedman:  
First, we may note the divergence of this view from that of [W. D. Ross], which, in 
a way, it anticipates.  According to the latter, the conflict is between some few or 
more of a definite number of intuitively discerned ‘prima facie duties,’ whereas for 
Wollaston—who seems to me closer to actual moral experience—the conflict is 
between the demands of an indefinite number of elements in a complex situation, to 
each of which (could they be dissevered) taken alone the ‘truthful’ or ‘appropriate’ 
act would not be obscure, but which taken together offer a problem of well-nigh 
insurmountable difficulty.  Wollaston is almost painfully aware of the hindrances 
in the way of the discovery of the ‘just right’ act in any really serious moral 
situation.
122
   
 
3. Epistemic continence. 
 Treating things as being what they are includes treating one’s knowledge in accordance 
with its nature, that is, limited.   
In the mean time I shall only say, that if in any particular case truth is inaccessible, 
and after due inquiry it doth not appear what, or how things are, then this will be 
true, that the case or thing under consideration is doubtful: and to act agreeably unto 
this truth is to be not opinionative, nor obstinate, but modest, cautious, docile, and 
to endeavour to be on the safer side. Such behaviour shows the case to be as it is 
(I.xi). 
 
The limitations of knowledge are discussed in Section III of RND “Of Reason and the Ways of 
Discovering Truth” (see section III.B above), and the obligations incurred with that limited 
                                            
122 Stedman, “Ethics of Wollaston,” 223.   
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knowledge are discussed in Section IV of RND “Of the Obligations of Imperfect Beings with 
Respect to Their Power of Acting” (See section III.E below) and in Section IX of RND “Truths 
Belonging to a Private Man, and Respecting (directly) Only Himself” (See Chapter IV.E below).   
 
4. The positive moral obligation. 
 While the moral rule is negative—not to act in such a way as to deny the nature of 
anything, both the nature of human beings as happiness-seekers, and the nature of anything else 
which affects their happiness—there is also a positive moral obligation to act in accordance with 
one’s nature by seeking happiness.  Not acting to seek happiness amounts to not desiring 
happiness and not desiring happiness constitutes not acting in accordance with human nature.  
Thus, human beings have self-regarding duties.     
 There is a positive moral obligation to act in accordance with one’s nature, which is that of 
a happiness-seeker, by seeking happiness.   
To make itself happy is a duty, which every being, in proportion to its capacity, 
owes to itself; and that, which every intelligent being may be supposed to aim at, in 
general (II.ix-x). 
 
There is also an obligation to treat other human beings in accordance with their nature, which is 
that of happiness-seekers.   
We cannot act with respect to either ourselves, or other men, as being what we and 
they are, unless both are considered as beings susceptive of happiness and 
unhappiness, and naturally desirous of the one and averse to the other (II.ix-x).   
 
To act in accordance with one’s nature as a happiness-seeker requires taking those actions which 
promote happiness and avoiding those actions which promote unhappiness.  Not to do so amounts 
to not seeking happiness.   
[W]illingly to neglect the means, leading to any such end [happiness], is the same 
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as not to propose that end, and must fall under the same censure (I.v). 
 
 What then constitutes morally good behavior?  Not taking any action which expresses a 
proposition which denies any truth which affects the happiness of a human being.  Taking those 
actions whose omission would assert a proposition which denies any truth which affects the 
happiness of a human being.  Also, taking those actions which bring about one’s happiness.   
 In addition, some acts may have so little effect that their moral significance is almost 
non-existent.   
[T]hough to act against truth in any case is wrong, yet, the degrees of guilt varying 
with the importance of things, in some cases the importance one way or the other 
may be so little as to render the crime evanescent or almost nothing (I.xi.ans5.1).   
 
Any act which is neither a denial of truth nor required by duty may or may not be done (I.ix).   
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E.  THE EXTENT OF MORAL OBLIGATION: SECTION IV, “OF THE OBLIGATIONS OF 
IMPERFECT BEINGS WITH RESPECT TO THEIR POWER OF ACTING” 
 Section IV of RND, “Of the Obligations of Imperfect Beings with Respect to Their Power 
of Acting,” defines the extent of moral obligation.  It is a response to the last objection in Section 
I: whether someone who knows the truth may not be able to act according to it. 
The question was this, If a man can find out truth, may he not want the power of 
acting agreeably to it? (IV).   
 
In the preceding section (Section III of RND, Chapter III.D) the foundational principle of acting in 
accordance with nature was used as the basis of the development of the moral rule.  To 
recapitulate:  
 Moral good and evil are defined as acting in accordance with or contrary to nature.  Those 
acts which are in accordance with nature are morally good.  Those acts which are not in 
accordance with nature are morally evil.  Acts which are morally good are right and acts which 
are morally evil are wrong by the definition of the terms (I.viii).   
 The standard for determining which acts are in accordance with nature and which are not is 
truth.  That is because true propositions describe nature as it is (I.ii) and therefore are in 
accordance with nature and false propositions deny nature and therefore are contrary to nature; 
nature and truth are coextensive.   
 Intelligent and free agents express propositions by their actions (I.iii).  These propositions 
have a truth value.  Actions which express true propositions are therefore in accordance with 
nature and actions which express false propositions are contrary to nature (per proposition I.ii).   
 It therefore follows that as actions which express true propositions are in accordance with 
nature, and acting in accordance with nature is morally good and therefore right, then actions 
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which express true propositions are morally good and therefore right; and, actions which express 
false propositions are contrary to nature, and as acting contrary to nature is morally evil and 
therefore wrong, then actions which express false propositions are morally evil and therefore 
wrong (I.iv).  (See Section D.7 above.)      
 The term “acts” refers only to actions performed by beings which are intelligent and free 
agents, that is, which can act from an internal motive, because everything else does not act but is 
merely acted upon.   
That act, which may be denominated morally good or evil, must be the act of a 
being capable of distinguishing, choosing, and acting for himself: or more briefly, 
of an intelligent and free agent (I.i).
123
    
 
It is this ability to act from an internal motive that is the source of moral obligation.   
[A human being] is conscious of a liberty in himself to act or not to act; 
and...therefore he is...a being whose acts may be morally good or evil (IX.ii.5).   
 
 This ability creates the necessity of choice because deliberate human action is not 
determined.  The necessity of choice in turn makes it necessary to have some basis on which to 
make choices.  That basis is acting in accordance with nature (this includes the defining 
characteristics of human nature: rationality (RND Chapter III, see Section III.B above) and 
happiness-seeking (RND Chapter II, see Section III.C above)).  Only undetermined human beings 
have a choice as to whether to act in accordance with nature or contrary to it.  All other beings are 
determined and hence “act” in accordance with their nature and with nature in general.  Thus, it is 
human nature itself (which is a part of nature) which is the source of moral obligation and 
accordance with nature which constitutes the definition of moral good and evil.  Those actions 
                                            
123 Compare with Locke: [No]thing can be capable of a law that is not a free agent.  Essay, 
I.3.14.   
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which are in accordance with nature are morally good.  Those actions which are contrary to nature 
are morally evil.    
 However, while intelligent and free agents can act from an internal motive, and only acts 
performed from such a motive constitute acts, and thus only such acts can be morally good or evil, 
intelligent and free agents are not free in all aspects of their existence; in some parts of their 
existence they are acted upon, just as inanimate objects, plants, and animals are (this is discussed 
in detail in Section IX of RND, see Chapter IV.E below).  Like inanimate objects they are subject 
to physical forces (IX.ii.1); like plants and animals, they experience growth, decay, and death and 
have physical needs which must be met in order to survive (IX.ii.2); like animals they have senses, 
feelings, and their actions affect their well-being (IX.ii.3).  
 Thus, as their moral obligation is derived from their ability to act from an internal motive, 
and is coextensive with it, and as their ability to act from an internal motive is not absolute but 
limited, then it follows that the extent of their moral obligation is also not absolute but limited and 
is therefore coextensive with the capacity to act from an internal motive.   
 Wollaston's argument is that obligation is a property of the capacity to act.  If the capacity 
to act does not exist then it can have no properties because non-existence has no properties.  
Hence a capacity which does not exist cannot have the property of being obligatory.   
 Thus, Wollaston’s definition of the extent of moral obligation is a form of the principle that 
“ought implies can.”124 
                                            
124 Compare the following discussion with Kant’s statement “The action to which the ‘ought’ 
applies must indeed be possible under natural conditions.” Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
A548:B576.  While both Wollaston and Kant define human beings’ freedom as the source of 
moral obligation, their definition of freedom differs, as for Wollaston empirical observation is the 
source of the definition of the human capacity for free choice (see quote from IX.ii.5 above) while 
Kant derives freedom from the distinction between noumenal and phenomenal nature while 
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 The argument consists of seven propositions.  1. What does not exist cannot incur an 
obligation (proposition i).  2. What does not have a power to act cannot incur an obligation to act 
(proposition ii).  3. Objects do not have a power to act and animals do not have a power to act 
above sense, therefore they cannot incur an obligation to act (proposition iii).  4. Intelligent beings 
have a power to act deliberately, therefore they incur an obligation to act which is equal to their 
power to act (proposition iv).  5. That power to act is called endeavour, which is doing as much as 
one can (proposition v).  6. Therefore, the moral obligation of an agent is to endeavour, that is, do 
as much as one can (proposition vi).  7. Final definition of moral obligation in accordance with the 
preceding Sections (proposition vii).   
 The argument in this section is based upon the premises stated in proposition I.i.  The 
existence or non-existence of the capacity to act is the starting point, in accordance with the 
definition of agency.   
Nothing is capable of no obligation. For to oblige nothing is the same as not to 
oblige (IV.i).  
 
 In order for an obligation to exist, the capacity to perform the obligatory act must exist; if 
the capacity does not exist, then because what does not exist has no properties, it is not possible for 
non-existence to have the property of having an obligation.  Therefore,    
So far as any being has no power, or opportunity of doing any thing, so far is that 
being incapable of any obligation to do it...For that being, which has not the 
faculties or opportunity necessary to the doing of any thing, is in respect of that 
thing a being utterly unactive, no agent at all, and therefore as to that act nothing at 
                                                                                                                                            
rejecting empirical observation as the source for morality.  Cumberland also expresses a view 
similar to Wollaston’s: “[A]ccording to the laws of both natural and moral philosophy, no other 
assistances towards an happy life are required from us, as we are accountable agents, than as such 
natural and moral laws concern the rules of free actions, and of such objects to them (i.e., to free 
actions) respectively belonging, as lie within the capacity or sphere of human freedom.”  Laws of 
Nature, part 1, chapter 1, section 4:10.   
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all (IV.ii).    
 
The first proposition in RND established the standard for moral obligation as the capacity to act 
from an internal motive, that is, of being “an intelligent and free agent” (I.i); it was also established 
that only such internally motivated acts constitute acting at all and that all other beings do not act 
but are determined.  From this it follows that human action constitutes action only when it is from 
an internal motive and that in those cases where the person does not have the capacity to act from 
an internal motive, that person is “unactive,” not acting, but determined just as all non-human 
beings are determined.  Because the capacity to act from an internal motive is the standard for 
moral obligation then in cases where that capacity does not exist moral obligation does not exist.  
Where action—defined solely as internally generated—is not possible, then an agent, which by 
definition is what can act, does not exist either, hence is “nothing” (or to put it in current terms, 
agency does not exist).      
 The definition of the capacity to act is somewhat Newtonian. 
To require or command one to do any thing is to require him to apply a power 
superior to the resistance to be met with in doing it (IV.ii).   
 
 Where the capacity to act does not exist, it is nothing, nonexistent, and what does not exist 
cannot incur obligations.   
But if he has no such power, then his power of that kind and degree is nothing: and 
it is nothing that is required to be applied (IV.ii). 
 
Concerning an act which is impossible for a being to perform, the being is not an agent.  If the 
capacity to act does not exist, that is, it is nothing, then the requirement is nothing, that is, does not 
exist.  Wollaston gives the following example:   
It is just the same, as if a man was commanded to do something with his third hand, 
when he has but two; which would be the same as to bid him to do it with no hand, 
or not bid him do it (IV.ii).   
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 A corollary of proposition IV.ii (and I.i) is that because inanimate objects do not have a 
capacity to act, they cannot incur an obligation to act; and as animals do not have a capacity to act 
above sense, they also cannot incur an obligation to act.
125
 
Inanimate and unactive beings are capable of no obligation: nor merely sensitive 
[animals] of any obligation to act upon principles, or motives above sense (IV.iii).  
 
 The second corollary of propositions IV.ii and I.i is that as intelligent beings (agents) have 
a capacity to act deliberately they therefore incur an obligation to act which is coextensive with 
their capacity to act. 
The obligations of beings intelligent and active must be proportionable to their 
faculties, powers, opportunities; and not more (IV.iv).  
 
 The term for acting in accordance with one’s capacity to act is “endeavour,” which is 
defined as doing as much as one can.  This is the extent of moral obligation as defined in 
proposition iv.  
To endeavour may fitly express the use of all the opportunities and powers, that any 
intelligent and active, but imperfect, being hath to act.  For to endeavour is to do 
what one can....so none can do more (IV.v). 
 
However, while there is an obligation to use the capacities one has, there is no certainly as to the 
success of the use of those capacities.     
One may exert his endeavours with greater advantage or success, than another; yet 
still they are but endeavours (IV.v).
126
 
                                            
125 “[Animals] perceive by moments, without reflection upon past or future, upon causes, 
circumstances, etc.” (II.i.obs.8).   
126 Compare this with Cumberland.  “First, this self-evident truth, that the propensity towards 
effecting any end, cannot be stronger and more operative than the determined purpose and 
inclination of the agent, to act, in all cases, to the very best of his abilities.” Laws of Nature, part 1, 
chapter 1, section 6:15.   
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 As obligation is coextensive with the capacity to act, and acting to the extent of one’s 
capacity to act is endeavour, then a moral agent’s obligation is to endeavour.   
The imputations of moral good and evil to beings capable of understanding and 
acting must be in proportion to their endeavours: or, their obligations reach, as far 
as their endeavours may (IV.vi).   
 
Thus, the definition of moral obligation in accordance with all the preceding Sections is: 
 
 They who are capable of discerning truth, though not all truths, and of acting 
conformably to it, though not always or in all cases, are nevertheless obliged to do 
these, as far as they are able: or, it is the duty of such a being sincerely to endeavour 
to practice reason; not to contradict any truth, by word or deed; and in short, to treat 
every thing as being what it is (IV.vii).   
 
 The question answered by this Section was asked at the end of Section I, in which the moral 
rule was stated.  The question was whether, even when a person knows what would constitute 
acting in accordance with a rational assessment of a situation, and in such a manner that his actions 
do not express a proposition which is false, and thus treat the identities and relations involved as 
what they are, is it not possible that he may be unable to act in accordance with this knowledge?   
 The answer is that it is indeed possible, and therefore, the moral obligations of human 
beings are defined and delimited by their capacities.  Their obligation to act is coextensive with 
their capacity to act.  However, it is not less than their capacity to act and thus they have a moral 
obligation to make their best efforts to fully use their capacity to act.    
Every one can endeavour: every one can do what he can.  But in order to [do] that 
every one ought to be in earnest, and to exert himself heartily; not stifling his own 
conscience, not dissembling, suppressing, or neglecting his own powers (IV.vii).    
 
Thus there is a moral obligation to develop one’s capacities, including reason, to use one’s reason 
to learn what constitute true descriptions of relevant identities and relations, and develop one’s 
capacities to carry out the conclusions reached by reason.   
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 The extent of this obligation is discussed in detail in Section IX, proposition iii (See 
Chapter IV.E below).  It will be summarized briefly here.         
 There is an obligation to improve one’s reason (IX.iii.6).  As reason is the distinguishing 
characteristic of human nature, by improving our rational faculties we become more rational and 
thus improve our nature.  However, people’s opportunities and capacities for improving their 
reason can be limited.  Therefore, the extent of one’s obligation to improve one’s reason is 
determined by one’s opportunities—as established in proposition ii above.  
 There is an obligation to learn from others (IX.iii.7).  This acknowledges true propositions 
concerning one’s nature—that one has limited knowledge and capacity, is fallible, and that it is 
possible for someone else to be more knowledgeable.  (To deny these true propositions would 
violate the moral rule.)  Everyone can get information from others.  The less a person knows the 
more he should seek to learn from others.     
 This does not mean following blindly the opinions of others, who are also fallible human 
beings, but listening to their arguments and using one’s own reason to determine what is 
reasonable to believe.  
 There is an obligation to overcome one’s prejudices (IX.iii.[8]).  One should work to 
eliminate preconceptions which prevent one from reasoning correctly and impartially.   
Everyone begins life in ignorance and then tends to be influenced by irrational ideas and 
eventually becomes set in them.  It is therefore necessary to work to clear one’s mind of them 
because they hinder good reasoning.  By doing so one makes one’s reason fit for use.   
 The way to find out the extent of one’s capacities is to use them, as opposed to 
preemptively claiming one does not have them.   
The short way of knowing this certainly is to try.  If he can do nothing, no labor 
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can be lost; but if he is capable of acting, and doth not act, the consequences and 
blame must be justly chargeable upon himself (IV.vii).    
 
 Virtue consists in using rightly whatever capacities one has.  There is a distinction 
between virtue and good fortune.  People have beneficial characteristics such as good looks, 
wealth, health, fortitude, etc., by nature.  Because they are given by nature they are not virtues but 
advantages.  Those who lack these beneficial characteristics are not therefore lacking in virtue 
when they do not use capacities that they do not have (per proposition IV.i).  Therefore, the extent 
of a person’s virtue depends on the extent to which he uses his capacities rightly—a person who 
has less of a beneficial characteristic and does as much as he can with it is as virtuous as one who 
has more and does the greater amount that he can with it (IX.iv).   
 
The universalization of morality 
 Wollaston also uses his system to derive the universalization of moral principles by 
applying the principle that morality consists of treating things as they are.  This is in Section VI of 
RND and is discussed in Chapter IV.B below.  Meanwhile, here is an illustrative quote.     
Let us suppose some rule, by which if all mankind would agree to govern 
themselves, it would be in general good for the world: that is, such a practice would 
be agreeable to the nature and circumstances of mankind.  If all men should 
transgress this rule, what would be the consequence of such an universal revolt?  A 
general evil, or something disagreeable to our nature and the truth of our 
circumstances (VI.iii).   
 
 97 
CHAPTER IV.  WOLLASTON’S APPLICATION OF HIS MORAL THEORY 
 In the remaining sections of RND (V-IX), Wollaston applies his moral theory to derive 
principles of religion (Section V), political theory (Sections VI and VII), and personal conduct 
(Sections VIII and IX).    
 Wollaston’s positions fall within the views of his era; however, he uses his moral rule to 
derive them.  His views on religion (Section V) are conventional; Chapin, for instance, 
characterizes them as “orthodox in a distinctively Anglican manner.”127  His political theory 
(Sections VI and VII) lies within the tradition of natural law and natural equality that flows from 
Aquinas and the prominent Anglican theologian Richard Hooker through Locke and Cumberland.  
His approach differs from Locke’s as it constitutes a deduction from premises which does not use 
historical examples, and has a different starting point for property rights.  His views on family life 
(Section VIII) have an emphasis on marriage as a means of happiness for the married couple that 
extends beyond marriage as primarily a means of procreation.  His account of obligation (Section 
IX) is based on the definition of human beings as rational, and the definition of obligation and its 
extent that were presented in Sections I and IV respectively.         
 
                                            
127 Chapin, “Was Wollaston a Deist?” 73.   
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A.  RELIGION: SECTION V, “TRUTHS RELATING TO THE DEITY. OF HIS EXISTENCE, 
PERFECTION, PROVIDENCE, ETC.” 
 In Section V Wollaston develops his views concerning God.  He offers two proofs for the 
existence of God—first cause and design, deduces conclusions about the nature of God, argues 
against some different views, for particular providence, provides answers to the problems of 
prescience and evil, and sets forth the proper attitude human beings should have towards God.   
 He presents the first cause proof of the existence of God (V.i, V.ii, V.iii) and then makes 
deductions about the nature of God.  God is eternal (V.iv), infinite (V.iv), incomprehensible 
(V.v), perfect (V.vi, V.xvi), and singular (V.vii).  All beings depend upon him for their existence 
(V.viii), and therefore he is the author of nature (V.ix).      
 He argues against some other conceptions of God.  God cannot be corporeal (V.xi), for if 
he were, neither matter nor motion could exist (V.xiii).  He cannot be  
infinite space, nor infinite duration, nor matter infinitely extended, or eternally 
existing, nor any, nor all of these taken together (V.xii)  
 
as this would lead to various unreasonable conclusions (such as Spinoza’s (V.xii.nn)).   
 Nor can other terms substitute for God.  Neither “chance” nor “fate” constitute causes.  
“Nature” is used carelessly and has several meanings none of which constitute a cause, except 
when it is used as a metonymous term for God, but that does not constitute a replacement for God 
(V.xiv).   
 He also presents the argument from design for the existence of God (V.xiv, V.xv, V.xvii).   
 He offers an argument for particular providence—that God acts in the world.  As God’s 
knowledge and understanding are perfect, he knows the future, including the acts of free agents.  
It is not impossible that God could a) design particular cases without disrupting the general laws of 
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nature; b) knowing how people will freely act, arrange to put them in the world in such a place that 
their actions not only fit a general plan but affect particular individuals; c) influence people’s 
minds without interfering with free will via “insinuations and impressions;” and d) may have 
means of acting in particular cases that are beyond human knowledge and do not disrupt the 
general laws of nature.   
 God treats everything as what it is.  Therefore, the natural laws governing material objects 
treat them as they are—always the same—and are therefore simple, few, and constant.  But 
“intelligent, active, free beings” must be ruled differently.  Because they are beings who can 
choose to behave as they should, or not; are susceptible to pleasure and pain; are aware that they 
owe their existence to God, or not; and whose cases vary greatly (unlike inanimate objects), 
therefore, how God acts towards them must be different from the way he applies natural laws to 
matter.  For particular cases to be treated as they are—virtuous or vicious—is reasonable.  As 
God is perfect, he must act according to reason,  otherwise he would have the imperfection of 
being unreasonable.  As his knowledge and power are perfect he must be able to do so.  What is 
not impossible must be possible for God.  Therefore, if it is possible that there is particular 
providence then it must be (V.xviii). 
 However, this leads to the problem of prescience.  If God knows the future, he knows it 
certainly, therefore it is certain, therefore there is no freedom.  The answer is that   
the nature of a thing is not changed by being known, or known before hand 
(V.xviii).     
 
The example he gives is that if he sees something, it is certain it is there, but it is not there because 
he sees it, he sees it because it is there.  Therefore,  
it is a future choice of the free agent, that determines the prescience, which yet may 
be infallibly true (V.xviii).   
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Another example is that some individuals can predict what will happen much better than most 
people due to their greater understanding,  
Observe what sagacity there is in some men, not only in respect of physical causes 
and effects, but also of the future actings of mankind (V.xviii).   
 
Therefore God, with his infinite understanding, can predict the future freely-chosen acts of free 
agents without determining them (V.xviii).     
 God’s perfection also leads to the problem of evil.  Wollaston denies Manicheanism— 
there is no independent existence of evil.  Not being able to account for the existence of evil is 
caused by our ignorance.  Some things seem evil because we cannot see the whole picture and 
some physical evils are necessitated by physical goods.  Matter cannot be perfect and therefore 
must have some evils.  Therefore, to ask why God permits evil is the same as asking why he 
permits a material world and human beings to exist.  Many evils are caused by wrong behavior 
and are therefore the fault of the agent.  They may also be means to happiness that cannot be 
obtained otherwise.  There are more good than evil things in the world (V.vii).    
 In response to the objection that good people suffer and evil people flourish and therefore 
the world is not ordered according to God’s reason, he answers that we don’t know certainly who 
is good or bad, nor what is good or bad for other people, what they experience, how they 
experience it, and what it leads to.  Furthermore, people are part of larger groupings such as 
families, nations, and humanity.  This is a condition of their being which leads to great 
inequalities.  The good may suffer and the bad may gain from large scale events because the good 
of the whole takes precedence over individual cases when they conflict (V.xviii).   
 Lastly, this problem is rectified in the afterlife in which the good are compensated and the 
bad punished.  That an afterlife is necessary to do this serves as proof that there is an afterlife.   
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If what is objected be in many instances true, this only infers the necessity of a 
future state (V.xviii).     
 
This happens so often in order to convince us of the certainty of a future state, because denying a 
future state means asserting that God is unreasonable, which is impossible (V.xviii).  (Wollaston 
addresses this issue further in Section IX, propositions vi-xvii; see Section E below.)     
 Behaving correctly towards God means a) not representing him by images; b) when 
speaking and thinking of God being very careful about our choice of words and understanding 
them in their sublimest sense; c) worshiping God as best we can, acknowledging what he is and 
what we are by a solemn and proper act of thoughtfully composed prayer; and d) having a correct, 
rational, non-superstitious view of God (V.xix).   
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B.  THE BASIS OF POLITICAL THEORY: SECTION VI, “TRUTHS RESPECTING 
MANKIND IN GENERAL, ANTECEDENT TO ALL HUMAN LAWS” 
 In Sections VI and VII Wollaston develops a political philosophy
128
 by applying his moral 
rule to humanity in general, beginning with human beings in a state of nature in Section 
VI—“Truths Respecting Mankind in General, Antecedent to all Human Laws,” and then the 
development of society in Section VII—“Truths Respecting Particular Societies of Men, or 
Governments.”         
 This section defines the rights human beings have in a state of nature.  However, the 
conditions of human beings in a supposed state of nature are not the basis of the argument; rather, 
their rights are deduced from the nature of their existence as rational, sensitive beings.  
Wollaston’s views concerning the state of nature for human beings are discussed in Section VII of 
RND (see Section C below).     
 The idea of property is central to his political philosophy.  However, property in this 
theory is a concept that comprehends far more than material goods.  Property begins with the 
person, who has property in his life, body, and actions, which are activities of the self.  These 
actions include labor, by means of which this right to property extends outward to material goods.  
A person’s property therefore includes any interactions, whether trade or other, which he has with 
the world and other persons.  Thus, property here means freedom, the freedom to act in the world, 
including interactions with other people, not only with material goods.  This conception of 
property is seamless; it proceeds from the self, to the actions of the self, and to external goods; 
                                            
128 There are also elements of economic theory and moral psychology in his discourse. 
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there is no cleavage between individual rights and property rights—they are all the same right.  
This theory begins with the nature of human beings as individuals; rather than start with land or 
society it begins with personhood and proceeds outwards.   
 Wollaston’s theory of natural equality is in the tradition of Aquinas, Hooker, and Locke, 
but developed in more detail than Locke’s.  His property rights theory is a departure from Locke's 
in its emphasis on property rights as emanating from the individual's ownership of himself, rather 
than Locke's focus on distribution of land originally granted by God to all humanity.  He also 
develops the consequences of individuation leading to property at considerably more detail than 
Locke’s mixing theory.129  His social compact theory is derived explicitly from the application of 
his moral philosophy, of the truth and happiness standards, including the right to pursuit of 
happiness.      
 Note: the headings below are mine.   
 
Proposition i—Individuation 
Every man hath in himself a principle of individuation, which distinguishes and 
separates him from all other men in such a manner, as may render him and them 
capable of distinct properties in things (or different subjects of property) (VI.i).  
 
 Individuals exist so distinctly that any property which one possesses cannot be possessed 
by another.  This is self-evident— 
The proof of this I put upon every man’s own conscience (VI.i).   
This leads to the question of whether there is anything which truly belongs to someone.  
   
                                            
129 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Mark Goldie (London: Everyman, 1993), 
Second Treatise, ch. 5, sec. 27:128.   
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Proposition ii—Self-possession 
There are some things, to which (at least before the case is altered by voluntary 
subjection, compact, or the like) every individual man has, or may have, such a 
natural and immediate relation, that he only of all mankind can call them his (VI.ii).   
 
 Life and body belong so much to a person they are indistinguishable from his self.  The 
labor of a person is his because it is the product of his body and capacities; his labor cannot be that 
of another, any more than his body can be the body of another.
130
   From this it follows that to 
claim the labor of another is a denial of truth, as it denies the labor to be that of the one who 
performed it.  (It was established in Section I that it is wrong to perform an act which expresses a 
proposition which is false, that is, denies things to be what they are.)           
 This immediate relation to one’s life, body, and the products of one’s labor constitutes the 
individual’s property rights.  What if others claim this property?  All of their claims are 
equal—equally invalid.  That is, if B performs some labor, and C then claims it, so can D, E, F, 
etc.  Because all their claims are equal they cancel each other and only B’s property right remains.  
 
Proposition iii—Universal Good 
 A general rule for human beings may be deduced from human nature.  In Section II it was 
established that it is the nature of human beings to seek happiness and that the means of attaining 
happiness is acting in accordance with nature.  In Section I it was established that acting in 
accordance with nature is coextensive with acting in accordance with truth, that is, performing acts 
which express propositions which are true.   
                                            
130 Compare with Locke: “[E]very man has a property in his own person.  This nobody has any 
right to but himself.  The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly 
his.”  Ibid.   
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From this follows a universal rule—that the purpose of society and laws is human happiness.     
Whatever is inconsistent with the general peace and welfare (or good) of mankind, 
is inconsistent with the laws of human nature, wrong, intolerable (VI.iii).    
 
Those maxims may be esteemed the natural and true laws of any particular society, 
which are most proper to procure the happiness of it.  Because happiness is the end 
of society and laws (VI.iii).    
 
If happiness is not the end of society and laws then unhappiness is; that would imply that 
unhappiness is desirable.  However, it was established in Section II that the seeking of happiness 
is human nature; therefore the seeking of unhappiness would be contrary to nature and hence truth.   
 What is true for particular societies is also true for humanity at large, which may be  
considered as one global society.   
And what is said of a particular society is not less true, when applied to the 
universal society of mankind (VI.iii).   
 
In which case,     
Now those things are most apt to produce happiness, which make the most men 
happy (VI.iii).   
 
Those laws which promote the happiness of humanity are the true laws of humanity (because they 
are in accordance with human nature as defined before).  Those laws which interfere with human 
happiness are contrary to nature (human nature) and truth (they deny the happiness-seeking nature 
of human beings).  Laws which favor some people at the expense of others cannot be general laws 
of human nature because they treat some human beings differently from others even though all 
human beings have the same nature.      
It is contradictory to say, that any thing can be a general law of human nature, 
which tends only to favor the pleasures of some particulars to the prejudice of the 
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rest, who partake of the same common nature (VI.iii).
131
  
 
Which leads to a somewhat utilitarian argument.   
 
As a million of men are more than one; so, in fixing the public laws of human 
nature, and what ought to be, or not to be, they must in reason be more regarded by 
a million of times; for here we consider men only as men. (VI.iii).   
 
In considering all of humanity which is made up of individuals who are rational animals, the global 
society may be considered as a rational animal as well.   
For if mankind may be said in general to be a rational animal, the general welfare of 
it must be the welfare of a rational nature; and therefore that, and the laws which 
advance it, must be founded in reason; nor can be opposed by any thing, but what is 
opposite to reason, and consequently to truth (VI.iii).  
 
At times, Wollaston considers a society to be an entity, as in,  
[T]he society may be considered as one body, that has common interests and 
concerns (V.xix.3).   
 
His argument is that the global society of all human beings, all of whom have the nature of being 
rational animals, may be considered, for the purpose of deriving universal laws, as an entity, 
which, being made up of rational animals, is a rational entity, and that therefore, universal human 
welfare is the welfare of a rational entity.  Therefore, its well-being is that of a rational nature.  
From this it follows that the laws governing it must be based on reason—and thus be in accordance 
with its nature.  It was established in Section III that reason is the means of discovering truth.  
Thus, a law that is contrary to reason is contrary to truth, that is, it expresses a false proposition.  
                                            
131 Compare with Cumberland’s argument (in response to Hobbes) that if reason dictates that A’s 
happiness consists of seeking to take everything from B and C, then it also dictates that B’s and C’s 
happiness consists of taking everything from A.  This constitutes a contradiction.  Therefore, 
one’s private happiness and only one’s own, cannot be the ultimate end.  “The private happiness 
prescribed by reason for each individual to prosecute, is essentially connected and joined with the 
happiness of others.  And this is the common good which, we argue, ought to be pursued by all.” 
Laws of Nature, part 2, chapter 5, section 16:328-9.  That is the only ultimate end which is 
consistent with the happiness of all the individuals, and produces it.   
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In Section I it was established that an action which expresses a false proposition is morally wrong.  
Hence, a law which is contrary to reason is “wrong and morally evil” (VI.iii).     
 This leads to universal rules.  (In the following paragraph I have inserted numbers to key 
to the explanation which follows.) 
[1] Let us suppose some rule, by which if all mankind would agree to govern 
themselves, it would be in general good for the world; that is, such a practice would 
be agreeable to the nature and circumstances of mankind.  [2] If all men should 
transgress this rule, what would be the consequence of such an universal revolt?  A 
general evil, or something disagreeable to our nature and the truth of our 
circumstances....[3] And as wrong it would be in any one man; because all the 
individuals have equal right to do it, one as much as another; and therefore all as 
much as any one.  [4] At least it is certain, that whoever should violate that rule, 
would contribute his share towards the introduction of universal disorder and 
misery; [5] and would for his part deny human circumstances to be what they are, 
public happiness to be what it is, and the rule to be what it really is, as much as if all 
others conspired with him in this iniquity and madness (VI.iii).      
 
 1. If there is a rule which is good in general it would be so because it is in accord with the 
nature of human beings in general, hence, it would be in accordance with nature.  It was 
established in Section II that acting in accordance with nature is necessary to attain happiness, 
therefore, such a rule would establish happiness in general.  Thus, if everyone follows this rule 
everyone’s good would result and it would be in accordance with the “nature and circumstances” 
of human beings.     
 2. If everyone broke such a rule the result would be general unhappiness.  To act in such a 
way as to bring about unhappiness is contrary to the human nature of happiness-seeking; it is 
therefore contrary to nature.  In Section I it was established that acting contrary to nature is 
contrary to the moral rule.   
 3. If it is wrong for one person to act contrary to nature or to a rule that is in accordance 
with nature (as established in Section I), then it is wrong for more than one or for all of them to do 
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so, and therefore it is wrong in all cases.     
 4. Whoever violates such a rule (one that tends to general happiness) is acting in such a way 
as to increase unhappiness.  And thus is acting contrary to the happiness-seeking nature of human 
beings, hence contrary to nature, hence contrary to the moral rule.     
 5. A person who does this (violates a rule which tends to general happiness) by such acts 
denies human circumstances, that is, that human beings are happiness-seekers and that happiness 
is attained by acting in accordance with nature (Section II); denies that general (public) human 
happiness is attained by following such a rule; and denies the existence of the rule by taking an 
action which expresses a proposition which contradicts the rule.    
 To summarize, if there is a rule which is good in general, is in accordance with the nature of 
human beings (is rational and true and tends to happiness), then if everyone violated it, the result 
would be general unhappiness—which would be contrary to nature (of human beings as 
happiness-seekers) and truth (true propositions about human beings).  It would be wrong for an 
individual to do so because such an act would deny that all individuals have an equal right to 
(pursuit of) happiness, deny human nature (true propositions about human nature and that human 
beings are happiness-seekers), and deny what the rule is (by action).   
 A person who acts so as to violate such a universal rule is pitting his desires against the 
happiness of all humanity.  He disregards everyone else’s good and separates himself from it and 
therefore excludes himself from humanity.  Therefore, such a person should be regarded as and 
treated as  
an alien and enemy to the common happiness and tranquility of our species (VI.iii).   
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Proposition iv—Reciprocity 
 A rational view of human beings leads to a principle of reciprocity.  
Whatever is either reasonable or unreasonable in B with regard to C, would be just 
the same in C with respect to B, if the case was inverted (VI.iv).
132
   
 
In Section III, proposition ii it was established that reasoning is conducted by abstract ideas, not by 
particulars.  Hence, 
reason is universal, and respects cases, not persons.  (See sect. III, pr. [ii]) (VI.iv).    
 
From this it follows that a good way to judge other people is to consider how we would view things 
in their place (VI.iv).
133
   
 A rational view of human beings also leads to a principle of equality (and a response to 
Hobbes).
134
  
 
Proposition v—Equality 
In a state of nature men are equal in respect of dominion (VI.v).      
(There is an exception for children.  The explanation is in RND Section VIII which deals with 
                                            
132 Compare with Cumberland: “It necessarily therefore follows that he who determines, 
concerning the right of another, otherwise than what he determines as to his own right, contradicts 
himself in a matter most notoriously well known.” Laws of Nature, part 2, chapter 5, section 
16:332.   
133 See also: “Should I, in the last place, find a man grievously hurt by some accident, fallen 
down, alone, and without present help like to perish, or see his house on fire, no body being near to 
help, or call out: in this extremity if I do not give him my assistance... by this refusing to do it 
according to my ability, I deny his case to be what it is; human nature to be what it is; and even 
those desires and expectations, which I am conscious to myself I should have under the like 
misfortune, to be what they are” (I.v).   
134 Compare with Cumberland: ”[C]ontradictory propositions, concerning the right of any two 
individuals to the same things or persons, cannot possibly be the dictates of right reason.  And this 
is the principal support of all Mr. Hobbes’s doctrine.” Laws of Nature, part 1, chapter 2, section 
6:148.   
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family relations (proposition vi).  See Section D below.) 
 In a state of nature, with no laws, people can only be considered as individuals of the same 
species, who therefore all come under the same definition of their identity.    Therefore, their 
relations are reciprocal, and they are equal.  B’s relation to C is the same as C’s relation to B.   
B has no more dominion over C than C reciprocally has over B; that is, they are in 
this regard equal (VI.v).    
 
Individuals’ possession of greater or lesser abilities or defects do not change this equality for the 
following reasons.    
 1. Who would judge who has the superior qualities?  To claim that someone has the power 
to judge this asserts he already has dominion over whomever he is judging and that is begging the 
question.   
 2. Greater endowments, whether natural or acquired, do not take away the property of the 
less-endowed in the possession and use of their endowments (per proposition ii—self-possession).  
[T]his does not deprive those, who have less, of their title to what they have; or, 
which is the same, give any one, who has greater abilities, a right to take it, or the 
use of it from them (VI.v).  
 
This holds for intellectual abilities.   
The case would be parallel to this, if B should happen to have better intellectual 
faculties than C (VI.v).    
  
The individuality of reason was discussed earlier, in Section III—“Of Reason.”   
[T]hat which is to be regarded in judging of right and truth is private; that is, every 
one must judge for himself....One man can no more discern the objects of his own 
understanding, and their relations, by the faculties of another, than he can see with 
another man’s eyes....They must be his own faculties and conscience, that must 
determine him.  Therefore to demand another man’s assent to any thing without 
conveying into his mind such reasons, as may proceed a sense of the truth of it, is to 
erect a tyranny over his understanding (III.xii.obs.).
135
   
                                            
135 Compare with Locke: “For however it [the understanding] may often mistake, it can own no 
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It also holds for physical strength.   
And further, if B should be stronger than C, he would not yet for that reason have 
any right to be his lord.  For C’s less degree of strength is as much his, as B’s 
greater is his; therefore C has as much right to his, and (which is the natural 
consequence) to use his, as B has to use his; that is, C has as much right to resist, as 
B has to impose or command, by virtue of his strength; and where the right (though 
not the power) of resisting is equal to the right of commanding, the right of 
commanding or dominion is nothing (VI.v).  
 
 3. Power and right are two different things and the one does not imply the other.   
 4. If power gives a right to dominion then it gives a right to everything that opposes it and 
then nothing is wrong—it leads to a contradiction: to oppose one with (greater) power as far as one 
has power is not wrong, but if he has a right to dominion it would be wrong, as he has a right not to 
be opposed.   
 5. The claim that someone has the right to do whatever he has the power to do is contrary to 
the “peace and general good of mankind” (VI.v) and therefore contrary to proposition 
iii—universal good. 
 6.  It is also what the powerful would not want if they were weak, and therefore 
unreasonable by proposition iv—reciprocity.   
  
Proposition vi—Right to (pursuit of) Happiness 
 From equality of dominion it follows that, 
       No man can have a right to begin to interrupt the happiness of another (VI.vi).     
 
because  
                                                                                                                                            
other guide but reason, nor blindly submit to the will and dictates of another.” Essay, IV.xvi, 4.   
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it supposes a dominion over him, and the most absolute too that can be (VI.vi)   
 
which is contrary to proposition v—equality.  It is also contrary to proposition 
iv—reciprocity—an aggressor would think an aggression unreasonable if the case were reversed.   
 The example Wollaston gives is of B taking something from C, who has never done any 
harm to B.  At the beginning—that is, the starting position—C’s right to keep his property is at 
least as good as B’s right to take it; as they cancel each other, there is no basis for B to claim a 
superior right to take it.  Therefore, things should stay as they are.  
[S]ince it is supposed, that C has never invaded the happiness of B, nor taken 
anything from him...but the whole transaction begins originally from B...C can 
have nothing that is B’s; and therefore nothing, to which C has not a least as good a 
title as B has; or, in other words, nothing, which C has not as much right to keep as 
B to claim.  These two rights being then at least equal, and counterpoising each 
other, no alteration in the present state of things can follow from any superiority of 
right in B: and therefore it must of right remain as it is; and what C has must, for any 
right that B has to oppose this settlement, remain with C in his undisturbed 
possession (VI.vi).     
 
Furthermore, C has a stronger case because he has a right to his own happiness greater than any 
other person can have by proposition ii—self-possession.  
[S]uch a property in his own happiness, as is mentioned in prop. [ii]. such a one as 
no other can have (VI.vi).   
 
 From this follows a right to self-defense.   
 
Proposition vii—Right to Self-defense 
Though no man can have a right to begin to interrupt another man’s happiness, or to 
hurt him; yet every man has a right to defend himself and his against violence, to 
recover what is taken by force from him, and even to make reprisals [get 
restitution], by all the means that truth and prudence permit (VI.vii).  All this is 
supposed to be in a state of nature and the absence of human laws (VI.vii.nw).    
 
Many reasons are offered for this.  Here are some. 
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 1. In proposition iii—universal good, it was established that whatever is contrary to general 
happiness is contrary to human nature and hence nature.  A great deal of the happiness of 
humanity depends on being able to save the innocent from aggressors and self-defense is the most 
important part of this.  Therefore, to deny the use of that ability of self-defense is contrary to the 
laws of nature. 
 2. If human beings have no right to self-defense it would follow that they have no right to 
anything, because if they do not have a right to keep what they have then they do not have a right to 
it. 
[S]ince that cannot be his right, which he may not maintain to be his right (VI.vii).   
 
 3. In proposition vi—right to happiness, it was established that there is no right to interrupt 
someone else’s happiness.  But if there is no right to self-defense then it follows that there is a 
right to aggression, which is contrary to proposition vi.  Also, as by the same proposition 
beginning to violate the happiness of another is wrong, stopping it is right by the terms (right and 
wrong).     
 4. In Section II, proposition ix it was established that there is an obligation to pursue 
happiness.  Therefore human beings not only have a right to defend their happiness but an 
obligation to do so.    
 5. The owner, in treating the property as his, is acting in accordance with truth.  The taker, 
in treating it as his, is acting contrary to truth which is wrong by the “fundamental proposition, 
sect. I prop. IV.” (“No act (whether word or deed) of any being, to whom moral good and evil are 
imputable, that interferes with any true proposition, or denies any thing to be as it is, can be right.”)   
 The right to self-defense must be exercised in accordance with truth (Section I) and one’s 
happiness (Section II).  It should not be pursued rashly—people should try to prevent damage if 
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possible; attempt to persuade an aggressor not to engage in aggression; or withdraw.  If these are 
not possible then they should “confront force with force” (VI.vii).  Not to do so constitutes 
denying happiness to be what it is (per Section II). 
 The consequences of self-defense are entirely the fault of the aggressor as they are the 
effects of his own act.   
He, who begins, is the true cause of all that follows; and whatever falls upon him 
from the opposition made by the defending party, is but the effect of his own act; or, 
it is that violence, of which he is the author, reflected back upon himself.  It is as 
when a man spits at heaven, and the spittle falls back upon his own face (VI.vii).    
  
Though the defender must not “act rashly, or do more than the end proposed requires” (VI.vii).   
 
 The right to self-defense includes the right to recover what has been wrongly taken.  
Proposition v—equality, established that the power to take something does not give the right to 
take it; therefore the right to possess it remains with the original owner.   From this it follows that 
a taking that is not undone constitutes a continuous act of aggression as the owner is continually 
deprived of the use of what was taken.   
 If the victim cannot get back what was taken he has a right to recover the value of what was 
taken, and the cost of recovery.  (This is what Wollaston means by “reprisal.”)       
 The preceding discussion began with a right to one’s self and the labor of one’s self.  How 
is the right to external things, especially land, to be established?  Wollaston proposes a theory that 
differs from Locke’s as it is based on first possession and on deductions from the moral rule and 
the preceding propositions, whereas Locke’s much lengthier discussion in Chapter 5 “Of 
Property,” of the Second Treatise136 utilizes many particular examples.    
  
                                            
136 Locke, Second Treatise, ch. 5, secs. 25-51:127-40.   
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Proposition viii—Right to First Possession 
The first possession of a thing gives the possessor a greater right to it, than any 
other man has, or can have, till he and all, that claim under him, are extinct (VI.viii).     
 
For the following reasons.   
 1. First possession is by God’s providence, in effect donation by God.   
 2. Taking what is unowned does not deny any truth concerning someone’s ownership and 
does not interrupt someone’s happiness.  Therefore it is not wrong (per Section I). 
 3. There is a positive obligation to take possession of things because that is necessary in 
order to pursue happiness.  It was established in Section II proposition ix that there is an 
obligation to pursue happiness.  Thus, not to pursue happiness by obtaining material things is 
wrong and therefore to do so is right.  If it is right, that means that someone who has done so is the 
“rightful possessor” (VI.viii).  
 4. Many things cannot be possessed without cultivation, especially land, which is the most 
prominent possession.  Once someone has done so, if an intruder deprives the owner of the fruit of 
his labor he treats it as though it were the result of the intruder’s labor—this is a denial of truth 
(moral rule, Section I) and contrary to proposition ii—self-possession.  
 5. To deny that first occupancy gives right to possession contradicts proposition 
iii—universal good, as it leads to perpetual warfare.   
 6. As power does not give right, in accordance with proposition v—equality (third reason), 
the only alternative is first possession.   
 7. One who seeks to dispossess another would regard the reverse as unreasonable; 
therefore dispossession is contrary to reason and proposition iv—reciprocity.  
 8. To expel someone from his property by force is the same as to assert a right to command 
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him to do so; this constitutes a claim to dominion over him.  It was established in proposition 
v—equality, that there is no such right to dominion.   
 9. To expel someone from his property constitutes an interruption of his happiness.  This 
is contrary to proposition vi—pursuit of happiness.  From this follows that the first possessor has 
a permanent right of possession.     
 
Proposition ix—Right to Transfer Property (free trade) 
 The right to property includes the right to dispose of it in various ways.   
A title to many things may be transferred by compact or donation (VI.ix).   
The right to dispose of property is the same as the right to use it and belongs to the owner.  If an 
owner of property exchanges or gives it to another, no truth is denied, as the recipient is treating the 
property as what it is, the owner’s.   
 Trade is beneficial to human beings.   
 When a trade takes place, the items traded may be equivalent; or they may each be  
equivalent in value to the parties respectively even though they differ; or they may be respectively 
preferable to the parties.  Therefore, both parties gain an advantage and neither one is hurt.  In 
making a trade they are acting according to the moral rule because they are treating things as what 
they are, that is, as to how the traded items relate to themselves, and promoting their happiness by 
obtaining something they prefer to the status quo.   
Indeed he, who receives the value of any thing, and what he likes as well, in effect 
has it still.  His property is not diminished; the situation and matter of it is only 
altered (VI.ix).    
 
From this, and proposition iii—universal good, it follows that there is a right to free trade.   
 
Mankind could not well subsist without bartering one thing for another; therefore 
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whatever tends to take away the benefit of this intercourse is inconsistent with the 
general good of mankind (VI.ix).      
 
Human beings cannot exist above extreme poverty without trade; therefore, interference with trade 
is contrary to the general welfare of humanity and thus is contrary to proposition iii—universal 
good; it is also contrary to proposition v—equality, as those who interfere with trade are asserting 
dominion over the life and property of others; and it is contrary to proposition vii—right to 
happiness, as it constitutes interrupting the happiness of others.        
 As stated in proposition xv below, attempts to obtain material goods by just means 
contribute to happiness, are in accordance with truth, and are therefore virtuous.         
 
Proposition x—Right to Property (I) 
 From propositions ii—self-possession, viii—right to first possession, and ix—right to 
transfer property, it follows that there is a right to property.   
There is then such a thing as property, founded in nature and truth; or, there are 
things, which one man only can, consistently with nature and truth, call his (VI.x).   
 
 
Proposition xi—Right to Property (II) 
 From which follows a right to keep one’s property. 
Those things, which only one man can truly and properly call his, must remain his, 
till he agrees to part with them (if they are such, as he may part with) by compact or 
donation (VI.xi).   
 
Or until they are destroyed, or he dies.  If someone takes property which belongs to another he is 
treating what is not his as his, which constitutes not treating things as they are which is contrary to 
truth (and the moral rule, Section I), because: 
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Proposition xii—Property Equals Use 
To have the property of any thing and to have the sole right of using and disposing 
of it are the same thing; they are equipollent expressions (VI.xii). 
 
That is, “Propriety without the use...is an empty sound” (VI.xii).  
 Inasmuch as the use of property is the same as the ownership of property, using property 
asserts ownership of it. 
 
Proposition xiii—Use Asserts Property 
He, who uses or disposes of any thing, does by that declare it to be his (VI.xiii). 253  
 
The use of something constitutes a declaration that one owns it (under the principle that actions 
have more reality, per Section I).   
 The borrowing or renting of property does not contradict this because it is one of the means 
by which an owner can dispose of his property; it constitutes giving permission for its use for a 
certain time.   
 
Proposition xiv—Definition of Justice and Injustice 
 The conclusion of all the preceding propositions is the definition of justice and injustice; 
justice constitutes respecting the property rights of persons, which include and begin with the first 
right—to self-possession (proposition ii); violating them constitutes injustice. 
To usurp or invade the property of another man is injustice; or, more fully, to take, 
detain, use, destroy, hurt, or meddle with any thing that is his without his 
allowance, either by force or fraud or any other way, or even to attempt any of 
these, or assist them who do, are acts of injustice.  The contrary, to render and 
permit quietly to every one what is his, is justice. Def. (VI.xiv).   
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Proposition xv—Injustice Is Contrary to Truth 
He that would not violate truth, must avoid all injustice; or, all injustice is wrong 
and evil (VI.xv).   
 
Injustice as defined in proposition xiv above—interfering with property in any way, with property 
defined as including the person himself—violates truth by denying the following true propositions.    
 “It denies men to be subjects capable of distinct properties,” that is, it denies individuation 
(contradicts proposition i) and persons’ property in themselves, including in their bodies, life, and 
labor (contradicts proposition ii).  Because it is destructive of general peace and happiness, it 
denies proposition iii—universal good.  Those who commit unjust acts would think such acts 
unreasonable if they were done to them, hence such acts deny proposition iv—reciprocity.  By 
committing such acts, those who do so are claiming dominion over those against whom they 
commit them and thus deny “our natural equality,” that is, deny proposition v.  Also, committing 
such acts constitutes a claim to a “right to begin to disturb the happiness of others” and this denies 
proposition vi.  Lastly, it denies the right to property established in proposition x (VI.xv).   
 It was established in Section I that to act so as to assert false propositions which affect 
human happiness is morally wrong.  Hence, injustice, which constitutes a denial of truth, is 
morally wrong.  Therefore, to attempt or assist an injustice is also wrong; it  
is being in the wrong as much as one is able to be (VI.xv).   
 In addition, the desire to do injustice is morally evil; the evil act is the product of an evil 
desire.  If an evil desire is prevented from being carried out it is still evil—it constitutes an 
obstructed evil act.     
 Various forms of the desire to obtain material goods have been lumped together under the 
negative term “covetousness.”  However, this term should be distinguished into three definitions 
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whose moral status differs.  1. Taking material goods from others—that is wrong as stated above.  
2. Obtaining material goods justly but hoarding them—this denies the truth of what is needed for 
happiness and therefore constitutes a vice.  3. Attempting to obtain material goods by just 
means—this contributes to happiness, is in accordance with truth, and is therefore virtuous.         
 
Sympathy and Human Nature 
 The preceding argument established a definition of justice based on the nature of the 
existence of human beings as individuals.  However, human sympathy is also part of the nature of 
human beings.  From this follows that acting in accordance with sympathy is also acting in 
accordance with nature and hence truth.     
 
Proposition xvi—Definition of Cruelty, Unmercifulness, Mercy, and Humanity 
When a man cares not what sufferings he causes to others, and especially if he 
delights in other men’s sufferings and makes them his sport, this is what I call 
cruelty.  And not to be affected with the sufferings of other people, though they 
proceed not from us, but from others, or from causes in which we are not 
concerned, is unmercifulness.  Mercy and humanity are the reverse of these 
(VI.xvi).   
 
 Cruelty: indifference to the suffering one inflicts and especially enjoyment of it.  Opposite 
is mercy.   
 Unmercifulness: indifference to the sufferings of others.  Opposite is humanity.   
 
Proposition xvii—Cruelty and Unmercifulness Are Contrary to Nature and Truth 
He, who religiously regards truth and nature, will not only be not unjust, but (more) 
not unmerciful, and much less cruel (VI.xvii).   
 
 Unmercifulness and cruelty are contrary to nature and truth.  They are contrary to truth 
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because they constitute denial of true propositions concerning the cases of others—to be 
unaffected by the sufferings of others is to deny the truth concerning what is happening to them 
and to deny their nature as sensitive, happiness-seeking beings.  To know of the sufferings of 
others is to have some representations of them in one’s mind, which means being conscious of 
them.  To be unaffected by them is to deny one’s knowledge and consciousness.       
 Unmercifulness and cruelty are contrary to nature because they constitute a denial that 
sympathy is a part of human nature.   
There is something in human nature resulting from our very make and constitution, 
while it retains its genuine form...which renders us obnoxious to [affected by] the 
pains of others, causes us to sympathize with them, and almost comprehends us in 
their case.  It is grievous to see or hear (and almost to hear of) any man, or even 
any animal whatever, in torment.  This compassion appears eminently in them, 
who upon other accounts are justly reckoned amongst the best of men; in some 
degree it appears in almost all (VI.xvii).  
 
It is therefore according to nature to be affected with the sufferings of other people; 
and the contrary is inhuman and unnatural (VI.xvii).  
 
Various circumstances can vitiate it this natural sympathy—it can be  
altered by vicious habits...perverted by transports of revenge or fury, by ambition, 
company, or false philosophy...oppressed by stupidity and neglecting to observe 
what happens to others (VI.xvii).   
 
The circumstances of human beings are difficult.  For them to be compassionate and help each 
other is good for the majority of humanity.  From which follows that not being compassionate 
denies proposition iii—universal good and is thus wrong.   
 Imagine being in the place of someone who is suffering.  What would you think if nobody 
helped you?  What you would think reasonable for yourself is reasonable for others in accordance 
with proposition iv—reciprocity.   
 Unmercifulness is a defect of humanity but cruelty is “diametrically opposite to it 
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[humanity].”  It not only has no regard for the suffering of others but causes it, delights in it, and 
worst of all, mocks the victims.  While unmercifulness fails to do good, cruelty actively does evil.  
That cruelty is contrary to nature is demonstrated by the propensity of cruel people to deny their 
cruelty, 
And no man, how cruel soever in reality he was, has ever liked to be reckoned a 
cruel man; such a confession of guilt does nature extort; so universally doth it 
reject, condemn, abhor this character” (VI.xvii).   
 
 To summarize: compassion is part of human nature; therefore to be unmerciful, or worse, 
cruel, is contrary to nature.  Also, it denies the truth of the human condition, general welfare, and 
reciprocity.     
 
Proposition xviii—Justice and Mercy Are Right 
As injustice, unmercifulness, and cruelty are wrong, their opposites are right.   
The practice of justice and mercy is just as right, as injustice, unmercifulness, and 
cruelty are wrong (VI.xviii).   
 
This follows from the nature of contraries (VI.xviii).   
 This concludes the definition of justice in a state of nature.  However, Wollaston adds a 
discussion of some particular instances of justice and injustice.   
 
Proposition xix—Particular Cases of Justice and Injustice 
Here I might end this section; but perhaps it may not be improper to be a little more 
particular, therefore, 
 
From the foregoing propositions may be deduced the heinousness of all such 
crimes, as murder, or even hurting the person of another any how, when our own 
necessary defence does not require it (it being not possible, that any thing should be 
more his, than his own person, life and limbs); robbing, stealing, cheating, 
betraying, defamation, detraction, defiling the bed of another man, etc., with all the 
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approaches and tendencies to them (VI.xix).   
 
 Such acts are unjust, violate truth, and are often cruel.  This is obvious concerning such 
acts as murder, robbery, cheating, slandering, etc.; this is especially so if one considers oneself in 
the place of the victim in accordance with proposition iv—reciprocity.  As such acts are unjust, 
acts which tend to, associate with, or excuse them are also unjust in varying degrees.  
Unfaithfulness to friends, violating obligations, ingratitude, and lying are unjust but are widely 
recognized to be so, so they are included under the etc., above.  They are widely recognized to be 
denials of truth, against the general good, contrary to reciprocity, and as wronging the victim.  
Various other damaging acts are wrong, such as innuendo, defamation, mockery, inciting quarrels, 
meddling, and urging viciousness on others.   
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C.  POLITICAL THEORY: SECTION VII, “TRUTHS RESPECTING PARTICULAR 
SOCIETIES OF MEN, OR GOVERNMENTS” 
 In Section VII, Wollaston proposes a theory of government based on the preceding 
section’s propositions concerning the moral status of human beings in a state of nature.   
 It presents some difficulties as the explicit statement of rights and the view of society as a 
Platonic organism are in conflict.  He regards society as a natural outgrowth of human nature and 
circumstances, hence, rather than being in opposition to a theoretical state of nature, it is the state 
of (human) nature.  As in the preceding section, he uses ideas derived from the natural law 
tradition of Aquinas, Hooker, and Locke, as well as Cumberland, and combines them with his 
moral rule.  Cumberland argues that property rights are antecedent to society
137
 and Wollaston 
establishes property rights first, in Section VI, as antecedent to government, which is defined in 
this section.  While there are many similarities between Wollaston’s views and those of Locke, 
Wollaston does derive these principles from his moral rule.    
 Note: the headings below are mine.   
 
Proposition i—People need society to live beyond bare survival, or at all 
Man is a social creature: that is, a single man, or family, cannot subsist, or not well, 
alone out of all society (VII.i).   
  
                                            
137 "We have deduced the original constitution of all civil society from two laws of nature, 
which...must be considered in a close, essential conjunction—as for example—in the first of these 
two laws there is strictly enjoined the settlement of a separate, distinct right and dominion over 
property, possessions, and the effects produced by personal industry, employment and labour.  
These rights are supposed even before the civil establishment of society; and therefore, the very 
moment every such society begins to exist, these rights and properties must be preserved distinct 
and inviolable, as means essentially necessary to the common good of the whole.” Cumberland, 
Laws of Nature, Prolegomena 26:lxviii.   
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In order for human beings to survive, and to have a somewhat pleasant life, requires more than one 
person can produce.  Even a simple life requires more than can be produced by one person.   
More things are necessary to sustain life, or at least to make it in any degree 
pleasant and desirable, than it is possible for any one man to make and provide for 
himself merely by his own labor and ingenuity.  Meat, and drink, and clothing, and 
house, and that frugal furniture which is absolutely requisite, with a little necessary 
physic [medicine], suppose many arts and trades, many heads, and many hands 
(VII.i).   
 
 Even if an individual could live by foraging, he would be helpless when he got sick or old.  
If a couple live alone, although their capacity for work is doubled, so are their needs, and when 
they have children their needs increase greatly.  Even if a couple with grown children live 
together, engage in some agriculture or animal husbandry (which would be hard without other 
people to trade with and from whom to obtain other goods); such an existence would provide only 
for physical survival and would provide nothing for the mind.   
[Y]et still it is only the cortex of the man, which is provided for; what must become 
of the interior part, the minds of these people? How would those be fed, and 
improved?  Arts and sciences, so much of them as is necessary to teach men the 
use of their faculties, and unfold their reason, are not the growth of single families 
so employed (VII.i).   
 
For people to spend their time solely occupied by keeping their bodies functioning is contrary to 
their nature as rational beings.
138
   
 Even if these objections were removed, as the population increased, an increasing number 
of small farmers would eventually come into conflict over land.  Also, some men are predatory 
                                            
138 Compare with Hooker: “But forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish 
ourselves with competent store of things needful for such a life as our nature doth desire, a life fit 
for the dignity of man, therefore to supply those defects and imperfections which are in us living 
single and solely by ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with 
others.”  Richard Hooker, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, Books I-IV, Introduction by Henry 
Morley (London: George Routledge and Sons, 1888), bk. 1, ch. 10:91, 
http://www.books.google.com. 
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and attack others.  Others are ambitious and would use any advantage in power they have to 
encroach on others.   
 These problems would cause families to form alliances, and as the problems increased, to 
form stronger and more detailed agreements until they become a society.   
Under so many wants, and such apprehensions, or present dangers, necessity would 
bring some families into terms of friendship with others for mutual comfort and 
defence; and this, as the reason of it increased, would become stronger, introduce 
stricter engagements, and at last bring the people to mix and unite (VII.i).   
 
Once this takes place the weak want to be protected by the stronger or more competent, and people 
sort into social positions according to their capacities, and thus a society arises.  This is inevitable 
as people cannot live otherwise.   
And then the weak being glad to shelter themselves under the protection and 
conduct of the more able, and so naturally giving way for these to ascend, the 
several sorts would at length settle into their places, according to their several 
weights and capacities with respect to the common concern.  And thus some form 
of a society must arise; men cannot subsist otherwise (VII.i).   
 
 Even if people can survive in family groups, life is infinitely better if they can enjoy the 
resources of living in a society: the economic benefits of trade, mutual help, protection of laws and 
law enforcement, protection from invasion by an army, and the use of discoveries made by 
others—both material and intellectual.  Also, the improvement of their minds by learning from 
others which enables them to develop fully as human beings.   
 Even in a society we are barely able to be secure and safe; how terrible would it be without 
it, exposed to the violence of predatory persons and having no haven?  Even in society with 
friends and conveniences we experience pains and sorrows; how bad would it be if we had no help 
or consolation in trouble?   
 Lastly, people desire society despite the problems it causes because permanent solitude is 
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“hideous.”  It is therefore human nature to live in society. 
Thus the social life is natural to man; or, what his nature and circumstances require 
(VI.i).   
 
Thus, living in a society is living in accordance with human nature and hence in accordance with 
nature and thus is in accordance with the moral rule (Section I).   
 
Proposition ii—The end of society is universal good (per VI.iii) 
The end of society is the common welfare and good of the people associated 
(VII.ii).
139
     
 
This follows from the preceding proposition.  Because people cannot survive or live well alone, 
they form societies.  Therefore, the purpose of a society is a better existence, that is, more 
happiness.  To the extent that a society improves the members’ lives it is fulfilling its purpose.   
[A]nd by how much their manner of living becomes better, by so much the more 
effectually is this end answered (VII.ii).   
 
Proposition iii—Society requires agreed-upon laws and a means of changing them 
 
A society, into which men enter for this end, supposes some rules or laws, 
according to which they agree all to be governed, with a power of altering or adding 
to them as occasion shall require (VII.iii).     
 
A group of people living together with no rules are an “irregular multitude” in which each one is a 
law unto himself and thus they interfere with each other.   
[N]or can such a concourse of people be any thing different from an indigested 
chaos of dissenting parts, which by their confused motions would damnify 
[damage] and destroy each other (VII.iii).   
 
This is because people differ in the extent of their understanding, their manner of thinking, the 
                                            
139 Compare with Locke “The end of government is the good of mankind.” Second Treatise, ch. 
19, sec. 229:231.   
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influence of their education, their manner of living, and other circumstances.     
 The result of all these conflicting and disordered desires is “confusion and unhappiness.”    
 In order to attain universal good and promote happiness, people must be made compatible 
with each other by rules.   
Such a combination of men therefore, as may produce their common good and 
happiness, must be such a one as, in the first place, may render them compatible 
one with another; which cannot be without rules, that may direct and adjust their 
several motions and carriages towards each other, bring them to some degree of 
uniformity, or at least restrain such excursions and enormities, as would render 
their living together inconsistent (VII.iii).   
 
Therefore, there must be express rules concerning property (per Section VI, property refers to the 
person as well as to material goods) and title established by “common consent” so that disputes can 
be settled by applying the rules to which the members of the society have agreed.   
 In order to maintain this arrangement securely there must be a means of preventing foreign 
invasion.  In addition, punishments for violations of the rules must be established; they must be 
intelligible, honestly established, agreed to by the members of the society, and published—these 
constitute the laws and social compact of a society.   
These rules, methods, and appointments of punishments, being intelligibly and 
honestly drawn up, agreed to, and published, are the mutual compacts under which 
the society is confederated, and the laws of it (VII.iii).   
 
 In conclusion, for people to be able live together, to be secure in their property, and to be 
safe and quiet, is a condition that promotes universal good (per VI.iii).  In order for this to be 
accomplished, laws are necessary; therefore, a society must have such laws.     
 The “public interest and welfare” require occasionally adding to, changing, or repealing 
laws.  Doing so is legitimate as it repeats the original social compact.  The end for which society 
is established, the common or universal good, continues to be the end of the society at all times, not 
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only when it is first established.   
 
Proposition iv—These laws must be in accordance with natural justice 
These laws and determinations must be such, as are not inconsistent with natural 
justice (VII.iv).     
 
A law which is contrary to natural justice declares that what is unjust is just and thus contradicts 
truth, because justice is coextensive with truth (per Section VI, proposition xv), and is 
“everywhere the same”—as truth is coextensive with nature and hence the world.  Also, to ordain 
what is contrary to truth is the same as to declare that what is true is false, or vice versa, which is 
absurd.    
 To establish injustice is contrary to universal good (per Section VI, proposition iii).  It is 
also contrary to happiness (per Section II, happiness is the end of human life) because being treated 
unjustly causes unhappiness.  It is therefore contrary to the purpose of society (which is universal 
good and happiness, proposition ii above) and thus denies the true proposition of what the purpose 
of society is.  It is therefore morally evil in accordance with Section I—because injustice denies 
truth (truth is coextensive with justice) and brings about unhappiness.    
 
Proposition v—Laws require government 
A society limited by laws supposes magistrates, and a subordination of powers; that 
is, it supposes a government of some form or other (VII.v).  
  
Where there are laws there must be persons a) to judge when the laws have been broken, to what 
extent, and to decide unclear cases; b) authorized to carry out judgments, punish offenders, prevent 
evils, and do various things for the public good; c) authorized to change, repeal, or make new laws; 
and d) to protect the public from sudden danger. 
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 If there are no persons authorized to execute the laws, then the laws are not executed; if the 
laws are not executed, they are, in effect, nonexistent; and as a society requires laws, without laws 
it is not a society.   
Guardians and executors of laws are therefore the vitals of a society, without which 
there can be no circulation of justice in it, no care of it taken, nor can it continue 
(VII.v).   
 
As one person can only be in one place at a time there must be a number of these functionaries in 
proportion to the population and area of the society.  The laws and concerns of a society vary and 
thus require functionaries with different abilities which vary hierarchically.  Therefore there must 
be a hierarchy which terminates in the legislative power. 
   [T]ill at last the ascent is terminated in some head, where the legislative power is 
deposited, and from whence spirits and motion are communicated through the 
whole body (VII.v).   
 
Government functionaries must also be subject to supervision; they are only men—something they 
are prone to forget.   
[S]ince not only private men want to be inspected, but even magistrates and officers 
themselves, who (though they often forget it) are still but men; and since the whole 
society is to be one, one compact body (VII.v).   
 
Proposition vi—People may give up some, not all, of their natural rights in order to gain the 
protection of a law-governed society 
A man may part with some of his natural rights, and put himself under the 
government of laws, and those, who in their several stations are intrusted with the 
execution of them, in order to gain the protection of them, and the privileges of a 
regular society (VII.vi).  
 
To give up some rights to gain the benefits of society is in accordance with the preceding sections 
and propositions.  It constitutes an exchange for something which is equivalent in value or of 
greater value and thus is in accordance with Section VI, proposition ix (right to transfer property).  
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It is consistent with truth as one is exchanging one’s own liberties and natural rights and therefore 
not denying anyone else’s property.  Also, it does not deny the nature of happiness (as the end of 
human beings) because the purpose of making the exchange is to gain happiness.  Not making the 
exchange would constitute denying truth (that one has the right to make the exchange) and 
happiness (that the exchange improves one’s situation).  Lastly, it promotes universal good per 
Section VI, proposition iii because one’s happiness coincides with general happiness as an 
individual’s happiness constitutes a part of the universal good.       
 What natural rights may a person give up and to what extent?  Those rights which are 
“essential to our being,” and those which we do not have the power to give up, may not be given 
up.  Beyond those, one may give up only what is consistent with the end (of happiness) and not 
more, because to go beyond would constitute a contradiction—as it would reduce happiness rather 
than increase it.   
As to the rest, he may depart from them so far as it is consistent with the end, for 
which he does this; not further, because beyond that lies a contradiction (VII.vi).    
 
Thus one cannot give away one’s entire property in order to preserve it, but can consent to give up 
some in order to preserve the rest, if otherwise all would be lost; and similarly one may share in the 
danger of national defense rather than be certainly destroyed, etc.  
 
Proposition vii—Members of a society give their assent explicitly or implicitly 
Men may become members of a society (i.e., do what is mentioned in the foregoing 
proposition) by giving their consent, either explicitly, or implicitly (VII.vii).   
 
Persons may consent to the social contract by themselves, by proxy, i.e., elected representatives, or 
 
 132 
by their behavior—by conforming to the laws and accepting the benefits of the society.140  The 
first two are explicit, the third, implicit.  Subsequent generations may express consent by explicit 
acts.  When no explicit consent has been given, implicit consent is assumed on the ground that 
one must have some love for one’s birthplace, gratitude for the constitution that protected one’s 
parents while they brought one up, and regard for the obligations they imposed.
141
  In addition, 
taking an inheritance or otherwise acquiring property by law, which one would not be able to keep 
in a state of nature, means accepting the laws by which one obtained it.
142
     
 As the laws securing one’s person and rights constitute an equivalent trade for one’s 
submission to them (per proposition vi above and Section VI, proposition ix), one cannot accept 
them without paying for them.   
Indeed since the security he has from the laws of the country in respect of his 
person, and rights, whatever they either are, or may happen to be hereafter, is the 
general equivalent for his submission to them, he cannot accept that without being 
obliged in equity to pay this (VII.vii).
143
   
 
 Where a person lives is determined by chance or choice (VII.vi); however, to stay or settle 
in a place shows that one likes it or prefers it to others or thinks under one’s circumstances one is 
                                            
140 This is similar to Locke, Second Treatise, ch. 8, sec. 119:176.   
141 This is similar to Locke, Second Treatise, ch. 6, sec. 73:150-1.   
142 This is similar to Locke, Second Treatise, ch. 8, sec. 120:176-7.   
143 This principle of political obligation as repayment differs from Locke's doctrine of tacit 
consent.  However, Simmons argues that Locke's argument implies it.  “The ‘enjoyments’ of 
benefits of government (which Locke mistakenly classifies as acts of tacit consent) may very well 
generate political obligations, as Locke believed; these obligations would not, however, fall under 
principles of fidelity or consent.  There are, of course, other sorts of obligations than those 
generated by consent, and Locke seems to rely on them while, as a consent theorist, officially 
denying their existence.  Thus, some of Locke's consent-implying enjoyments might in fact bind 
us to political communities... under some...principle of repayment.”  A. John Simmons, “Tacit 
Consent and Political Obligation,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 5 no. 3 (Spring 1976): 291,  
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264884.   
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better off staying.  This constitutes consent.     
 
Proposition viii—Two things a member of a society is obligated to do as such 
When a man is become a member of a society, if he would behave himself 
according to truth, he ought to do these things (VII.viii).   
 
 1. A member of a society should consider that property is founded not only in nature (per 
Section VI), but also by the laws of the society, and that one has accepted these laws (per 
proposition vii) and that this strengthens the right to property and renders it “more inviolable and 
sacred.”   
 2. A member of a society is obligated, when he is wronged, to act in accordance with the 
law and not as he would in a state of nature.  The definition of law includes the observance of it.    
For it is contained in the idea of a law, that it is intended to be observed (VII.viii).   
 
Therefore, a person who is a part of a society based on law, who willingly breaks the law, is 
denying what the law is, and denying that he is a member of the society (by his actions), and 
therefore is denying the preceding true propositions.        
 
Proposition ix—Individuals remain in a state of nature when a) there is no law; b) the law is not in 
effect; or c) the law is contrary to natural law 
In respect of those things, which the laws of the place take no cognizance of, or 
when if they do take cognizance of them, the benefit of those laws cannot be 
had...he who is a member of a society in other respects retains his natural liberty, is 
still as it were in a state of nature, and must endeavour to act according to truth and 
his best prudence (VII.ix).   
 
 a) Concerning all cases which are not addressed by a law, one should act according to truth 
and nature. 
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 b) This is also the case if the law is not in effect, as, for example, when a person is attacked 
and no help from authorities is available.  In such a case, because there is no way for the law to 
operate, it does not exist, and the person is back in a state of nature.   
[I]t is the same as if there was nothing; since in effect there is no law, where no 
effect or benefit from it is to be had (VII.ix).   
 
 c) A law which is contrary to natural law is not a law. 
There is a third case, which perhaps may demand admission here; and that is, when 
laws are plainly contrary to truth and natural justice.  For though they may pass the 
usual forms, and be styled laws; yet, since no such law can abrogate that law of 
nature and reason, to which the Author of our being hath subjected us, or make 
falsehood to be truth; and two inconsistent laws cannot both oblige, or subsist 
together; one of them must give way; and it is easy to discern, which ought to do it 
(VII.ix).    
 
He adds a quote from Cicero in a footnote:  
That’s very foolish indeed, to imagine that all those things are just, which are 
established by the decrees and laws of the people.  If right were made by the 
ordinances of the people, by the decrees of princes, or by the sentences of judges, it 
would be right to rob on the highway; it would be right to commit adultery; it would 
be right to forge wills; supposing all these were allowed by the majority, and by the 
decrees of the populace.  Cic. (VII.ix.nl).   
 
The implications of this are discussed in the commentary below.
144
   
 
Proposition x—Societies may engage in war for self-defense; aggressive war is wrong 
The societies intended in this section, such as kingdoms and commonwealths, may 
defend themselves against other nations; or, war may lawfully be waged in defence 
and for the security of a society, its members and territories, or for reparation of 
injuries (VII.x).   
 
 In a state of nature there is a right to self-defense (VI.vii).  Societies are in a state 
                                            
144 Locke discusses this issue at much greater length than Wollaston in Chapter 8, “Of Tyranny,” 
in the Second Treatise.   
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of nature regarding each other, therefore the persons allied within a society have that right 
of self-defense (unless the societies have limited their rights by agreements).  A war may 
be regarded as every individual member of a society defending himself with the assistance 
of the rest and therefore falls under the same principle as individual self-defense.  (The 
individuals’ rights to self-defense join together.)  The interest in self-defense of a society 
is greater than that of an individual because the number of persons concerned is greater.  
In a state of nature an individual is entitled to defend himself by whatever means are in 
accordance with truth; as nations are in a state of nature, the justice of a war can be 
determined using the principles established in Section VI.  Mutual defense is a great, or 
the greatest end of society.     
 As the legitimate purpose of war is self-defense, wars conducted from ambition and for 
conquest are wrong,  
condemned by all true philosophy and religion (VII.x).   
 The only legitimate purpose of war is the establishment of peace.   
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Commentary on Sections VI and VII 
 The question Sections VI and VII raise is, what sort of society did Wollaston have in mind?  
He expresses two apparently conflicting views.  One is of society as a voluntary association of 
rights-bearing individuals with limited cession of those rights; the other is of society as a body into 
which individuals are subsumed.  The former view is a step by step deduction from the individual 
and his rights to happiness obtained by trade and mutual cooperation; the latter may be a reflection 
of Cumberland’s view that the good of the individual is obtained by pursuing the common good, 
and that society is a sort of organism. 
 This is Cumberland’s view:      
We are bound down by a strict obligation to pursue the common good, when, from 
the nature of things exposed to our observation and senses, we are given to 
understand, (and more especially when such a knowledge as this arises from 
rational causes) that, acting for this end is the cause necessarily requisite to 
constitute our own complete, perfect happiness.... And, in the same manner, that the 
health of one limb depends upon the health of the whole animated living body, or, 
just in like manner, as the preservation of those powers, naturally lodged in our 
hands, cannot prove effectual or of any use, unless regard be first had to that life, 
and those powers in general which are dispersed, diffused, and intimately blended 
through the whole body (II.5.27, p. 359).    
 
Whereas Wollaston describes the development of a society as a historical process which occurs as 
follows:  
And then the weak being glad to shelter themselves under the protection and 
conduct of the more able, and so naturally giving way for these to ascend, the 
several sorts would at length settle into their places, according to their several 
weights and capacities with respect to the common concern.  And thus some form 
of a society must arise; men cannot subsist otherwise (VII.i) [italics added].  
 
Does this mean that people may continuously sort into different positions in a free society in 
accordance with their inclinations and capacities, or that such a sorting takes place once and then 
becomes hereditary, that is, maintained by force?  The propositions in Section VI, especially 
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proposition ix, which asserts the right to free trade, indicate the former. 
 Alternatively, this may be a historical account of the process by which a hierarchical 
society arose, and which should be superseded by a society organized in accordance with natural 
justice.   
 Natural justice requires a society because without a social order people are like atoms 
colliding with each other at random (an “irregular multitude” engaged in “confused motions”) and 
causing each other harm and destruction.  This brings about much “confusion and unhappiness.”  
A society brings the chaotic social atoms into order by rules.  By doing so it increases happiness 
and thus is in accordance with the moral rule.  What would such rules be like?  They are intended 
to “render [people] compatible” and “direct and adjust their several motions and carriages towards 
each other.”  This does not imply an authority directing people’s actions; rather, the rules may be 
like traffic laws; they say how to go, not where and when to go; this would be in accord with 
Section VI.   
 Wollaston clearly rejects moral relativism and states that natural justice is universal.   
To pretend by a law to make that to be just, which before and in itself was unjust, is 
the same as to ordain that which interferes with truth; because justice is founded in 
truth (as before), and everywhere the same (VII.iv.2).   
 
This is supported by a footnote quote from Aristotle:  
Justice is founded in nature, is unalterable, and is equally in force everywhere; in 
the same manner as the fire burns here and in Persia. Arist. (VII.iv.nf).  
 
As nature is the same everywhere (nature is the world), natural justice is the same everywhere.  
Therefore, this would not appear to uphold the existing social order simply because it happened to 
be the established order in the society in which RND was written.     
 However, when he describes government in society he uses a body metaphor that is almost 
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Platonic.  The terms used are of the physiological theories of the time such as vitals, circulation, 
and [animal] spirits.    
 A disordered group of people is described as “indigested chaos.”  Government 
functionaries are:  
the vitals of a society, without which there can be no circulation of justice in it...nor 
can it continue (VII.v).   
 
The supreme power is a head which animates the body:  
[T]ill at last the ascent is terminated in some head, where the legislative power is 
deposited, and from whence spirits and motion are communicated through the 
whole body (VII.v).       
 
And the society as a whole is described as a body:  
[S]ince the whole society is to be one, one compact body (VII.v).    
 On the other hand, government functionaries are men like all others (this sentence 
immediately precedes the one above):  
[S]ince not only private men want to be inspected, but even magistrates and officers 
themselves, who (though they often forget it) are still but men (VII.v).   
 
On the one hand the society is like a body with only some persons having the role of head, which 
implies the others play subordinate roles in this body.  On the other hand government 
functionaries are men like all the rest and subject to the law like all the rest.  Does this mean a 
body in which all the parts are equal?  It is not clear.  
 Adding to the problem is a statement in Section V—“Truths Relating to the Deity,” in 
favor of establishment of religion which also refers to society as a body.   
For a man may be considered as a member of a society, and as such he ought to 
worship God....Or the society may be considered as one body, that has common 
interests and concerns, and as such is obliged to worship the Deity, and offer one 
common prayer (V.xix).  
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The reason for this is that religion is necessary to maintain order by inculcating virtue.   
And further, toward the keeping mankind in order, it is necessary there should be 
some religion professed, and even established; which cannot be without some 
public worship.  And were it not for that sense of virtue, which is principally 
preserved (so far as it is preserved) by national forms and habits of religion, men 
would soon lose it all, run wild, prey upon one another, and do what else the worst 
of savages do (V.xix).  
 
This is in accordance with the definition at the beginning of RND of religion as equivalent to 
morality. 
The foundation of religion lies in that difference between the acts of men, which 
distinguishes them into good, evil, indifferent. For if there is such a difference, 
there must be religion, & contra (I.i).   
 
 The purpose of establishing a religion is the teaching of morality to and maintenance of 
virtue in a public, many members of whom have no other means to learn moral principles.   
Beside, there are many, who know not of themselves, how to pray; perhaps cannot 
so much as read.  These too must be taken as they are, and consequently some time 
and place appointed, where they may have suitable prayers read to them, and be 
guided in their devotions (V.xix). 
 
The context suggests that Wollaston regarded the establishment of religion as primarily the means 
of providing moral instruction to the general public, rather than the maintenance of particular 
theological doctrines.  It cannot be determined from this whether Wollaston, who was an 
ordained, non-practicing Anglican minister, was supporting that established religion.  This 
recommendation of establishment follows the development of Wollaston’s unique definition of 
religion in RND Sections I-V.  The proposition quoted above, which is the last in Section V, 
contains a very lengthy discussion of the proper attitude human beings should have towards 
God—a very abstract one—which leads to the paragraph quoted.       
 The issue of how society should be organized is not clarified by proposition vi, in which he 
states that people may give up some rights but not all their rights in order to gain the benefits of a 
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society.  However, what may be given up and what not is not clear.  The standard stated is that 
rights “essential to [one’s] being” may not be given up and that a net benefit to the individual must 
result; that is, the happiness gained by the protection afforded by the society must be greater than 
the pain caused by the loss of the rights which are given up.  What rights are essential is not stated.   
 But he concludes
145
 with the proposition (ix) that laws which are contrary to natural justice 
are not laws at all and that with regard to unjust laws individuals are back in a state of nature.  
[H]e who is a member of a society in other respects retains his natural liberty, is still 
as it were in a state of nature, and must endeavour to act according to truth and his 
best prudence 
 
Presumably, this means that individuals have a right to disregard such unjust laws, though they 
may not have the power to do so, hence “prudence.”   
 The argument in favor of society as a mutual association of rights-bearing individuals who 
give up a limited portion of their rights in order to secure greater happiness and who cannot ever be 
said to have given up anything which is not in accordance with natural justice is developed 
throughout Sections VI and VII, premise by premise.   
 The view of society as a body which can be regarded as acting as an entity, and into which 
individuals must then be subsumed is not supported by premises but simply appears in two 
propositions (VII.v, V.xix).  No connection is made between this view and the happiness 
calculation or the moral rule.  That is, there is no argument offered that being subsumed in a 
society that is a singular entity is the means to the most happiness for those subsumed.  In 
addition, such an arrangement is not consonant with the detailed working out of the means to 
happiness through individual rights which constitutes most of Sections VI and VII.   
                                            
145 The last proposition (x) concerns the relations of societies, not the individual to society.   
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 Nor is an argument offered that such an arrangement is in accordance with the moral rule.  
For that to be so it would be necessary to demonstrate that the arrangement constitutes treating 
individuals as what they are, which would in turn require an argument establishing that it is the 
nature of human beings to be cells in a social body.  Not only is such an argument not offered, it 
would be contrary to the definition of human nature in a state of nature that is presented throughout 
Section VI.  It would also be necessary to demonstrate that such an arrangement is treating society 
as what it is, and that would require demonstrating that it is the nature of society to be an 
individual-subsuming, body-like entity; such an argument is also not offered and would also be 
contrary to most of the argument presented in Section VII.  
 In conclusion, the argument developed in Sections VI and VII is for the definition of 
human beings as rights-bearing individuals; for a universal definition of justice that is derived 
from human nature and is not culturally determined; and for a society formed by these 
rights-bearing individuals for the increase of their happiness; towards which end they give up only 
so much of their rights as is consonant with increasing their happiness and without ever giving up 
their right to natural justice.  The statements concerning society as a body are not consonant with 
this argument.   
 What views Wollaston had on how to get from the existing society to something more 
consonant with the views expressed in RND and how much change that would have required is 
impossible to determine.  There are statements in RND that indicate he did not think that society 
was acceptable as is, e.g.,  
It is contradictory to say, that any thing can be a general law of human nature, 
which tends only to favor the pleasures of some particulars to the prejudice of the 
rest, who partake of the same common nature (VI.iii).
146
   
                                            
146 In addition, in Section VIII, proposition vi, he offers an argument against Robert Filmer’s 
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 Eighteenth-century references to RND indicate that it is its libertarian implications which 
were influential.
147
  An interesting example is a 1744 pamphlet defending the pawn-brokering 
profession.
148
  It first cites RND’s moral principle:  
[I]f it be a sin or vice by our words, actions, or omissions...to contradict or 
counteract the truth of any known proposition whatever; or, in other words, to act a 
lye*, in which the very formal nature of vice consists... 
(*footnote reference cites RND I.iii,iv,etc.) (8).   
And later explicitly references the propositions concerning the supremacy of natural justice in 
Section VII.   
But, if any man thinks the statute against usury and extortion of such vast 
consequence to the safety and happiness of the community, that he cannot forgive 
the least violation of a tittle, jot, or letter therein contained, he would do well to 
consult the great Mr. Locke’s discourse, entitled, Considerations of the Lowering 
of Interest, and Raising the Value of Money; and afterwards to read Sect. 7th, Prop. 
4th and 9th, of The Religion of Nature delineated (65).   
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                            
Patriarcha (See Section D below).   
147 See e.g., Bland and Ganter in Chapter II.A above.   
148 Pawn-broker, A, An Apology for the Business of Pawn-Broking (London, 1744), 
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/MOME?af=RN&ae=U100829160&srchtp=a&ste=14, 
document no. U100829160.   
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D.  DOMESTIC LIFE: SECTION VIII, “TRUTHS CONCERNING FAMILIES AND 
RELATIONS” 
 In Section VIII Wollaston applies his theory to family relations.  The starting point of all 
relations is a married couple (VIII).  The purpose of marriage is the continuation of the species 
and the happiness of the married couple (VIII.i).  Marriage requires a performative act (VIII.ii).  
Marital relations, the combination of property, and children all strengthen marriage (VIII.iii).  
From this it follows that marrying when it is likely that such a bond will not form is wrong 
(VIII.iv).  Parents have an obligation to take care of their children (VIII.v).  Parents have 
authority, but not dominion, over their children (VIII.vi).
149
   
 The argument in this proposition leads to a refutation of Robert Filmer’s Patriarcha.   
 In Section VI—“Truths Respecting Mankind in General, Antecedent to All Human Laws,” 
Proposition v—equality, it was stated that while  
In a state of nature men are equal in respect of dominion (VI.v).   
However, there is an exception for children.    
I except for the present the case of parents and their children.   
The explanation for this is that,   
In order to the good of children, their education, etc. there must be some authority 
over them lodged by nature in the parents (VIII.vi).   
 
At the beginning of life, children cannot survive if they are not fed, clothed, etc.  The parents have 
a duty to do so, per the preceding proposition.  They must do it according to their judgment and 
these actions constitute authority.   
[T]his is plainly an act of authority, to order and dispose of another according to 
                                            
149 Locke makes a similar argument in Chapter 6, “Of Paternal Power,” in the Second Treatise.   
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one’s judgment (VIII.vi).   
 
It is a fact of nature that children need the care of the parents, that the care must be done according 
to the judgment of the parents, and that parents are therefore, de facto, in a state of authority over a 
child.   
 This—that the child needs care by the parents, and that the parents must use their judgment 
to decide the care—continues to be the case as the child grows older, until maturity.  A toddler has 
no knowledge and still requires care.  Later, the child’s senses have developed but not his 
knowledge and judgment which need much time and practice to develop.  Adults do not find it 
easy to know the world, and children do not know it at all.  Children are subject to peer pressure 
and as their peers are as ignorant as they are the effect is to multiply bad judgment.   
[T]hus folly mingles with folly, and increases prodigiously (VIII.vi).   
Lastly, because the position of children in the world depends upon their parents, their parents must 
govern their affairs and direct them.  Thus, the judgment of the parents must guide the children 
through infancy, childhood, and youth.   
 However, this parental authority does not constitute dominion (dominion was defined in 
VI.v) because the purpose of this authority is only the good of the children and does not extend 
beyond that end.  Parental authority is limited.  It does not mean that parents may order their 
children to do evil—if they do so, the children should not obey.  Nor does it mean that parents 
may do whatever they please to children, such as kill, maim, or abandon them.  Also, when the 
children are adults and possess property (per Section VI, property includes the person), their 
parents have no more right to this property than anyone else.  Whereas dominion consists of a lord 
commanding whatever he wants and its only criterion is the lord’s pleasure; it is not for the 
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subject’s good and is unlimited.  Therefore, the principles of rights established in Section VI are 
not overthrown by the case of parents and children.   
 Against Filmer, Wollaston argues that the patriarchal justification for absolute monarchy is 
false.  Parental authority is not “despotic or absolute power.”  As parental authority is only for 
the good of the children and only when they are incapable of caring for themselves, monarchical 
power would only be justified if it were for the good of the subjects and only if they were incapable 
of taking care of themselves.  Therefore, a monarch, as the putative father of a country, cannot be 
said to have absolute power, as parents do not have absolute power.   
The authority of parents goes not this length (VIII.vi).
150
   
 Also, from a parent’s authority over children it does not follow that the eldest son has this 
authority over his siblings; still less that an heir of a parent should have it over collateral relations 
in succeeding generations.  The family relation declines geometrically over the generations (see 
proposition x)
151
 and soon vanishes, and Filmer’s argument along with it.  
 The remaining propositions in the Section state that children should acknowledge they owe 
                                            
150 This is similar to the argument in Locke, Second Treatise, ch. 15, sec. 170:202.   
151 In proposition x Wollaston argues that relations decrease in a geometrical progression; the 
grandchildren have ½ their “blood” in common, the next generation ¼, the generation after that ⅛, 
and so on.  Therefore, over time, the relationship becomes “inconsiderable.”  This geometric 
calculation of heredity was reinvented in the late nineteenth century by hereditarians.  “[T]he ‘law 
of ancestral heredity,’ laid out in principle by Francis Galton and modified and so-named by Karl 
Pearson, which states generally that to any offspring ‘each parent contributes on average one-half, 
or (0.5), each grandparent one-fourth, or (0.5)
2, and so on.’”  Rachel A. Ankeny, “Marvelling at 
the Marvel: The Supposed Conversion of A. D. Darbishire to Mendelism,” Journal of the History 
of Biology 33 no. 2 (Autumn 2000): 318.  The references are to Francis Galton, “The Average 
Contribution of Each Several Ancestor to the Total Heritage of the Offspring,” Proceedings of the 
Royal Society of London 61 (1897): 401-413 and Karl Pearson, “Mathematical Contributions to 
the Theory of Evolution: On the Law of Ancestral Heredity,” Proceedings of the Royal Society 62 
(1898): 386-412.   
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their existence to their parents (VIII.vii); children have duties towards their parents (VIII.viii); the 
natural affection between parents and children should be followed (VIII.ix); and the natural 
affections of other relations towards each other should be followed but they decrease in degree as 
the relation decreases (VIII.x).   
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E.  VIRTUE AND THE SOUL: SECTION IX, “TRUTHS BELONGING TO A PRIVATE 
MAN, AND RESPECTING (DIRECTLY) ONLY HIMSELF” 
 Section IX has two parts.  In the first, consisting of propositions i-iv, Wollaston provides a 
detailed account of how to act in accordance with the moral principles developed in the first four 
sections of RND, that is, how to live virtuously.  In Section IV—“Of the Obligations of Imperfect 
Beings with Respect to Their Power of Acting” (see Chapter III.E above), Wollaston presented a 
general account of the extent of moral obligation.  Here, he expands the discussion of moral 
obligation into enumerated obligations, in keeping with the moral rule stated in Section I—“Of 
Moral Good and Evil” (see Chapter III.D above), as well as the principles established in Sections 
II—”Of Happiness” (see Chapter III.C above) and III— “Of Reason” (see Chapter III.B above).  
In the second part, consisting of propositions v-xviii, he presents arguments for the immortality of 
the soul.  This section relies on Cartesian dualism for some of its arguments.      
 Note: the headings below are mine 
 
Part I—Virtue 
Proposition i—an individual knows himself best 
Every man knows (or may know) best, what his own faculties, and personal 
circumstances are, and consequently what powers he has of acting, and governing 
himself (IX.i).   
 
Because he only of all mankind has the internal knowledge of himself, and what he 
is; and has the only opportunity by reflection and experiments of himself to find, 
what his own abilities, passions, etc. truly are (IX.i).    
 
The qualification “may know” is added because many people “seem to be without reflection, and 
almost thought” (IX.i.ny).   
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Proposition ii—an individual who examines himself carefully will make the following true 
observations about his nature 
He, that well examines himself, I suppose, will find these things to be true (IX.ii).   
 
 
1. Human commonality with matter.  
 A person has things in common with inanimate matter, such as being subject to gravity and 
physical injury.    
 
2. Human commonality with plants and animals. 
 A person has things in common with plants and animals, such as growth from a seed, the 
need for nutrition, having a network of vessels, and undergoing the process of 
ripen[ing], flourish[ing], wither[ing], decay[ing], [and] d[ying] (IX.ii.2).   
Like them, a person can be sick, injured, or killed, and needs nourishment, suitable habitation, 
protection from injuries, etc.     
  
3. Human commonality with animals. 
 A person has things in common with animals such as receiving information of external 
things by the senses; feeling one’s body and experiencing pleasures and pains from it—not only 
being subject to negative and positive things but also feeling them.  Also, being able to move and 
act and having the power to greatly affect one’s enjoyments and sufferings by one’s actions.   
 
4. Human uniqueness: reason. 
 A person has other faculties which are neither in matter, vegetables, nor animals; which he 
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uses to  
investigate truth or probability and judge whether things are agreeable to them or 
not, after the manner set down in [S]ect. III or, in a word, that he is animal rationale 
(IX.ii.4).  
  
(See Chapter III.B above.) 
 
5. Human power to act from an internal motive. 
 A person is  
conscious of a liberty in himself to act or not to act; and that therefore he is such a 
being as is described [in] [S]ect. I, prop. [i], a being whose acts may be morally 
good or evil (IX.ii.5).   
 
As stated in Section I (“Of Moral Good and Evil”), proposition i, only a being which can act from 
an internal motive is subject to morality whereas everything else is merely acted upon (See 
Chapter III.D above).   
 
6. Human internal motives. 
 A person is conscious   
[t]hat there are in him many inclinations and aversions from whence flow such 
affections as desire, hope, joy, hatred, fear, sorrow, pity, anger, etc.; all which 
prompt him to act this or that way (IX.ii.6).   
 
 
7. Human limitations. 
 A person is aware that he has great defects and limitations in his reason and his ability to 
act on many occasions.  Also, that his feelings are frequently prone to go wrong and be excessive,  
that he is in many respects fallible and infirm (IX.ii.7).   
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8. Human desire for happiness. 
 A person desires to be happy.  (As established in Section II (“Of Happiness”); see Chapter 
III.C above.)   
 
Proposition iii—moral obligations deduced from proposition ii observations 
If he doth find these things to be so, then if he will act as he ought to do (that is, 
agreeably to truth and fact) he must do such things as these (IX.ii).   
 
 
1. Obligation to be rational. 
He must subject his sensual inclinations, his bodily passions, and the motions of all 
his members to reason; and try every thing by it (IX.ii.1).  
  
 As vegetation is more than matter, sense is more than vegetation, and reason is more than 
sense, it follows that reason is the uppermost faculty.  Therefore, as established in Section III (“Of 
Reason”), proposition xi, a person is a being that is subject to the law that he must be governed by 
reason.  This is proven by one’s own experience—one cannot do what there is more reason 
against doing than for doing.  People err against reason because they do not use it, or will not use 
it, or not use it enough; or because they have defective faculties.   
 As established In Section III, proposition x, acting according to reason is coextensive with 
acting according to truth, that is, acting so as not to deny any truth, which was established in 
Section I (“Of Moral Good and Evil”) to constitute acting right.  Therefore, acting right requires 
acting according to right reason.  Not to subject one’s sense inclinations to reason is to deny that 
one is rational or that reason is the uppermost faculty, which constitutes denying one’s humanity.   
 If an animal stopped acting according to sense and lay in one spot expecting to live like a 
plant it would be like (though not as bad as) a person giving up his reason and living like an animal, 
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which is what he does if he gives up reason and pursues only physical desires.   
For as in that case the brute neglects the law of his nature, and affects that of the 
order below him; so doth the man disobey the law of his nature, and put himself 
under that of the lower animals; to whom he thus makes a defection (IX.iii.1).   
 
Those who not only reject the government of reason in order to act according to their feelings and 
desires, but use reason to serve these desires, and not to consider whether their ends and means are 
“just or unjust, right or wrong,” are violating “the order of nature” and denying truth (the truth of 
what their nature is).  They are inverting nature and are worse than animals—they become 
animals with reason, which are the worst brutes.  An animal acting according to “sense and bodily 
appetites” is acting according to its nature, but a person acting so is acting contrary to his nature. 
[W]hen he makes his rational powers to serve the brutish part, to assist and promote 
it, he heightens and increases the brutality, enlarges its field, makes it to act with 
greater force and effect, and becomes a monster (IX.iii.1).  
 
 A person who is conscious of the truth of proposition ii above, will examine things 
carefully and will never pursue a physical desire at the expense of reason; he will ensure that his 
desires and angers are rationally directed.  Directing everything in life by reason constitutes 
virtue.   
Every word and action, every motion and step in life should be conducted by 
reason (IX.iii.1).   
 
2. Obligation to pursue happiness.  
He must take care not to bring upon himself want , diseases, trouble; but, on the 
contrary, endeavour to prevent them, and to provide for his own comfortable 
subsistence, as far as he can without contradicting any truth (IX.iii.3).  
 
 This is in accordance with the obligation to seek happiness which was established in 
Sections I (“Of Moral Good and Evil”) and II (“Of Happiness”).  (See Chapter III.D.10.4 above.)    
 This obligation must be pursued in accordance with the moral rule.  In Section I (“Of 
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Moral Good and Evil”), proposition ix, an objection was offered which is addressed again here.    
If I want money, don't I act according to truth, if I take it from somebody else to 
supply my own wants? And more, do not I act contrary to truth, if I do not? 
(I.ix.obj3).   
    
 For example, a person has needs such as hunger and in order to supply his needs he takes a 
neighbor’s property.  He says he is acting as what he is—someone subject to hunger, etc., and 
therefore, not to take the neighbor’s property would be to act contrary to truth.  However, this 
does not justify him because the rule requires taking care of oneself without contradicting truth.   
The grand rule requires, that what he does, should interfere with no truth; but what 
he does interferes with several (IX.iii.2).   
 
He denies facts (the neighbor’s ownership of the property), and truths that were established in 
Sections VI (“Truths Respecting Mankind in General”) and VII (“Truths Respecting Particular 
Societies of Men”); (these sections established the right to property; see Sections B and C of this 
chapter, above).  By not taking from someone else he would not be denying that he is subject to 
hunger, etc., but by doing so he would be denying the neighbor’s rights.    
Not taking from another man his money by violence is a forbearance, which does 
not signify, that I do not want money, or which denies any truth.  But taking it 
denies that to be his, which (by the supposition) is his. The former is only as it were 
silence, which denies nothing; the latter a direct and loud assertion of a falsity 
(I.xi.ans3).   
 
A person can provide for himself by means which do not deny truths.   
[T]here are ways of expressing this want, or acting according to it, without 
trespassing upon truth. The man may by honest labor and industry seek to supply 
his wants; or he may apply as a supplicant, not as an enemy or robber, to such as can 
afford to relieve him; or if his want is very pressing, to the first persons he meets, 
whom truth will oblige to assist him according to their abilities (I.xi.ans3).   
 
(For the obligation to help in emergencies in accordance with one’s capacity, see discussion of 
Section I (“Of Moral Good and Evil”), proposition v, in Chapter III.D.6 above.)   
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 Thus, a person can only be said to be denying his needs and thus denying true propositions 
concerning his nature, if he does not attempt to meet his needs by those means which are available 
to him and which do not express propositions which deny truths concerning other persons.   
  In acting to avoid suffering or danger a person must use his reason.  If he does not, if he 
acts contrary to reason (impulsively or unthinkingly), he is acting as a sensitive being only and not 
as a sensitive-rational being, and thus contrary to his nature, and thus is denying his nature.   
 In general, it is rational to regard oneself as a being who requires various things and needs 
to take various actions in order to pursue happiness and avoid unhappiness.  It is therefore rational 
to take such actions, unless there is a reason not to take them.  A person who does not act so as to 
avoid bad things or improve his life when such actions are not contrary to reason is denying his 
nature and his circumstances to be what they are, and thus is acting contrary to his nature and the 
moral rule.  All the more so if he takes actions which harm himself.     
Certainly when a man may without transgressing the limits prescribed consult his 
own safety, support, and reasonable satisfaction, and does not; and especially when 
he takes a counter-course, and exposes himself, he forgets many of the foregoing 
truths, and treats himself as not being what he is (IX.iii.2).   
 
 Rationally pursuing happiness also requires considering the future.  (This is in accordance 
with the calculations in Section II (“Of Happiness”); see Chapter III.C above).  The extent of 
consideration of the future should be commensurate with the quantity of future; present pleasures 
should not be pursued in such a way as to prevent greater ones later.  (The context of this 
calculation includes the belief in the afterlife which is argued for in part II below.)     
 Those evils which cannot be prevented should be borne “patiently and decently;” such an 
attitude serves to mitigate them.  They should, as much as possible, be reduced if they cannot be 
prevented altogether.  Being mentally prepared to deal with bad things helps to deal with them, 
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especially in the case of death.   
 
3. Obligation to consider feelings and desires. 
He must consider even bodily and sensual affections, passions, and inclinations as 
intimations, which many times he not only may, but ought to hearken to (IX.iii.3).  
 
 It must always be remembered that feelings and desires must be subject to reason.  
However, when they are regulated by reason they are performing their natural 
function—providing inclinations to act—without which we would not act, and they constitute  
just motives and good arguments to act upon (IX.iii.3).   
 That the inferior appetites exist is just as true as that superior reason exists is true.  Like 
everything else, they must be treated according to their nature, as what they are—though not as 
more than they are.  When reason is against them, they are disabled by it; however, when it is not 
against them, they are  
unfettered and free, and become governing principles (IX.iii.3).  
 It was established in Section III (“Of Reason”), proposition xiv that when there is no reason 
against sense information, that constitutes a reason for it; and in proposition xv, that it follows that 
acting in accordance with credible sense information is in accordance with reason and therefore in 
accordance with nature and therefore obligatory.  This applies to feelings and desires, which also 
constitute sense information—when there is no reason against an inclination it becomes the ruling 
principle and “takes the commanding post;” in that case, acting in accordance with 
rationally-supported feelings and desires constitutes acting in accordance with one’s nature.  
Inasmuch as there is an obligation to act in accordance with one’s nature then  
a man must act as being what he is in n.3 under prop. [ii] of this section (IX.iii.3).   
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 Feelings and desires are what motivate human beings to act; they are part of human nature; 
to act in accordance with them—always under the guidance of reason—is to act according to 
nature. 
The springs of all human actions are in fact, either a sense of duty, or a prospect of 
some pleasure or profit to be obtained, some evil or danger to be avoided; that is, 
either the reasonableness of what is done, or the manner, in which something doth 
or is like to affect the agent; and that is again, human actions are founded either in 
reason, or passion and inclination.  (I need not add they may be in both.)  This 
being so, what should hinder, when reason does not work, but that the inferior 
springs should retain their nature, and act? (IX.iii.3)   
 
 Feelings and desires, when they are subject to reason and provide it with information, are 
good and can tend to noble ends; human beings could not exist without them.  It follows that they 
are a part of human nature in order to provide a motive for action when reason alone would not.  
When they are properly managed, that is, controlled by reason, they are positive characteristics and 
not defects in human nature.  Therefore, those philosophers who advocate complete indifference 
as a goal are advocating what is contrary to nature and thus contrary to the moral rule.          
Love of that which is amiable, compassion toward the miserable and helpless, a 
natural abhorrence and resentment of that which is villainous or vicious or base, 
fear of evils, are things, which duly tempered, have laudable effects; and without 
them mankind could not well subsist.  By which it appears, that the Author of 
nature has placed these conatus’s, these tendencies and reluctancies in us, to 
dispose us for action, when there are no arguments of a higher nature to move us.  
So far are they, rightly managed, from being mere infirmities.  And certainly the 
philosopher, who pretends to absolute apathy, maims nature, and sets up for a 
half-man, or I don’t know what (IX.iii.3)152.   
 
 However, our feelings are very likely to become too strong and therefore attempting to 
                                            
152 Compare with Locke: “A perfect indifferency in the mind, not determinable by its last 
judgment of the good or evil, that is thought to attend its choice, would be so far from being an 
advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as 
the want of indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection 
on the other side.”  Essay, II.21.48.   
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weaken them somewhat is a way of preventing this; or else, when considering the mean between 
extremes, moving away more from the worse extreme.  Although feelings are to be acted upon 
when not contrary to reason, that does not mean they should be enabled to run wild—they are only 
to be heard.   
 It follows from this that people are entitled to choose what they prefer, as long as it is 
“innocent;” as well as pursue their well-being prudentially and lawfully, in accordance with 
Section II (“Of Happiness”), proposition xiii:  
Those pleasures are true, and to be reckoned into our happiness, against which there 
lies no reason (II.xiii).  
 
If gratifying a desire is against reason and truth, then denying it constitutes treating it as what it is; 
if it is not contrary to reason and truth, then complying with it constitutes treating it as what it is, 
hence acting in accordance with the moral rule.   
 However, there is an       
 
4. Obligation to self-improvement. 
He must use what means he can to cure his own defects, or at least to prevent the 
effects of them; learn to deny temptations, or keep them at a proper distance; even 
mortify, where mortification is necessary; and always carry about him the sense of 
his being but a man (IX.iii.4).  
 
A person who does not engage in self-improvement is acting contrary to proposition ii, note 
7—that human beings are “fallible and infirm.”  That constitutes denying true propositions about 
his nature.  It also constitutes a wrongful omission, as established in Section I (“Of Moral Good 
and Evil”), proposition v.     
 Therefore, persons have an obligation to figure out what their weaknesses are and how to 
compensate for them.  This does not contradict note 3 above, because that established that when 
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reason is against an inclination the inclination should not be followed; an inclination may only be 
followed if reason is not against it.   
 (To be clear about what he means by mortification, he states  
[n]o monkery, no superstitious or fantastical mortifications are here recommended 
(IX.iii.4.nf).)  
 
 The last clause of this note, that a person should 
always carry about him the sense of his being but a man (IX.iii.4)  
covers a lot of ground.  If people think of what they and others are, namely, the same kind, they 
will not be conceited, not so critical, punitive, and vengeful, but rather be modest.  They should 
seek to    
not...be proud, conceited, vain; but modest, and humble, and rather diffident of 
themselves; not to censure the failings of others too hardly, not to be over-severe in 
punishing or exacting justice, and particularly not to be revengeful; but candid, 
placable, mansuete [civilized], and so forth (IX.iii.4).   
 
5. Obligation to self-examination and repentance. 
He ought to examine his own actions and conduct, and where he finds he has 
transgressed, to repent (IX.iii.5).  
 
If he has harmed another, he should make reparations.  If reparations are impossible, or he has 
wronged himself, he should repent, and act in a way that shows he wants forgiveness—which 
shows that he wishes it undone.  He should take every means to avoid relapsing.   
 These actions are what a rational mind includes in the definition of a fault or wrong action.  
What is contrary to truth is unreasonable, wrong, or a fault;  A rational mind cannot approve of 
what is unreasonable and therefore must disapprove of it.  A rational animal acts according his 
nature and truth and the definition of wrong if he avoids committing wrong, and, if he has 
committed it, attempts to undo it, or at least repent.  A criminal does not behave as a rational 
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animal and deliberately opposes truth.  A person who has done wrong treats himself as what he is 
by regarding himself as in danger of relapsing.   
 
6. Obligation to improve one’s reason. 
He must labor to improve his rational faculties by such means, as are (fairly) 
practicable by him, and consistent with his circumstances (IX.iii.6).  
 
If it is a disadvantage to be subject to error and act in ignorance then it follows that it is an 
advantage to know truths that prevent this; and the more knowledge the greater the advantage.   
 Reason is the means of obtaining knowledge (true descriptions of the world per Section I, 
proposition ii); therefore, improving the functioning of one’s reason constitutes improving one’s 
means of obtaining true information about the world.  Not to seek to improve the means of 
obtaining true information constitutes denying the nature of true information—that it is the means 
of pursuing happiness.     
 By improving our rational faculties we become more rational, improve our nature, and 
become more attentive to rational enjoyments (IX.iii.6).   
 The means of improving the mind are  
the instruction of able men, reading, observation, meditation (IX.iii.6).   
Not everyone has the opportunity or capacity for making use of these, or has them only to a limited 
extent.  One’s obligation is determined by one’s opportunities as established in Section IV (“Of 
the Obligations of Imperfect Beings with Respect to their Power of Acting”), proposition ii 
So far as any being has no power, or opportunity of doing any thing, so far is that 
being incapable of any obligation to do it; or, no being is capable of any obligation 
to do that, which it has not power or opportunity to do (IV.ii).  
 
That is why the qualification “by such means as are...practicable” is included above.     
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In order to survive people need material goods.  Without them the rational part “cannot dwell 
easy” and the pursuit of knowledge is interrupted.  It is therefore rational to conclude that the 
pursuit of material goods 
 which tends to the preservation and happiness of the whole (IX.iii.6)   
is necessary and important.  However, this takes time and effort which may preclude the 
development of reason except for those whose occupation is learning.     
 People’s opportunities for developing their reason vary considerably depending on their 
circumstances.  Those who are “more free from worldly cares” or whose work brings them some 
literacy can only have partial knowledge.  Some people have health, early education, 
encouragement, useful acquaintances, and no problems.  Others have disadvantages which force 
them  
to be their own guides, and make their way as well as they can (IX.iii.6).   
Nevertheless,  
every man may in some degree or other endeavour to cultivate his nature, and 
possess himself of useful truths (IX.iii.6).   
 
Not to do this is to reject reason—which is always unreasonable, give up one’s humanity, and fall 
into an animal existence.  (However, in Section I he acknowledged that,  
our abilities and opportunities are not equal; some labor under disadvantages 
invincible (I.v).)   
 
7. Obligation to learn from others.   
He must attend to instruction, and even ask advice; especially in matters of 
consequence.  
 
 Not to do so is to deny the true propositions concerning one’s nature: that one has limited 
knowledge and capacity, is fallible, and that it is possible for someone else to be more 
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knowledgeable.  Everyone can get information from others and the less a person knows the more 
true it is that he should learn from others.  Outside their area of expertise, people should get 
information from those who are expert.  In human society there is a trade of knowledge, as well as 
of goods and services.   
There is or should be a commerce or interchange of counsel and knowledge, as well 
as of other things; and where men have not these of their own growth, they should 
thankfully receive what may be imported from other quarters (IX.iii.7).   
 
This does not mean following blindly the opinions of someone else, who is also a fallible human 
being; but listening to his arguments and using one’s own reason to determine what is reasonable 
to believe.  Simply to follow another without thinking is to give up reason and be like an animal.     
[B]ut by the assistance of another, and hearing what he has to say, to find out more 
certainly on which side reason, truth, and happiness (which always keep close 
together) do lie.  And thus it is indeed a man’s own reason at last, which governs. 
 
He, who is governed by what another says (or does) without understanding it and 
making the reason of it his own, is not governed by his own reason, and that is, by 
no reason that he has.  To say one is led by the nose (as we commonly speak) gives 
immediately the idea of a brute (IX.iii.7).   
 
8. Obligation to overcome one’s prejudices. 
He must labor to clear his mind of those preoccupations and encumbrances which 
hang about it and hinder him from reasoning freely and judging impartially 
(IX.iii.[8]).   
 
 Everyone begins life with no knowledge and then tends to acquire irrational ideas and 
eventually becomes set in them.  
We set out in life from such poor beginnings of knowledge, and grow up under such 
remains of superstition and ignorance, such influences of company and fashion, 
such insinuations of pleasure, etc.; that it is no wonder if men get habits of thinking 
only in one way; that these habits in times grow confirmed and obstinate; and so 
their minds come to be overcast with thick prejudices, scarce penetrable by any ray 
of truth or light of reason (IX.iii.[8]).   
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One must work to clear one’s mind of these prejudices and habits which hinder good reasoning.  
Not to do so, that is, not to make one’s reason fit for use, constitutes a declaration that one does not 
intend to use reason and therefore constitutes a declaration that one is irrational.  This contradicts 
proposition ii, note 4 above—a human being is a rational animal.   
 Conclusion of proposition iii: 
[I]t is the duty of every man...to behave himself in all respects...as far as he is able 
according to reason (IX.iii).   
 
From which follows,    
 
Proposition iv—obligation to live virtuously and piously 
Every man is obliged to live virtuously and piously (IX.iv).   
Living virtuously and piously is coextensive with living according to reason (see Section III—“Of 
Reason,” chapter III.B above) and truth (see Section I—“Of Moral Good and Evil,” chapter III.D 
above).    
 The preceding sections demonstrated that to live virtuously and piously means being 
reverent and dutiful towards God (Section V—“Truths Relating to the Deity,” section A above); 
just with regard to other people’s property (Section VI—“Truths Respecting Mankind in General,” 
section B above, and Section VII—“Truths Respecting Particular Societies of Men,” section C 
above); and pursuing happiness without impiety and harm to oneself and others (propositions i-iii 
above).   
 The most important virtues concerning oneself are prudence—which is “the queen of 
virtues,” and constitutes the exercise of reason; temperance—pursuing physical pleasures only 
when they are consistent with our well-being and never treating them as the sole purpose of our 
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existence; chastity—it does not deny the “tender passions” but does mean not indulging them 
contrary to reason, nor giving up the man to satisfy the animal, nor hurting others for one’s 
pleasure; and pursuing them lawfully and privately;  frugality—considering one’s family’s 
present and future, keeping in mind that the future is always uncertain, saving for the future and 
refraining from extravagance; it permits generosity and even magnificence when they are in 
accordance with a true assessment of one’s circumstances.  There are other virtues which it is not 
necessary to list.   
 There are methods to improve one’s judgment of what constitutes virtuous behavior.  One 
is to imagine one has already taken the contemplated action and consider what one would think of 
it then, while keeping in mind that the lengthy regret one might feel afterwards will be much 
greater than the short-term pleasure.  Another is to imagine someone else performing the 
contemplated action and consider how one would regard it; this works because we see others’ 
faults better than our own.  Also, when a virtue is a mean between two bad extremes, it is 
sometimes better to incline more toward one of these extremes than the other.   
 Living virtuously tends to happiness.   
Since then to live virtuously is to practice reason and act conformably to truth, he, 
who lives so, must be ultimately happy, by sect. II. prop. [xiv], and therefore not 
only the commands of reason, but even the desire of happiness...will oblige a man 
to live so (IX.iv).   
 
Experience shows that the virtuous life is the happier life; virtuous pleasures are truer than vicious 
ones; the vicious life is dangerous and ends badly.  However, virtue does not make a person happy 
when he is subject to terrible suffering; nor does it guarantee good fortune; it does make a person 
less unhappy and brings inner tranquillity.   
 One should consider the question of which is better, a virtuous life which naturally tends to 
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happiness or a vicious one which naturally tends to unhappiness?    
In brief, virtue will make a man here, in any given circumstances, as happy as a 
man can be in those circumstances; or however it will make him happy hereafter in 
some other state; for ultimately, all taken together, happy he must be (IX.iv).    
 
(This includes the assumption that the virtuous will be rewarded in the afterlife, which is the 
subject of part II of this section, below.)     
 An objection that is raised to this argument is that if virtue is supposed to make people 
happy, how is it that there are virtuous people who are miserable?  The answer is that in ordinary 
cases virtue has a natural tendency to produce happiness but it does not follow  
that there are no perturbations in human affairs (IX.viii.4).   
Virtue can be overpowered by bad things; it does not make people invulnerable; nor can it control 
bad things which affect both the virtuous and the vicious.  Conversely, vice may provide more 
pleasure than pain, contrary to its natural tendency, because a vicious man may have good fortune 
that causes him more pleasure than the pain which naturally follows from his vices.   
 In addition to virtue and vice, people’s circumstances affect their pleasures or sufferings; 
no one claims that only the natural tendencies of virtue and vice affect people and not the natural 
tendencies of their circumstances.  Virtue only 
tends to make men happy in proportion to their circumstances; and vice does the 
contrary (IX.viii).   
 
That is, virtue produces the happiness that is within one’s power; makes people happier than they 
would otherwise be—in their circumstances; it tends to improve their circumstances but does not 
completely correct them; nor does it ensure that their enjoyments exceed their sufferings; nor does 
it ensure that vicious people’s vices, although they do cause them pain, will cause their sufferings 
to exceed their enjoyments (IX.viii).    
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 Good fortune does not constitute virtue.  There are various beneficial characteristics, such 
as good looks, wealth, health, fortitude etc., which people have by nature.  Because they are given 
by nature they are not virtues but advantages.  In their case the virtue consists in using them 
rightly.  The same principle applies to lacks of these beneficial characteristics—it is not a lack of 
virtue not to have them and therefore not to use what one does not have.  A person who has less of 
a beneficial characteristic and does as much as he can with it has as much virtue as one who has 
more and does the greater amount that he can with it (IX.iv).   
 
Part II—The soul 
 Part II of Section IX consists of arguments for the immortality of the soul.  Numerous 
arguments are offered for the following propositions, which I have omitted.
153
   
 One has a consciousness of one’s own existence, of one’s intellectual capacities, and of 
one’s power to begin and stop motions in one’s body (IX.v).  The subject of one’s 
self-consciousness must be different from the body—it is the soul (IX.vi).  The soul cannot be 
mere matter (IX.vii).  (He offers many arguments for this among which are references to 
Cartesian dualism and a quote from Locke.)  The soul is immortal.  That good people suffer and 
bad people flourish means that there must be an afterlife in which this is rectified; otherwise, it 
would mean that God is not rational and this is contrary to what was established in Section V.  It is 
possible that these instances were established by God in order to prove the existence of an afterlife.  
Irrationality is so prevalent in this world that there must be one in which reason prevails (IX.viii).  
The soul, when it leaves the body, will go to a state that is in accordance with its nature (IX.ix).  In 
                                            
153 Alexander Altmann traces several of the arguments in this section to medieval Jewish 
philosophers.  Altmann, “William Wollaston,” 236-8.   
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this state, souls will be positioned in accordance with their differing degrees of perfection (IX.x).  
These differences are the same as the differences in reasonableness (IX.xi).  It is reasonable to 
suppose this (IX.xii).  The positions of the reasonable and virtuous will be better than those of the 
foolish and vicious (IX.xiii).  The condition of the souls in the future state will also depend on the 
happiness and unhappiness they experienced in life (IX.xiv).  If the immortality of the soul cannot 
be demonstrated, its mortality certainly cannot (IX.xv).  Even if the immortality of the soul is 
considered merely probable, or only a chance, a virtuous life is still preferable to a vicious one 
(IX.xvi).  Therefore, to act in accordance with what is true, in addition to considering one’s 
present state and providing for one’s happiness in it, one must also consider that there will be an 
afterlife and provide for one’s happiness there (IX.xvii).  
 RND concludes with this final statement of how to behave ethically:   
For a conclusion of the whole matter; let our conversation in this world, so far as we 
are concerned, and able, be such as acknowledges every thing to be what it is (what 
it is in itself, and what with regard to us, to other beings, to causes, circumstances, 
consequences); that is, let us by no act deny any thing to be true, which is true; that 
is, let us act according to reason; and that is, let us act according to the law of our 
nature.  By honestly endeavouring to do this we shall express our duty to Him, 
who is the Author of it, and of that law; and at the same time prosecute our own 
proper happiness (the happiness of rational beings); we shall do what tends to make 
us easy here, and be qualifying ourselves and preparing for our removal hence to 
our long home; that great revolution, which, at the farthest, cannot be very far off 
(IX.xvii).   
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CHAPTER V.  WOLLASTON’S CRITICS 
 The established view of Wollaston’s moral theory is that it is nonsensical, and that it was 
thoroughly refuted long ago.  However, an examination of the arguments that supposedly 
devastated Wollaston’s moral theory reveals most of them to be attacks on straw men, and all of 
them fail to engage the theory.  Hume’s prominent attack on Wollaston turns out to be closely 
adapted from a straw man invented by John Clarke of Hull; Clarke’s straw man was also utilized 
by Hutcheson and Price.  Hume’s and Bentham’s claims concerning the contents of RND are so 
far-fetched that they lead to the conclusion that neither of them read it.  The more obscure 
criticisms by Thomas Bott also do not seriously engage Wollaston’s theory.   
 That the established view is unjustified has been notably recognized by Joel Feinberg, who 
writes:  
[A]fter discovering in various commentaries the amount of scorn and ridicule that 
have been heaped on his now forgotten theory, and the shocking misrepresentations 
and sophistries used in ‘refuting’ it, I am moved (out of a simple sense of justice!) 
to set the record straight.
154
   
 
(See Section D below on Feinberg’s paper.)   
                                            
154 Feinberg, “Wollaston and His Critics,” 346.   
 
 167 
A.  THE MISLEADING OBSERVERS STRAW MAN 
 The attack which probably has most damaged the reputation of the moral theory espoused 
by William Wollaston in The Religion of Nature Delineated is David Hume’s claim that 
Wollaston’s moral theory defines an immoral act as one that causes a false belief in an observer.155   
 That this claim is a straw man has been recognized by some prominent commentators.   
     Hume has simply misread Wollaston.  Nowhere does Wollaston claim that the 
essence of all wrongdoing is telling a lie and thus deceiving others.  Rather he 
holds that all wrongdoing is an offense against the truth, whether or not any 
observer is present to be deceived.  What makes an act wrong, according to 
Wollaston, is not that it misleads others or causes false belief, but rather that it 
violates truth, which is quite another thing....Thus, Hume sets out to refute a theory 
Wollaston never held.
156
 
 
The comparison with another eighteenth-century British rationalist position, that of 
William Wollaston,  is instructive here.  Wollaston argues in The Religion of 
Nature Delineated (London, 1722) that actions aim to represent reality – but the 
natural and social world of ordinary life rather than the intuitionists' normative 
metaphysical order.  For Wollaston, immoral actions are contrary to reason for the 
simple reason that they assert plain falsehoods.  Thus, he thought that theft is 
contrary to reason because the thief implicitly asserts that what he takes is not the 
property of another, and that is false.  Wollaston's rationalism might be called 
reductive, since it seeks to reduce moral categories to those of truth and falsehood.  
From even this cursory description it should be clear, by the way, that Hume's 
“refutation” of Wollaston in the Treatise is directed at a straw man 
(THN.461-62n).
157
   
 
 Any reading of RND makes it difficult to discern how Hume arrived at his farfetched claim 
that Wollaston asserts that immorality consists of creating a false belief in an observer, given that 
the moral rule espoused in RND is that an act is immoral if it expresses a proposition which is false 
and thereby denies things to be what they are, thus denying nature.   
                                            
155 Hume, Treatise, 296-7 (3.1.1.15 & note 68).   
156 Feinberg, 347.   
157 Darwall, British Moralists, 327n14.   
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No act (whether word or deed) of any being, to whom moral good and evil are 
imputable, that interferes with any true proposition, or denies any thing to be as it 
is, can be right.   
 
Those propositions, which are true, and express things as they are, express the 
relation between the subject and the attribute as it is; that is, this is either affirmed 
or denied of that according to the nature of that relation.  And further, this relation 
(or, if you will, the nature of this relation) is determined and fixed by the natures of 
the things themselves.  Therefore nothing can interfere with any proposition that is 
true, but it must likewise interfere with nature (the nature of the relation, and the 
nature of the things themselves too), and consequently be unnatural, or wrong in 
nature (I.iv).  
 
His moral rule is 
That every intelligent, active, and free being should so behave himself, as by no act 
to contradict truth; or, that he should treat every thing as being what it is (I.xi).   
 
 The source of Hume’s claim can be found in the argument against RND in John Clarke’s158 
pamphlet “An Examination of Moral Good and Evil, Advanced in a Late Book, Entitled, The 
Religion of Nature Delineated.”159   
 Clarke's argument against RND can be summarized as follows.  First, Clarke denies a 
central premise of RND—that actions express propositions.   
A true proposition may be denied, or things may be denied to be what they are, by 
deeds, as well as by express words or another proposition (I.iii).       
 
Clarke argues:  
 
Affirming and denying are actions, which in strict propriety of language are only 
applicable to agents; so that actions, whether words or deeds, can not be properly 
said to affirm or deny any thing; the Agent only can be properly said to affirm or 
deny truth by his actions, whether words or deeds.  This though it may seem a nice 
                                            
158 This John Clarke (1687-1734), identified on the title page as “Master of the public 
grammar-school in Hull” is to be distinguished from the John Clarke who wrote the introduction to 
later editions of RND.   
159 Clarke, Examination.  Spelling, italics, and capitalization have been modernized.  All 
square-bracketed items within quotes are my additions.   
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distinction, yet is not more nice than necessary; for in order to a person's affirming 
or denying the truth, an intention to affirm or deny is required, without which he 
cannot be said to affirm or deny it.  A man is then, and then only, said to affirm or 
deny a thing, when he conveys a proposition in his own mind to the minds of 
others; as expressing his own sense, apprehension or persuasion of the agreement 
or disagreement of things (6-9).  [The original page numbering skips from page 6 
to page 9.] 
 
 Clarke maintains that actions cannot express propositions.  Clarke interprets Wollaston as 
saying that actions themselves express propositions, not that rational agents express propositions 
via their actions, although the first proposition in RND states that only the actions of rational 
beings are under consideration.   
That act, which may be denominated morally good or evil, must be the act of a 
being capable of distinguishing, choosing, and acting for himself: or more briefly, 
of an intelligent and free agent (I.i).   
 
 Wollaston’s position is that a being can be said to act only if it acts from an internal 
principle; whatever does not do so does not act—it is only acted upon.  Thus, only the actions of 
intelligent and free agents are truly acts and subject to moral judgment (I.i).    
 Clarke also maintains that agents can express propositions only when they intend to do so, 
and only by words (or by agreed-upon signals), and that they can only affirm or deny truth when 
they intend to do so (9-10).   
 At this point, Clarke could argue that since a major premise of RND (that actions express 
propositions) is false, then the conclusion is false.  However, that is not the argument he makes.  
Instead he claims that the meaning of RND's argument is entirely different from what is stated in 
the text, and dogmatically asserts that it must mean that immorality consists of conveying false 
impressions by actions.  
[W]hereas he means no more, but that actions or omissions denominated immoral, 
have a natural meaning or signification, inconsistent with some truth; and that 
 
 170 
therefore the immorality of any action, or omission, does not lie in the intention, but 
in the natural tendency or signification of the action or omission to deny some truth, 
in a fitness to raise, or excite, in the minds of such as see or hear of it, propositions 
contrary to the truth (12).  
 
And again:  
 
The only reasonable and true sense therefore that can be put upon Mr. Wollaston's 
general assertion, that men may by their actions or omissions deny truth, is this, that 
actions, even such as are not by compact or agreement made expressive of, and 
equivalent to propositions, may yet convey propositions into the minds of such as 
may see, or otherwise come to the knowledge of them, inconsistent with, or 
contrary to some truth, even where a person has no intention by his action or 
omission of conveying any such sense or proposition to the minds of others....We 
are now therefore to examine his doctrine according to this sense of his words 
(19-20).   
 
 In both paragraphs Clarke merely asserts dogmatically that RND means what he declares it 
to mean.  In the latter he announces that he intends to proceed to “examine” RND in accordance 
with his assertion.  However, notwithstanding his assertion, there is nothing in RND that could be 
interpreted to mean what Clarke claims it means and therefore his claim is very much a straw man 
and the doctrine he “examines” bears no relationship whatever to the moral theory proposed in 
RND. 
 Clarke's argument is not that since a major premise of RND (that actions express 
propositions) is false, then the conclusion is false, but that since the premise is false the argument 
means whatever Clarke declares it to mean, which is, that immorality consists of performing an 
action which leads to someone else having a false belief. 
 A comparison of Hume’s statements with Clarke’s shows that Hume’s statements closely 
parallel Clarke's claims about RND, his arguments, and his examples. 
 Hume writes:  
As to those judgments which are the effects of our actions, and which, when false, 
give occasion to pronounce the actions contrary to truth and reason; we may 
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observe, that our actions never cause any judgment, either true or false, in 
ourselves, and that 'tis only on others they have such an influence.  'Tis certain, 
that an action, on many occasions, may give rise to false conclusions in others....In 
this respect my action resembles somewhat a lye or falsehood; only with this 
difference, which is material, that I perform not the action with any intention of 
giving rise to a false judgment in another (3.1.1:296).   
 
Hume here is following Clarke:  
This though it may seem a nice distinction, yet is not more nice than necessary; for 
in order to a person's affirming or denying the truth, an intention to affirm or deny is 
required, without which he cannot be said to affirm or deny it (6-9).   
 
 Hume continues with Clarke’s claim that Wollaston is asserting that actions themselves 
express propositions, not that agents express propositions via their actions:  
It causes, however, a mistake and false judgment by accident; and the falshood of 
its effects may be ascrib’d, by some odd figurative way of speaking, to the action 
itself.   
 
And then with Clarke’s straw man:  
 
But still I can see no pretext of reason for asserting, that the tendency to cause such an error 
is the first spring or original source of all immorality (3.1.1: 296-7).   
 
Continuing in a footnote he writes:  
 
One might think it were entirely superfluous to prove this, if a late author 
[Wollaston], who has had the good fortune to obtain some reputation, had not 
seriously affirm’d, that such a falshood is the foundation of all guilt and moral 
deformity (3.1.1: 297n68).   
 
 In addition to the similarity between Hume’s and Clarke’s central claim there is also 
considerable similarity between Hume’s and Clarke's particular examples.  As part of his 
“examination” of RND, Clarke offers the following argument:   
Does a man lie with his neighbor's wife?  He by that action impudently denies her 
to be his neighbor's, and affirms her to be his own; though the circumstance of 
secrecy, with which that kind of gallantry is usually carried on, visibly implies the 
quite contrary, viz. that she is not his own; which being a truth, some people may 
perhaps be thankful to our author for the notable argument his doctrine furnishes 
them with, to prove the innocence of adultery (16).   
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Hume uses Clarke's example:  
[A]nd that a person, who thro' a window sees any lewd behaviour of mine with my 
neighbour's wife, may be so simple as to imagine she is certainly my own 
(3.1.1:296).   
 
As well as Clarke's argument that secrecy would obviate the immorality:  
Add to this, that if I had us’d the precaution of shutting the windows, while I 
indulg'd myself in those liberties with my neighbour's wife, I shou’d have been 
guilty of no immorality; and that because my action, being perfectly conceal'd, 
wou'd have had no tendency to produce any false conclusion (3.1.1:297n68).   
 
 Hume’s argument concerning criminals also closely resembles Clarke's.  Wollaston’s 
argument is that immorality consists of actions which express propositions which deny truth.  In 
the case of theft or robbery, the truth being denied is that the taken item belongs to the person from 
whom it is taken.  (Wollaston derives a right to property from human existence in a state of nature 
in Section VI of RND.  See Chapter III.B above.)   
If a man steals a horse, and rides away upon him, he may be said indeed by riding 
him to use him as a horse, but not the horse of another man, who gave him no 
license to do this. He does not therefore consider him as being what he is, unless he 
takes in the respect he bears to his true owner (I.vi).   
 
In keeping with his straw man, Clarke argues that the issue is whether a criminal's action leads an 
onlooker to believe falsely that the stolen items belong to the thief, and then to assert that this will 
likely not happen, because the nature of the action will be clear to an onlooker.  Clarke's example 
is of armed robbery: 
He [the robber] never so much as dreams of the denial of any such thing, nor has his 
action any such signification, but quite the contrary.  For men do not use to claim 
their own in that violent manner, but rogues frequently take that method to deprive 
honest people of their own; and therefore the thought that would naturally arise in 
the mind of a spectator upon it, that is, the natural meaning or signification of the 
action would be, that the money certainly belonged to the traveler, and not the 
highwayman (11).   
 
 
 173 
Hume’s similar argument changes robbery to burglary:  
For the same reason, a thief, who steals in by a ladder at a window, and takes all 
imaginable care to cause no disturbance, is in no respect criminal.  For either he 
will not be perceiv'd, or if he be, 'tis impossible he can produce any error, nor will 
any one, from these circumstances, take him to be other than what he really is 
(3.1.1: 297n68).   
 
 Hume’s argument that Wollaston’s position that theft is immoral is circular because it 
assumes a right to property is also very similar to Clarke’s.   
Clarke:    
Yet our author is not at liberty to suppose, there is such a thing as property in the 
world, or that any man can be truly said to have a property in any thing; because 
such a supposition, is taking the thing for granted, which it is the design of this first 
section of his book to prove (30-31).   
 
(As noted above, Wollaston’s theory of property rights is in Section VI of RND.)      
Hume:  
Besides, we may easily observe, that in all those arguments there is an evident 
reasoning in a circle.  A person who takes possession of another's goods, and uses 
them as his own, in a manner declares them to be his own; and this falshood is the 
source of the immorality of injustice.  But is property, or right, or obligation, 
intelligible, without an antecedent morality?   
 
 Hume does apparently originate the equally dogmatic claim that the straw man version of 
RND would lead to the claim that inanimate objects can be immoral.  This claim has been 
thoroughly addressed by Joel Feinberg—see Section D below.     
 There is no evidence that Hume read RND.  There is nothing in Hume's statements 
concerning RND which evince any familiarity with its contents.  Hume neither quotes from it nor 
refers to anything that appears in it, unlike Clarke who quotes passages from RND.  While Clarke 
discusses examples that appear in RND, Hume’s examples come solely from Clarke.   
 The similarities between Hume's argument and Clarke's are persuasive.  Hume repeats 
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Clarke's central claim, his objections, and his examples.  The conclusion to be drawn from a 
comparison of Clarke's and Hume's arguments against RND (and with RND itself) is that Hume 
never read RND but only Clarke's pamphlet, from which he borrowed almost all of the elements of 
his attack on RND.  It is Clarke who is the source of this peculiar mischaracterization of RND, 
though its prevalence is due to its having been propagated by Hume.   
 Prior to Hume
160
, Frances Hutcheson
161
 also utilized Clarke’s straw man to criticize 
Wollaston.   
[T]his quality in actions, whether we call it significancy or not, that only true 
propositions can be inferred from them by just reasoning, be moral goodness?  
And may it not be the very idea of moral evil in actions, that some false conclusions 
can by just consequence, be deduced from them? (268-9).   
 
This is not proper signification.  A judicious observer never imagines any 
intention to communicate opinions in some of the most important actions, either 
good or evil (272).   
 
 Hutcheson’s chapter on Wollaston consists primarily of such arguments about 
signification.  The only source for this claim is Clarke’s straw man.  Hutcheson’s references to 
arguments that are supposedly in RND are spurious, as is the one sentence that is presented as a 
direct quote from RND (266).   
 After Hume, Richard Price, in his A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals (1758)
162
 
also utilized Clarke’s straw man, that is, the claim that Wollaston asserts that immorality consists 
of creating a false belief in an observer.  (That this claim is derived directly from Clarke and not 
from Hume is indicated by Price’s referring, in a paragraph not quoted here, to a statement that 
                                            
160 Hutcheson’s Illustrations on the Moral Sense was first published in 1728 and thus predates 
Hume’s Treatise.   
161 [Hutcheson], Illustrations.  Spelling, capitalization, and italicization have been modernized.   
162 Raphael, British Moralists.   
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appears in Clarke but not in Hume.)     
The evil of ingratitude and cruelty is not the same with that of denying truth, or 
affirming a lie: nor can the formal ratio and notion of it (as Mr. Wollaston speaks) 
be justly said to consist in this; because there may be no intention to deny any thing 
true, or to produce an assent to any thing false.  Ingratitude and cruelty would be 
wrong, though there were no rational creatures in the world besides the agent, and 
though he could have no design to declare a falsehood; which is a quite distinct 
species of evil (727).   
 
 In a recent paper, responding to the papers by Tweyman, Feinberg, and Joynton, et. al., (see 
Chapter II.C above), John J. Tilley
163
 states that their argument is that “Wollaston’s moral theory 
has long been ignored owing not so much to its flaws as to the abuse it received from its most 
famous critics, beginning with Hume and continuing with Bentham, Stephen, and others” (1099).  
Tilley states that this argument “stresses weak, unfair criticisms, found in prominent works, 
published many years after Wollaston’s book appeared” and argues that Clarke’s, Hutcheson’s, 
and Bott’s (see below) criticisms are “fair” and “potent” (1099).  However, inasmuch as Hume’s 
arguments incorporate Clarke’s, and Tilley has already admitted that Hume’s arguments are 
“weak” and “unfair,” it can hardly follow that the same criticism by Clarke is successful.   
  
                                            
163 Tilley, “Wollaston's Early Critics.”   
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B.  THOMAS BOTT AND HIS FOLLOWERS 
 Thomas Bott
164
 made several criticisms of RND, some of which were later utilized by 
other critics.  Bott states that his criticism is based on Section I, Proposition ix, in which 
Wollaston states that happiness (the causation of unhappiness) is the standard by which the degree 
of wrongness of a denial of truth is measured.  Apparently because the happiness standard is 
presented in Section II, after the statement of the moral rule in Section I, Bott regards the happiness 
standard as having been unjustifiably added onto the moral rule and even as contrary to it.   
Here therefore he takes into his notion of morality, not only the practice of truth, but 
the influence also of that truth upon the welfare and happiness of mankind (6).   
 
Yet how such a concession as this, is consistent with the definition of moral good 
and evil...it will be very hard to say; or rather, any one must plainly perceive an 
absurdity and inconsistency (7).   
 
 In addition Bott argues that if the definition of immoral acts is that they are contrary to truth 
then all truths must affect happiness, otherwise acting in accordance with or contrary to truth could 
not affect happiness.       
For sure, if the very essence of moral good and evil lies in the mere agreement or 
disagreement of our acts with truth, all truth must be supposed to be moral, and to 
have, in its tendency an influence upon human happiness: otherwise, the practice or 
neglect of it could no ways affect human happiness (7).   
 
 Bott’s error is to regard the happiness standard as added onto or contradicting the moral 
rule, rather than as the standard of the moral rule, with the moral rule as the means of attaining 
happiness.  This leads him to reverse Wollaston's position and claim that all truth affects 
happiness, rather than that only those truths which affect happiness are the subject of the moral 
rule. 
                                            
164 [Bott], Principal and Peculiar.  Spelling, capitalization, and italics have been modernized.   
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 Bott also argues that as all truths are equally true the denial of any truth is morally equal to 
the denial of any other truth.   
I think his notion of moral good and evil makes all truths not only moral, but 
equally so; or, in other words, all truths are in themselves of equal importance, 
according to his definition; and the agreement or disagreement of our actions with 
them, equally moral or immoral (9).   
 
This objection also depends on not recognizing the role of happiness as the standard of 
truth-violation.  (See Chapter III.D.8 above.)    
 This argument was picked up by Hutcheson.   
If then significancy of falsehood be the very same with moral evil, all crimes must 
be equal (274).   
 
 Lastly, Bott argues that there is no difference between asserting true or false propositions 
by words or by deeds and therefore there is no moral difference between them.   
A meets B, a poor wretch at the point of starving, takes notice of his case, says 
every thing that is right about it, and goes his way.  C comes immediately after, 
sees what B's case is, gives him relief and departs.  Here A's words and C's action, 
are supposed perfectly to agree with B's circumstances...therefore...because the 
agreement is equal, the moral goodness of their acts must be equal too (11-12).   
 
This disregards RND’s principle that propositions expressed by actions have more reality than 
those expressed by words and therefore greater moral import.  (See Chapter III.D.4 (RND I.iii) 
above.)   
 Bott’s argument depends on focusing selectively on a few statements in RND and 
disregarding essential parts of Wollaston’s theory.   
 Later in the century John Brown
165
 reiterated one of Bott’s arguments.  Brown argued that 
                                            
165 John Brown, Essays on the Characteristics (1751) in D. H. Monro, A Guide to the British 
Moralists, Fontana Philosophy Classics, general ed. A. M. Quinton (London: Wm. Collins Sons & 
Co Ltd, 1972): 159-170.  Capitalization has been modernized.   
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the various criteria of moral goodness offered by earlier moral philosophers, such as virtue, beauty 
(Shaftesbury), fitness (Clarke), or truth (Wollaston) were not the definition of moral goodness but 
were only the means to the actual moral good which is ‘the voluntary production of the greatest 
happiness’ (166) (Cumberland).   
 As Bott did, Brown argued that Wollaston plainly uses happiness as his criterion of moral 
good and therefore truth cannot be the criterion of moral goodness.  
Mr Wollaston is no less explicit in this particular: For in every instance he brings, 
the happiness of man is the single end to which his rule of truth verges in an 
unvaried manner (163).   
 
 Brown does not address Wollaston’s use of truth as the means of attaining happiness and 
his view that truth and happiness are coextensive.  Wollaston argued that rules such as Brown’s 
(derived from Cumberland), are too general to provide a means of making moral decisions.  (See 
Chapter I above.)     
 In a recent paper
166
 John J. Tilley argues that another objection by Bott is successful in 
refuting RND.  This objection is that if an act conflicts only with unimportant truths then it is not 
wrong; from this it follows that some acts that conflict with truth are not wrong, and therefore 
RND’s rule is denied.   
 This is the statement by Bott as quoted by Tilley: 
[Wollaston] speaks . . . of important truths, truths of weight, etc., which, I think, 
may be fairly understood as allowing that there are truths of no importance; (as it is 
very certain there are a great many . . . ). Yet how such a concession as this, is 
consistent with the definition of moral good and evil . . . it will be very hard to say; 
or rather, anyone must plainly perceive an absurdity and inconsistency. (Bott, 7) 
(274).   
 
 Tilley’s argument is that if a truth lacks “a positive degree of importance” then there is no 
                                            
166 Tilley, “Problem of Inconsistency,” 265-280.   
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“positive degree of wrongness.”  
— It is possible that the truths with which some acts conflict (assuming that acts 
can conflict with truths) lack any positive degree of importance. 
— If every truth with which an act conflicts lacks a positive degree of importance, 
then the act has no positive degree of wrongness, which is to say that it’s not wrong. 
— Therefore, it is possible that some acts that conflict with truths are not wrong 
(274).   
 
And thus RND’s rule is denied.   
 However, how “positive degrees” are defined is not explained.  Aside from using this term 
Tilley does not offer an argument for why even an infinitesimal wrong is the same as no wrong at 
all.  Wollaston clearly stated that some wrongs are insignificant (see Chapter III.D above), but 
however insignificant they are, insignificance is not the same as nonexistence.  The standard of 
“positiveness” is invented by Tilley.   
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C.  THE “ALL IMMORALITY IS LYING” STRAW MAN 
 From Clarke’s claim that RND’s position concerns the significance of actions, Hutcheson 
derived the claim that RND’s moral rule is that all immoral acts are lies.   
Never was bare significancy of falsehood made the idea of moral evil (263).   
This view, that Wollaston’s moral rule concerns making true or false statements, was reiterated by 
Price: 
It is well known that Mr. Wollaston...places the whole notion of moral good and 
evil in signifying and denying truth (727).   
 
 By the time of Jeremy Bentham, the claim that RND’s principle is that all immorality 
consists of telling a lie had been elaborated still more.  Bentham’s criticism of RND is:   
We have one philosopher, who says, there is no harm in any thing in the world but 
in telling a lie: and that if, for example, you were to murder your own father, this 
would only be a particular way of saying, he was not your father.  Of course, when 
this philosopher sees any thing that he does not like, he says, it is a particular way of 
telling a lie.  It is saying, that the act ought to be done, or may be done, when, in 
truth, it ought not to be done.
167
   
 
In Wollaston’s system, what is wrong with murdering anyone is that it denies his nature (and one’s 
own) as a rational, happiness-seeking being (see Chapter III above).   
 Bentham’s straw man was perpetuated in Leslie Stephen’s prominent history of 
eighteenth-century thought:   
Thirty years’ profound meditation had convinced Wollaston that the reason why a 
man should abstain from breaking his wife’s head was, that it was a way of denying 
that she was his wife.  All sin, in other words, was lying.
168
 
  
 One should note that Bentham followed Wollaston in seeking a single rule that would 
                                            
167 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, ch. 2, sec. 14, 
note 8, in Raphael, British Moralists, sec. 959.   
168 Stephen, vol. 1, ch. 3, sec. 39:109.   
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produce human happiness, and that Wollaston considered something akin to Utilitarianism’s rule 
of the greatest good for the greatest number, and rejected it on the grounds that the uniqueness and 
variability of individual experiences of pain and pleasure mean that a rule that applies the same 
standard to all persons will produce unequal and unjust results.   
Men’s respective happinesses or pleasures ought to be valued as they are to the 
persons themselves, whose they are; or according to the thoughts and sense, which 
they have of them; not according to the estimate put upon them by other people, 
who have no authority to judge of them, nor can know what they are; may compute 
by different rules; have less sense; be in different circumstances; or such as guilt 
has rendered partial to themselves.   
 
 
Every man's happiness is his happiness, what it is to him; and the loss of it is 
answerable to the degrees of his perception, to his manner of taking things, to his 
wants and circumstances (I.ii.obs.4).   
 
 The Bentham/Stephen view continued into the twentieth century.  Hence, Alistair 
Macintyre characterizes Wollaston’s position as:  
All wrongdoing is a species of lying, and lying is saying or representing what is 
false.
169
    
 
And in introducing a selection from RND in his anthology of British moralists, D. H. Monro says:  
Most of the problems of moral philosophy would be solved if moral propositions 
could be shown to be ordinary empirical statements, subject to the same tests of 
truth or falsity.  Wollaston tried to show that they were just that.
170
   
 
 The excerpt of RND that Monro reprints is proposition I.iii, which states that actions 
express propositions.  Monro apparently regards this as constituting Wollaston’s moral rule, even 
though it is the means of determining whether actions are in accordance with nature, which is the 
foundational principle of RND’s moral theory.   
                                            
169 Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (New York: Macmillan, 1966): 170.   
170 Monro, A Guide to the British Moralists, 316.   
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D.  JOEL FEINBERG’S RESPONSE TO HUME 
 Joel Feinberg argues that Wollaston’s views deserve a reexamination.   
The Rev. William Wollaston (1659-1724) was one of the most famous and highly 
esteemed writers of his time, and yet in the century following his death, his 
reputation fell into sharp decline until he became an object of disrespect in the 
writings of Hume, Price, Bentham, and others.  A fair-minded contemporary 
reader, I think, will find that Wollaston did have something important and original 
to say, however confused his manner of saying it, so that is one reason for 
reexamining his major work, The Religion of Nature Delineated (1722) (345).   
 
 Feinberg’s interest is in Wollaston’s premise that actions declare propositions.   
What I take to be the most suggestive point in Wollaston, namely, that certain 
actions can ‘in a manner declare or affirm’ propositions (350).   
 
 Although he recognizes that Clarke/Hume’s claim that Wollaston’s moral theory is that 
immorality consists of creating a false belief in an observer is a straw man, he is still sufficiently 
influenced by it to interpret Wollaston’s premise as claiming that actions express propositions 
symbolically, and therefore have to be understandable by an observer in order to do so.  (Feinberg 
read the excerpts from RND Sections I-II in the Selby-Bigge anthology of British Moralists, not a 
complete edition (345n1).)     
Most actions suggest nothing at all beyond what an observer would be entitled to 
infer on the shakiest inductive grounds, which is to say they make no “declaration” 
whatever (349).   
 
And the error in Wollaston’s bold theory of declarative actions is simply that of 
uncritically extending a plausible account of the symbolic effect of some actions to 
cover the heterogeneous class of all actions (351).    
  
(For the explanation of Wollaston’s premise that actions express propositions by creating states of 
affairs see Chapter III.D.3-4 above.)   
 Feinberg therefore interprets Wollaston’s premise as being similar to his ideas concerning 
the expressiveness of actions.   
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I have still another reason [for an interest in RND].  Elsewhere, I have found it 
useful to speak of the “symbolic aspect” of actions171 and to claim even that some 
actions can “express judgments.”172  In all the modern history of moral 
philosophy, Wollaston is the writer who has taken these notions most seriously, so 
it might well be instructive to reconsider his views (345).   
 
 Feinberg regards Wollaston’s position as akin to his own belief that there are cases in 
which people experience a feeling of violated truth that is distinct from feeling sympathy for the 
victim of an injury.   
  When those actions declare to the world some proposition which is in fact false and 
defamatory, then the person defamed has been unfairly treated.  Our shock and 
outrage at such treatment, which is characteristic of our reaction to perceived 
injustice generally, has a righteous and impersonal quality about it that is explained 
by our special allegiance to truth.  The sense of violated justice in this case is one 
and the same as the sense of violated truth, hence its peculiar tone of impersonal 
objectivity, as if it were experienced on behalf of the truth itself (351-2).   
 
Feinberg’s view is similar to Wollaston’s view that violations of truth are offensive in and of 
themselves.   
Much might be added here concerning the amiable nature, and great force of truth.  
If I may judge by what I feel within myself, the least truth cannot be contradicted 
without much reluctance: even to see other men disregard it does something more 
than displease; it is shocking (I.iv.5).    
 
 Feinberg regards Wollaston’s theory as an attempt to improve upon Stoicism’s standard of 
acting in accordance with nature—immoral actions treat things as if they are not what they are and 
are therefore contrary to truth.   
But the theory is no worse in this respect than the prevailing deist-stoic theory of 
“living according to nature,” and is in fact what Wollaston intended it to be, an 
interpretation and partial clarification of that ancient theory.  Wollaston holds with 
the Stoics that actions are wrong because they are “contrary to nature,” not because 
                                            
171 Doing and Deserving (Princeton, 1970): 68-70, 98-105.   
172 “Noncomparative Justice,” The Philosophical Review 83, no. 3 (July 1974): 297-338, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183696.   
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they may have a tendency to deceive possible observers (347).   
 
 Feinberg argues that RND does not overcome the objections raised against Stoicism, 
especially that it does not provide a standard by which to measure degrees of wrongness.   
Wollaston’s theory...needs supplementation by criteria of relative “worth” and 
“importance,” and also criteria of relevance for descriptions of actions and things 
represented or affected by actions (345).   
 
(See beginning of Chapter III.D, III.D.8, and III.C above for RND’s use of happiness as the 
standard of wrongdoing.)   
 Feinberg characterizes the established criticisms of Wollaston as “dead wrong” and 
“shocking misrepresentations and sophistries.”  (See the introduction to this chapter above.)   
He characterizes Hume’s criticism of Wollaston as follows:  
Hume has simply misread Wollaston.  Nowhere does Wollaston claim that the 
essence of all wrongdoing is telling a lie and thus deceiving others.  Rather he 
holds that all wrongdoing is an offense against the truth, whether or not any 
observer is present to be deceived.  What makes an act wrong, according to 
Wollaston, is not that is misleads others or causes false belief, but rather than it 
violates truth, which is quite another thing....Thus, Hume sets out to refute a theory 
Wollaston never held (347).   
 
 He also deals with Hume’s claim that RND implies that inanimate objects can be immoral.   
At this point I must interrupt Hume's argument to point out how sophistical it has 
become.  It surely goes without saying that in order for an action to be “vicious and 
immoral,” it must in fact be an action!  Natural objects erupt, explode, tumble, and 
fall, but they do not act.  A fortiori, they cannot act viciously and immorally.  
Wollaston's question was the same as that raised by all moral theorists, namely: 
What distinguishes the class of human actions that are morally wrong from the 
class of human actions that are not morally wrong?  No answer to that question 
could possibly commit a theorist to the absurd consequence that inanimate objects 
sometimes act immorally.  Hume's argument not only fails to touch the theory he 
wrongly ascribes to Wollaston, but it also can be directed just as well against any 
moral theory, including the utilitarian theory that Hume himself held, for if the 
production of pain and suffering is the basis of immorality, and natural objects by 
erupting, exploding, falling, and tumbling, cause pain, then it could be said to 
follow (by Hume's logic and on Hume's own moral theory) that inanimate objects 
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can be vicious and immoral.
173
   
 
Hume seems to anticipate this reply, for he goes on to say that “‘Tis in vain to urge, 
that inanimate objects act without liberty and choice,” but no reason is given to 
show why this natural rejoinder is “in vain,” but only the dogmatic reiteration that 
“If the tendency to cause error be the origin of immorality, that tendency and 
immorality would in every case be inseparable” (348).   
 
 To Hume’s objection that Wollaston assumes truth as a first principle Feinberg responds: 
  
This is precisely the challenge that can be leveled at a partisan of any first principle 
of morals, and of course, there is no conclusive way of meeting it.  One cannot 
prove a first principle without assuming it in its own proof.  Thus, one might 
challenge the hedonist to explain why it is wrong to cause pain, and the only cogent 
reply he can make is to question the ingenuousness of the query.  The “falsehood 
principle” seemed as evident to Wollaston as the pain principle did to Bentham 
(350).   
 
(RND’s foundational principle is that human beings should act in accordance with nature; as truth 
corresponds to nature, acting in accordance with truth constitutes acting in accordance with nature.  
See Chapter III.D above, and RND I.i.)  
 Feinberg’s paper is a useful corrective to some of the prevalent misrepresentations of 
Wollaston.  However, the incomplete source he used leads him to misunderstand RND’s claim 
that actions express propositions as applying to symbolic expression rather than to the creation of 
states of affairs, and to miss the connection between Sections I and II which presents happiness as 
the standard for evaluating the relative moral status of actions.   
 Feinberg recognizes that Wollaston’s theory that persons express propositions by their 
actions is a notable development—he characterizes it as “the most suggestive point in Wollaston.”  
However, despite his recognition that Hume’s attack on Wollaston is directed at a straw man—he 
states “Hume sets out to refute a theory Wollaston never held”—his discussion of Wollaston’s 
                                            
173 Tilley argues that Feinberg only asserts this and does not offer an argument explaining why 
Hume's argument is wrong.  Tilley, “Physical Objects,” 92.   
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theory is affected by this claim and leads him to think Wollaston is speaking of actions as 
“symbolic” and that actions are meaningful only if an observer can interpret this meaning; he then 
discusses the difficulties of interpreting the nature of actions merely by viewing them (351).   
 He recognizes that Wollaston’s moral standard is acting in accordance with nature, but not 
the connection between nature and truth, that is, that true statements describe nature accurately and 
that truth and nature therefore are coextensive; instead, he interprets Wollaston as regarding 
violation of truth as an offence against truth itself in similarity to his own view.   
 His statement that Wollaston’s theory lacks “criteria of relative ‘worth’ and ‘importance’” 
indicates that he overlooked that Wollaston’s happiness standard, which is stated in Section II or 
RND, does provide these criteria, even though his source does contain excerpts from RND Section 
II.   
 Feinberg’s paper is an important step towards replacing dismissals of Wollaston based on 
straw men with consideration of his actual ideas.   
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E.  THE DESCRIPTION ERROR 
 A persistent criticism of RND claims that RND’s moral standard can be met by expressing 
a proposition about an immoral action that is true; because the proposition accurately describes the 
action it constitutes a true proposition and thus meets the standard which is allegedly that of taking 
actions which express true propositions.  However, this criticism is based on misunderstanding 
what RND’s rule is.   
 This argument was first made by John Clarke of Hull, who said that actions can be 
interpreted in various ways to express any truth desired, and that vicious actions can be said to 
express some truth, especially concerning the desires of the actor.  So that, for instance, breaking 
a bargain constitutes  
an affirmation of this proposition, that the breach of the bargain was a likely means 
to rook his chapman of some money,
174
   
 
and that  
every [immoral] action or omission does as well affirm truth as deny it; for instance 
this truth, that the person concerned proposes or promises to himself some interest 
or advantage.
175
   
 
And because the propositions that constitute these descriptions of the actions are true, then the 
actions are virtuous.   
 This argument has been revived by modern commentators such as Beiser: 
Hence a mugger who points his knife at me in an alley signifies by his action the 
true proposition “If you do not hand over your money, then I will stab you.”176   
 
                                            
174 Clarke, Examination, 15.   
175 Ibid., 17.   
176 Beiser, Sovereignty of Reason, 303.   
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And Tilley (who cites Clarke):  
Unless Wollaston gives us a non-capricious method for identifying the 
proposition(s) an action signifies, it seems to be anyone’s guess whether an 
action—the breach of a bargain, say—signifies the falsehood “The bargain was not 
made” or instead signifies the truth “To breach this bargain is a way of cheating 
so-and-so.”177   
 
 The argument is that an immoral action may be described by a true proposition, and that 
because the proposition is true the action is moral because it allegedly meets RND’s rule, that rule 
being defined as acting according to truth.  However, RND’s rule is negative—it requires not 
performing any action which expresses a proposition which is false (and which affects human 
happiness)—it does not constitute a requirement to express true propositions.   
 Wollaston anticipated this objection and addressed it in his third objection and answer.  
He states the objection thus:   
If I want money, don't I act according to truth, if I take it from some body else to 
supply my own wants? And more, do not I act contrary to truth, if I do not? 
(I.xi.obj.3).   
 
And responds to it: 
Ans. to objection the 3d. Acting according to truth, as that phrase is used in the 
objection, is not the thing required by my rule; but, so to act that no truth may be 
denied by any act. Not taking from another man his money by violence is a 
forbearance, which does not signify, that I do not want money, or which denies any 
truth. But taking it denies that to be his, which (by the supposition) is his. The 
former is only as it were silence, which denies nothing: the latter a direct and loud 
assertion of a falsity; the former what can contradict no truth, because the latter 
does.   
 
 Hence, in the examples given by the critics, that the action may be expressing a true 
proposition of evil intent or effect, does not meet the moral rule.  Only not expressing a 
proposition which denies what is true meets the moral rule, and these actions do all express 
                                            
177 Tilley, “Problem of Inconsistency,” 279n8.   
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propositions which deny truths, such as, that the property belongs to the other person, that the 
person is a rational, sensitive, happiness-seeking being, or that the statements made to the person 
are false (the cheat makes statements which deny the truth that the statements he makes are false).   
 A variation on this argument is made by using the existence of terms which refer to 
immoral acts to argue that the agent is asserting a proposition which correctly uses that term and 
therefore is expressing a truth.   
 For example, Feinberg argues:     
Suppose Hume, to make things perfectly clear to his neighbor's wife, shuts the 
windows, pulls the blinds, and then announces: “I hereby declare that I am not your 
husband and you are not my wife, and that I am not about to treat you as if you were 
my wife, but rather I am going to act as if you are what you are in fact, namely, my 
mistress,” and then proceeds to “take his liberties.”  It would be difficult to see in 
what way, then, Hume could be accused of acting “contrary to truth” (349).   
 
 Feinberg’s argument depends on the existence of a term for describing that particular 
wrong action.  It may be made clearer if one unpacks the term “mistress."  That a woman is 
married means she has taken a solemn oath to have relations only with her husband.  What would 
constitute treating her as what she is, namely, a woman who has taken a solemn oath to have 
relations only with her husband?  Not having relations with her.  To have relations with her 
means to deny (by action) that she has taken a solemn oath to have relations only with her husband. 
To express by words an acknowledgment that she has taken that oath does not counter the action 
which denies it, because actions create states of affairs, whereas words merely express mental 
states (see Chapter III.D.4 above).  The term "mistress" actually constitutes an acknowledgment 
that she has taken that oath, and that she is not being treated as someone who has taken that oath.  
Thus, the term itself acknowledges that the relationship with her constitutes denying a truth—that 
she is married to another man—and that therefore engaging in this relationship is immoral.   
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 The argument is based on misconstruing RND’s rule as being met by stating propositions 
which accurately describe an action, whereas the rule requires not performing acts which express 
propositions which are false and thus deny things to be what they are, and which affect human 
happiness.   
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CHAPTER VI.  CONCLUSION 
 I have demonstrated that Wollaston’s moral theory is an interesting attempt to create a rule 
for carrying out the foundational principle of acting according to nature by defining conformity to 
truth as conformity to nature, and by devising the innovative principle that rational agents express 
propositions by their actions.  As the truth values of the propositions that are expressed by actions 
can be evaluated, and as the truthfulness of the propositions expressed by the actions constitutes 
their conformity to nature, and as conformity to nature is the definition of morality, this enables 
judgment of the moral status of the actions (see Chapter III above).  
 Wollaston’s innovation is the idea that actions express propositions.  This makes it 
possible to assign truth values to actions.  This is joined to the principle that truth is coextensive 
with nature, which is based on defining a true statement as one that describes nature accurately.  
(This is a foundational principle that is stated in the second proposition of RND (I.ii).)  From 
which it follows that expressing true propositions constitutes acting in accordance with nature and 
expressing false propositions constitutes acting contrary to nature.  The propositions that actions 
express are true or false, and therefore the propositions that actions express are either in 
accordance with nature (if true) or contrary to nature (if false).  This, then, provides a method of 
determining whether actions are in accordance with nature.  An action is in accordance with 
nature if the proposition it expresses is true and therefore in accordance with nature as defined in 
proposition I.ii, and an action is contrary to nature if the proposition it expresses is false and 
therefore contrary to nature.  Given the foundational principle that the standard of morality is 
accordance with nature, then actions which express true propositions (which, being true, are in 
accordance with nature) are morally right, and actions which express false propositions (which, 
being false, are contrary to nature), are morally wrong.  Also, as it is the nature of human beings to 
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seek happiness, and as acting in accordance with nature is the means of attaining happiness, 
happiness sets the standard by which the degree of the moral rightness or wrongness of actions is 
evaluated.  The greater the unhappiness caused by a morally wrong action the greater the 
immorality.   
 In addition, I have also demonstrated that the prevalent criticisms of RND which have 
caused it to be largely disregarded do not engage the theory and are often directed at straw men 
(see Chapter V above).   
 Why did RND prove so vulnerable to straw men?  How did the philosopher who at one 
time was regarded as having made considerable progress towards the task of deriving morality 
demonstratively, via natural reason, come to be mocked, discarded, and forgotten?  There are a 
number of reasons which probably led to this outcome.     
 As discussed in Chapter III.A above, the argument of RND is difficult to follow because 
the order in which the argument is presented is the reverse of the structure of the argument.  The 
moral rule which is the conclusion of the argument is presented first, in section I, and its premises 
are presented in Sections II and III.  When the premises are presented, the moral rule is not 
repeated, and the connection between the moral rule and its premises is not clearly stated.   
 The standard of the moral rule, i.e., happiness, is presented in Section II, after the rule 
itself.  Much material is interposed between the two, and the proposition which states that 
happiness is the moral standard occurs in the middle of Section II (II.x).  This arrangement leads 
some critics to miss the connection between the two sections, overlook the argument that 
happiness is the standard for the moral rule, and thus to claim that the argument is circular because 
it assumes moral standards 
 The argument for the validity of reason is presented in Section III, following the argument 
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for the moral rule in Section I, and the standard for the rule in Section II.  Yet it underlies the 
entire argument, which is that this moral rule can be derived by reason alone.   
 Thus, the conclusion which is presented in the first section depends on principles 
established in both the second and third sections, and the principle established in the second 
section depends on the principle established in the third section.  Because the premises follow the 
conclusion it is easy for readers to miss the connections.   
 It is also difficult to keep track of the connections among nature, reason, truth, and 
happiness because the presentation of the argument lacks clarity.  Important parts of it, such as the 
definition of nature, are presented in scattered statements and sometimes expressed only briefly, 
and the connections among the different parts of the argument are not always made explicit.  
 In addition, Wollaston does sometimes equate truth, reason, and happiness (he argues that 
they are coextensive), which also obscures the order of the argument and makes it difficult to tell 
which has priority, which part justifies which, and also leads to criticism that the argument is 
circular.  This difficulty is illustrated by the twentieth-century literature on Wollaston, in which 
three commentators reach three different conclusions about the relative priorities of truth and 
happiness within Wollaston’s theory.  Thompson178 argues that truth has priority over happiness.  
Joynton
179
 argues that happiness has priority over truth.  Tweyman
180
 argues that they have equal 
weight.  
 In some propositions Wollaston states that any and all denial of truth is wrong.  This 
obscures the argument that it is only denial of truths concerning the happiness of human beings 
                                            
178 Thompson, Ethics of Wollaston, 4.   
179 Joynton, “Problem of Circularity.”   
180 Tweyman, “Truth, Happiness and Obligation.”   
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that is the subject of the moral rule.  This may lead to the claim that his rule is about making false 
statements, that is, lying, rather than taking actions which deny the true state of affairs concerning 
human beings.   
 This problem was recognized soon after RND’s publication.  In the introduction to the 
abridgement of RND that was published in 1726, the anonymous abridger states:  
And if this Author has somewhere laid too much stress on abstracted truth, and 
determined too rigorously (more rigorously perhaps than his own principles in the 
main might require) in an instance or two...; it may be an argument that he is not 
infallible, but is no diminution of the truth of his principles...; he has made further 
amends by what he has said of happiness and reason; and by his doctrine that the 
degrees of guilt arising from the violation of truth vary with the importance of 
things.
181
   
 
 RND is not a fully developed work.  The term “Delineated” in the title indicates that it was 
a rough draft.
182
  Statements at the beginning and end of it indicate it was written at the request of 
an individual and was addressed to him, and not intended as a public treatise.
183
  Wollaston's 
death soon after the publication of RND meant that he could not defend it nor revise it to meet 
objections by making the argument clearer. 
 I have found no evidence that Wollaston attracted any followers who developed his theory, 
nor evidence that after 1725 there were published any refutations of the straw men that were 
presented as his theory, which allowed these misrepresentations to prevail over time.      
 The initial acceptance and popularity of RND may have been superficial.  Wollaston 
                                            
181 Compendious, A2-3.  This quote begins on an unnumbered page between A2 and A3.  
Spelling, capitalization, punctuation, and italics have been modernized.   
182 “Sensible how unfinished this performance is, I call it only a Delineation, or rude draught” 
(RND, [Preface]).   
183 An explanation of the circumstances which led to a slightly corrected public edition is in the 
“Advertisement” at the beginning of RND.   
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combines ethical theory and ethical instruction in one book.  The four chapters in which the 
theory is explicated are followed by five chapters in which Wollaston presents arguments 
concerning God, political theory, family relations, and personal conduct, including lengthy 
arguments for the existence of God and the immorality of the soul; these five sections constitute 
nearly three-quarters of the book.   
 Chapin characterizes Wollaston’s views on religious issues as “orthodox in a distinctively 
Anglican manner,”184 and specifically notes that he  
argues for a future state of rewards and punishments, for the immateriality and 
immortality of the soul, for a particular providence, and for the efficacy of prayer.  
He gives a thoroughly orthodox “answer” to the problem of evil, and his position on 
free will, eschewing the predestinarian doctrines associated with 
seventeenth-century Puritanism, is that of the great majority of eighteenth-century 
Anglicans.
185
   
 
Woelfel, who was an Episcopalian minister, describes Wollaston’s views as “orthodox, albeit very 
latitudinarian.”186 
 Thus, RND may have been accepted as arguing for established religious views,
187
 with 
Wollaston’s innovative moral rule not really understood and the argument for it not analyzed and 
considered apart from the moral instruction.  The praise of Wollaston is often general—of his 
moral views as good and of his character as virtuous, learned, and pious—but this does not 
constitute a discussion of the argument for his moral rule.   
                                            
184 Chapin, “Was Wollaston a Deist?” 73.   
185 Ibid.   
186 Woelfel, “William Wollaston’s Religion of Nature,” 249.   
187 For example, Bott, in his conclusion, praises Wollaston’s "particular excellencies...the 
principal of them...his dissertation concerning a providence...where he has discovered a great 
reach of thought; and what he says concerning a future state” (22).   
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 His political theory (in Sections VI and VII of RND), may have been more influential.  As 
discussed in Chapter II.A above, his property rights theory was cited in a major copyright case, at 
a time when the principle of copyright was being established.  The similarity between the views 
expressed by Wollaston in Sections VI and VII of RND (see Chapter IV.B-C above) and the views 
expressed in the Declaration of Independence, and the presence of RND in the curricula of the 
colleges that educated many of the leaders of American society (see Chapter II.A above), suggest 
that his political theory may have had some influence on American thought.     
 Over time generational shifts took place.  At the beginning of the nineteenth century RND 
was 75 years old and natural religion had ceased to be a source of moral theory.   
 RND was read less and less and Hume’s and others’ misrepresentations of Wollaston’s 
argument (see Chapter V above) prevailed.  The views expressed by some subsequent 
commentators give the impression that they are based on the straw men rather than on Wollaston’s 
actual position.     
 By the twentieth century received opinions concerning RND were that it was worthless and 
had been refuted and so it was not studied seriously (only excerpts of it were available in 
anthologies
188
), which let the received opinions stand.  Hume’s prominence led his attack on 
RND to be regarded as authoritative, although Hume did not read RND and his attack is on a straw 
man (see Chapter V.A above).     
                                            
188 The anthology of British moralists edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge was first published in 1897.  
Another anthology, edited by Benjamin Rand, of philosophers ranging from ancient to modern, 
was published in 1909.  A more recent anthology of British moralists, edited by D. D. Raphael, 
first published in 1969, is still in print.  All of these anthologies printed excerpts of Sections I and 
II of RND.  In 1974 a facsimile edition of RND in its entirety, edited by Stanley Tweyman, was 
published.  In the last few years, electronic scans of eighteenth-century editions of RND have 
become readily available.  See the Bibliography below and Chapter II above.   
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 This is unfortunate, because in addition to its intrinsic interest for its innovative attempt to 
provide a way to evaluate the moral status of actions by reason, and its largely  unrecognized 
position in the history of rationalism, RND is also of interest as a precursor of contemporary moral 
realism and offers an interesting addition to it.     
 Eighteenth-century rationalism is considered to be the precursor of contemporary moral 
realism.
189
  It is therefore interesting to compare in what ways Wollaston’s views prefigure those 
expressed in one of the most cited papers in contemporary moral realism, Peter Railton’s “Moral 
Realism”.190   
 Railton is an advocate of “naturalized moral epistemology” (200).  He holds that moral 
inquiry is an empirical inquiry and that moral properties supervene on natural properties and may 
be reducible to them.     
 Wollaston holds that moral properties can be deduced from natural facts:  
[I]f things are but fairly permitted to speak for themselves their own natural 
language, they will, with a moderate attention, be found themselves to proclaim 
their own rectitude or obliquity; that is, whether they are disagreeable to it, or not 
(I).   
 
And that these properties are relational:  
In order to judge rightly what any thing is, it must be considered not only what it is 
in itself or in one respect, but also what it may be in any other respect, which is 
capable of being denied by facts or practice: and the whole description of the thing 
ought to be taken in (I.vi).   
 
Similarly, Railton defines his approach thus: 
                                            
189 Christine M. Korsgaard, “Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral 
Philosophy,” The Journal of Philosophical Research, Philosophy in America at the Turn of the 
Century, The Philosophy Documentation Center (2003): 99.   
190 Peter Railton, “Moral Realism.”      
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I will argue for a form of moral realism which holds...that moral properties are 
objective, though relational; that moral properties supervene upon natural 
properties, and may be reducible to them; that moral inquiry is of a piece with 
empirical inquiry (165).   
 
The idea of causal interaction with moral reality certainly would be intolerably odd 
if moral facts were held to be sui generis; but there need be nothing odd about 
causal mechanisms for learning moral facts if these facts are constituted by natural 
facts, and that is the view under consideration (171).   
 
 Railton’s method of arriving at a realist account of morality is to begin with a realist 
account of non-moral values—what is desirable or good for a person; this constitutes an objective 
account of subjective interest (176).  What satisfies an objective interest of a person is 
non-morally good for that person.  Subjective interest is related to objective interest via a process 
in which people adjust their desires to their interests through trial and error, that is, their opinion of 
what course of action is good for them is subject to change based on the results their actions 
produce.  This process of adjustment may be done either through active reflection or without 
reflection.  People's objective interests supervene upon natural facts (183). 
 This is consonant with Wollaston’s position that a person’s good (defined as happiness) 
can only be attained by treating things as what they are, that is, acting in accordance with nature: 
As the true and ultimate happiness of no being can be produced by any thing, that 
interferes with truth, and denies the natures of things: so neither can the practice of 
truth make any being ultimately unhappy (II.xi).   
 
[T]he way to happiness and the practice of truth incur the one into the other (II.xiv).   
 
 Railton argues that the same feedback process of adjusting behavior operates socially as 
well as individually.  It is characteristic of morality that it expresses a social point of view.  This 
viewpoint is not subjective or arbitrary—it expresses what is “rational from an impartial point of 
view” (202).  Ideally, morality would express what would be agreed upon were all persons’ 
interests to be considered equally and rationally (190).  Over time, it is likely that practice and 
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observation lead to adjusting social criteria of morality so as to move them closer to the rational 
ideal (196-7). 
 Similarly, Wollaston’s theory leads to the position that the interests of all human beings 
have equal moral weight: 
Whatever is either reasonable or unreasonable in B with regard to C, would be just 
the same in C with respect to B, if the case was inverted (IV.iv).   
 
Whatever is inconsistent with the general peace and welfare (or good) of mankind, 
is inconsistent with the laws of human nature, wrong, intolerable (VI.iii).   
 
(Also see Chapter IV.B above.)   
 Railton argues that there is evidence in favor of this view.  For instance, over time the 
generality of moral views has increased—the definition of a human being has been successively 
expanded from one's own tribe to encompass all of humanity (197).  Also, a process of 
humanization of morality has taken place—human well-being has become the primary source of 
moral justification as there has been a corresponding move away from other sources (197-8).  
How then to account for moral disagreement objectively rather than subjectively?  The subject 
matter of morality is complex and quite far removed from direct observation (195).  Also, as a 
social creation it is less subject to external correction than individual behavior (196).   
 Wollaston’s view is that human nature (acting within all of nature) is the foundational 
source of morality: 
Again, there are some ends, which the nature of things and truth require us to aim 
at, and at which therefore if we do not aim, nature and truth are denied (I.v);   
as 
[t]ruth is but a conformity to nature (I.iv).   
Likewise, Railton concludes: 
We are natural and social creatures, and I know of nowhere else to look for ethics 
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than in this rich conjunction of facts (207).   
 
Thus, both Wollaston and Railton, despite the two and a half centuries difference between them, 
propose moral theories which are based on establishing correspondence between human behavior 
and the facts of the world as the means of attaining what Wollaston defines as happiness and 
Railton as the good for persons.   
 Wollaston’s overlooked innovation, the principle that actions express propositions,191 
offers possibilities for a different method of evaluating the moral status of actions which could 
serve as a means of more fully realizing moral realism’s project of empirical moral inquiry by 
providing a more precise connection between actions and moral conclusions of the sort that 
Railton, for example, argues for.
192
   
 The principle that actions express propositions to the same extent that verbal statements 
express propositions bridges the gap between ideas in the mind and the facts of the world (i.e., 
nature).  It defines the actions of moral agents as natural events which can thus be evaluated in the 
same way that all natural objects and events are evaluated.  These actions of agents can then be 
evaluated as to whether they are consistent or inconsistent with all other parts of nature.  The 
correspondence between the truthfulness or falsehood of the propositions that moral agents 
express by their actions and the empirical facts of the world, provides a focused method of 
evaluating the moral status of such actions in accordance with the empirical standard of moral 
realism.  In addition, the principle that actions express propositions with more reality than verbal 
                                            
191 Feinberg characterizes this as “the most suggestive point in Wollaston.”  “Wollaston’s 
Critics,” 350.   
192 “I will argue for a form of moral realism which holds...that moral properties are objective, 
though relational; that moral properties supervene upon natural properties, and may be reducible to 
them; that moral inquiry is of a piece with empirical inquiry” (165).   
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propositions, because actions create states of affairs, provides a method to judge the moral status of 
actions by agents when they conflict with verbal statements expressed by those agents.   
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